The Logic of Access to European Commission Expert Groups: Assessing the Delay of the eCall Project

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Abstract

This paper argues that the "logic of access" theory drawn up by Pieter Bouwen (2002) can be applied to expert groups set up by the European Commission. Before the hypothesis is tested in a case study, the theory is extended in two ways. Whereas Bouwen focuses on the exchange channels that business interests choose to gain access to the different institutions, this paper concentrates on the needs of the European institutions during the selection process of their preferred negotiation partners. Secondly, it is extended to contain a dynamic element – whereas Bouwen concentrates on a single choice that business interests make at the onset of a campaign, it argues that changed information needs of the European Commission can lead to changes in negotiation partners – also during a negotiation process.

The logic of access theory is applied in a case study which focuses on the negotiations surrounding the pan-European in-vehicle emergency call eCall. It has been negotiated within the framework of three successive expert groups under the auspices of the Information Society and Media Directorate General since 2003. Focus of the case study analysis will be to examine the reasons for the slow progress in the negotiations.

The analysis of the case study is divided in two stages: Firstly, the institutional structures of the negotiation panels and the stakeholders' positions are analysed to rule out that they might influence the European Commission's selection of negotiation partners and to identify the reasons for the slow progress in said negotiations. For these purposes the Actor-centred Institutionalism framework (Scharpf 2000) is employed. The analysis brings to light that those stakeholders that had selected eCall in the first place ceased to support it actively in the subsequent implementation panels. This shift in positions was paralleled with a shift of the private interest representation from individual companies to organised representation through the respective European industry associations. Additionally, weak institutional governance rules during the negotiation phase slowed down the negotiation pace. The second step then analyses the shift from individual interest representation to organised interest representation employing Bouwen's framework.

The paper also takes up a question by Bouwen regarding the applicability of his theory to non-business interests and explains the Member States'

role in the negotiations. Finally, in order to present a well-rounded overview of the issue at stake, this paper concludes with an examination of recent developments of eCall outside the negotiation panels analysed.

Zusammenfassung

Der Beitrag bringt den theoretischen Rahmen der Zugangslogik von Pieter Bouwen (2002) und Expertengruppen, die von der Europäischen Kommission gegründet wurden, zusammen. Bevor die Hypothese anhand einer Fallstudie getestet wird, wird die Theorie zunächst dem Zwecke des Beitrags entsprechend weiterentwickelt. Wo sich Bouwen auf den Kanäle konzentriert, die private Unternehmen wählen, um Zugang zu den verschiedenen europäischen Institutionen zu erhalten, stehen hier die Bedürfnisse der Europäischen Institutionen, aufgrund derer sie die für sie idealsten Verhandlungspartner auswählen, im Fokus. Des Weiteren wird das theoretische Konzept um ein dynamisches Element ausgeweitet – wo Bouwen sich auf eine Wahl der privaten Interessen zu Beginn einer Kampagne konzentriert, argumentiert dieser Beitrag, dass der veränderte Informationsbedarf der Europäischen Kommission zu einem Wechsel der Verhandlungspartner führen kann – auch während eines Verhandlungsprozesses.

Die Theorie der Zugangslogik wird anhand einer Fallstudie angewandt deren Gegenstand das pan-europäische, fahrzeugintegrierte Notrufsystem eCall ist. Seit 2003 wird es in drei aufeinander folgenden Expertengruppen unter der Schirmherrschaft der Generaldirektion Informationsgesellschaft und Medien verhandelt. Als ein Teil der Fallanalyse werden die Gründe für den langsamen Fortschritt der Verhandlungen identifiziert.

Die Fallanalyse ist in zwei Schritte unterteilt: Zunächst werden die institutionellen Strukturen und die Positionierungen der Hauptakteure analysiert um auszuschließen, dass sie die Wahl der Verhandlungspartner der Europäischen Kommission beeinflussen und um die Gründe für den langsamen Fortschritt der Verhandlungen zu identifizieren. Hierfür wird der Akteurszentrierte Institutionalismus (Scharpf 2000) verwandt.

Die Analyse ergibt, dass die Akteure, die eCall zunächst ausgewählt hatten, die aktive Unterstützung des Systems in den anschließenden Verhandlungsgremien aufgaben. Diese Positionsverschiebung war in einer Verschiebung der Vertretung der Industrieinteressen begründet: Während diese in der Auswahlphase noch durch einzelne Unternehmen geschah, wurde sie in der Verhandlungsphase von den europäischen Verbänden wahrgenommen. Parallel führten schwache institutionelle Regeln in den Verhandlungsgremien zu einer Lähmung der Verhandlungen. Im zweiten Schritt wird die Verschiebung der Repräsentation von einzelnen Unternehmen zu europäischen Verbänden mit dem Konzept der Zugangslogik erklärt.

Am Ende wird die von Bouwen mehrfach aufgebrachte Frage nach der Anwendbarkeit seines theoretischen Rahmens auf Interessen, die nicht aus

der Privatwirtschaft stammen, adressiert und die Rolle der EU Mitgliedsstaaten in den Verhandlungen erklärt. Der Beitrag schließt mit einigen Kommentaren zur Verallgemeinerung der Ergebnisse und aktuellen Entwicklungen von eCall, die außerhalb der analysierten Gremien stattfanden.

1 Introduction

Over the past years, we have seen the spread and often repeated use of closed consultation committees that provide expertise to the European Commission during the first stages of a policy making process. Because most of their activities go unnoticed, they are one example often cited in discussions about the lack of transparency and legitimacy of the European policy making process. Looking into the reasons for the creation of such fora Broscheid and Coen (2002: 17) argue that as an answer to an ever growing quantity of lobbying activities, the European Commission created restricted-access fora to reduce the number of actors with which it needed to interact on particular issues. This increased efficiency and decreased the transaction costs that the Eurpean Commission had to invest for particular expert advice.

A special kind of these closed consultation committees are expert groups.[1] They can be made up of representatives from Member State governments, academia and various interests groups (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2008: 5). Their primary aim is to provide expertise on particular matters to the European Commission but also to prepare initiatives, to mobilise support for the policy in question and to build consensus (Larsson 2003: 20). In return, the organisations engaged in the groups expect that their position and expertise is taken up in the legislative proposals drafted by the European Commission. This resource dependence perspective on the internal work process of expert groups entails that the European Commission is dependent on the input of its negotiation partners in order to draw up effective regulation (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 258). The same assumption regarding resource dependencies forms the basis of the "logic of access" theory (Bouwen 2002). Argued from the angle of private inter-

[1] Another form of committees working under the auspices of the European Commission are comitology committees. There are also different Council Committees and Committees organized by the European Parliament.

ests, it explores the apparent ad hoc lobbying behaviour of private interests vis-à-vis the European institutions. It identifies three different kinds of information and assumes that since each institution has a specific role in the policy-making process, each institution has a specific input demand when consulting external expertise. Consequently, the theory develops hypotheses on how business interests can most efficiently organise their input in order to gain access to the European institutions.

This paper will argue that the different kinds of interests identified and the mechanisms described by Bouwen can also be applied to the European Commission's selection process of members for expert groups. It also argues that changed information needs of the European Commission can lead to changes in negotiation partners – also during a negotiation process.

To apply Bouwen's concept, the selection and negotiation of the pan-European in-vehicle emergency call (eCall) is analysed as a case study. The advantage of this case study is that the Commission set up different panels along the negotiation process. This makes it possible to study the selection of experts at three different points during the negotiation process of a system that basically requires the same stakeholders all along the process. Thus, the main variables (stakeholders and issue) remain constant while other variables (institutional structures and interest demand by the European Commission and stakeholder's positions) may change.

In order to rule out that the institutional structures of the negotiation panels or the stakeholders' positions influence the European Commission's choice of negotiation partners, both will be analysed based on the Actor-centred Institutionalism (Scharpf 2000) in section five.

The analysis finds that whilst the institutional structures of the negotiation panels basically remain unchanged, a shift towards organised representation occurs among the main industrial stakeholders that entails a change of their positions on the emergency call system. The following part employs Pieter Bouwen's logic of access theory to explain this shift in stakeholder representation and the analysis gives some answers regarding Bouwen's question on the applicability of his theory to non-

business interests. Finally, the conclusion presents an overview of recent developments of eCall outside the negotiation panels analysed.

2 Methodology and eCall study motives

The decision to concentrate on a single case study was taken in view of the existing criticism towards this approach, such as the usefulness of research based on one study, its lack of potential to draw generalisations and theories, arbitrariness in the choice of case studies (Gerring 2007; Flyvbjerg 2006; Yin 1994 etc). Nevertheless, this paper is designed to test the use of a particular theory in a field to which it has not been applied to before. Thus, using a case study remains the key instrument to conduct the required fact-based analysis.

eCall was chosen because the selection of stakeholders for one particular issue can be studied at three different stages during the development of a policy. Thus, although eCall may represent one single issue, its particular negotiation process leads to 3 case studies in one. Furthermore, only through a single case study can the dense volume of material on the eCall case be analysed in a way that new insights and foundations for further, possibly comparative research can be laid.[2]

3 The theoretical context

The case study will be analysed first with the help of a policy-oriented framework. It contextualises the institutional structures and the positions of the key actors around eCall to rule out that the institutional structures of the negotiation panels or the stake-

[2] For the analysis, official documents such as communications from the European Commission, information pamphlets and position papers as well as unofficial papers such as protocols, and presentations were used to document the changes. Most documents were found on the websites of the eSafety Forum (http://www.esafetysupport.org/en/ecall_toolbox/) and that of DG INFSO (http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/esafety/ecall/index_en.htm).

holders' positions influence the European Commission's choice of negotiation partners. For this analysis, the Actor-centred Institutionalism (Scharpf 2000) is applied.

Scharpf's framework assumes that social phenomena are the result of the interactions between actors who act intentionally. The institutional structures in which these interactions occur, define the rules, the actor constellations, action orientations and their resources. In fact, these structures are defined as a generic term that describes the key influences on the actors (2000:78). This quite broad definition of the term is, depending on each research question, limited in terms of time and space but it is not limited by the theoretical framework itself. Although this could be interpreted as a deficit on the theoretical level, it can be very helpful when attempting to include all observations from the "real world" in a theoretical concept.

As a central proposition, Scharpf (2000: 83f.) argues that the information about the institutions which act as framework for negotiations often suffice to analyse central aspects of a policy. Thus, a researcher should first explore those institutional frameworks and only in case some questions remained unclear, turn to an analysis of the most important actors involved. This prioritisation will be adopted for the analysis of the panels of the eCall negotiations.

As the actual focus of the paper, the "logic of access" theory (Bouwen 2002) is applied to the eCall expert groups in section seven. It was developed to explain the logic behind the apparent ad hoc lobbying behaviour of private interests vis-à-vis the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Basis of the provision is the assumption that both sides need goods from the other side. For access to the EU agenda setting and policy-making process, corporate actors provide *access goods* to the European institutions. Bouwen defines three kinds of access goods: (1) Expert knowledge on technical and systematic details that private companies can best provide, (2) Information about the European Encompassing Interest (IEEI)[3] that

[3] The encompassing interest according to Bouwen is an interest that aggregates the positions of a number of representatives from one sector. If these

European associations can best provide and (3) Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI) that are best provided by national associations.

Since the European institutions need these goods in different intensities along the policy-making process, Bouwen prioritises the different access goods for the three institutions (and with it, he sets forth a theoretical ranking of which organisational forms of private interests should have the best access to which European institution).

Because the negotiations on eCall are being held under the auspices of the European Commission and the other institutions are not involved, this paper concentrates on the provisions of the framework for this institution of the European Union. For the European Commission, Bouwen assumed a primary demand for expert knowledge (thus input from individual firms), followed by IEEI (European industry associations) and IDEI (national institutions) in its initial paper. When he empirically tested the assumptions by interviewing Commission staff from the EU financial services sector on the frequency with which they were in contact with each of the three organisational forms of private interest (and that of consultancies), the results showed that the European Commission staff's contact with European associations was slightly more frequent than that with individual firms (Bouwen 2004).

Thus, in the case of eCall, the private interests most likely represent themselves or they are represented by European industry associations.

interests are limited to one state, it is a Domestic Encompassing Interest, if the interests aggregated from across the EU, it is a European Encompassing Interest.

Table 1: European Commission Staff Contact

	Primary Contact	**Ranking of Contacts**
Bouwen 2002 (theory)	Individual Firm	Individual Firm > European Associations > National Associations > Consultancies
Bouwen 2004 (empirical test)	European Associations	European Associations > Individual Firms > National Associations > Consultancies

For purposes of this analysis, the framework is somewhat modified in its focus: Whereas Bouwen focuses on the exchange channels that business interests select to gain access to the different institutions (the push-factor), this paper concentrates on the pull-function of the European institutions. As the good "access to the EU agenda setting and policy-making process" can only be provided by the EU institutions themselves but the access goods can be provided by a more or less large variety of corporations and organisations (depending on the subject), the author assumes a surplus of access goods on the industry's side. Thus, the European Commission is in a position in which it can decide from which actor it obtains its information. It will choose according to its needs and the degree of legitimacy with which an organisation can provide for these needs in the eyes of the European Commission. According to Bouwen, the features that determine this legitimacy are the variety of different members an organisation represents and the density of the interest group's membership (Bouwen 2002: 370).

Further, Bouwen does not make any statements about the influence of a change in information demand by the European Commission. This paper argues that when a change in information demand occurs, the European Commission may well react to it by adjusting its negotiation strategy accordingly by selecting those negotiation partners that best suit its new demands.

In Bouwen's theory the good that private interests receive – access to the EU agenda setting and policy-making process – stays a rather loose concept. But in the case of the Commission selecting experts for an expert group, it can be defined further. Although the members of these groups cannot take binding deci-

sions themselves, they are an influential factor in the legislative process because they provide the advice, information and experience on which the Commission bases its decisions (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2007: 6). Thus, for private interests being asked to participate in expert groups opens up a definitive channel through which the lawmaker can be provided with customised information on particular matters – and has a real chance that its information will be taken into account during the formulation of the ensuing policy.

The next section will describe key features of the eCall system before its negotiation process is analysed.

4 eCall – the system

eCall is an in-vehicle emergency system activated in the post-crash phase of a road accident focussing on minimising medical consequences for crash victims by securing faster rescue. eCall allows first responders to locate the site of an accident more precisely than via conventional emergency calls by employing satellite positioning systems. In case of a road accident, an alarm is either manually activated by the occupants of the vehicle or automatically triggered via sensors registering impact on the vehicle. Thus rescue efforts can be initiated without the active engagement of witnesses or victims. Subsequently, a voice connection based on the pan-European emergency number 112 is set up to the closest Public Service Answering Point (PSAP) and a Minimum Set of Data (MSD) including vehicle identification details and information on the time and position of the crash will be transmitted. With this information, first emergency services are able to respond more quickly and concertedly than they could have in the case of a conventional call. eCall proponents claim that with the system the response time can be reduced up to 50% in rural areas and up to 40% in urban areas (eSafety Support Office no date a). Additionally, accident-related costs may be reduced significantly, according to a study (Abele et al. 2004:114). This European Commission-commissioned study estimated that the EU-wide introduction of eCall could save about 2500 lives

annually, up to 22 billion Euros in accident costs and up to four billion Euros in congestion costs in case 100% of the European passenger car fleet were equipped with eCall. However, studies on the specific situations in individual Member States showed less potential for the system (Auerbach 2006: 153; McClure/Graham 2006: 6; Sihvola et al. 2009: 104).[4] As a rule of thumb, the more densely a country is populated, the less impact does a system have which is most efficient in remote areas. Further, with the ever-increasing penetration of mobile devices and mobile network coverage in Europe, situations in which witnesses or victims of accidents are not able to contact emergency services because there is no phone available, occur less and less frequently.

Nevertheless, the system was selected as the priority of the eSafety Forum in November 2002.[5] It was chosen from a list of 28 recommendations and at the time the year 2006 was proposed as an eventual introduction date (eSafety Support 2002d: 8). However, progress in the subsequent eCall Working Group was not made accordingly. In August 2004, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was released which called onto all stakeholders to actively contribute to the development of an implementation road map for eCall. After it had been signed by various representatives from key stakeholder groups, the European Commission announced that eCall was going to be integrated into all new vehicles destined for the European market from 2009 onwards (European Commission 2005). Only 14 months later, the intro-

[4] Auerbach states that according to the proportion of the EU-traffic that is allocated to Germany (17%), the calculation of the SEiSS-paper would accord a reduction of 340 road fatalities p.a. to eCall. However, the best-case scenario in Auerbachs calculations shows a reduction of only 201 road fatalities p.a.. The British study concluded a probable reduction of road fatalities by 3% p.a. (70 lives saved). The Finnish study calculates that 3.6% of all road fatalities in Finland could be prevented.

[5] The eSafety Forum was founded as one measure to respond to the target of the White Paper on European Transport Policy of 2001 to halve the number of road fatalities in the European Union by 2010. Its goal was to accelerate the development, deployment and dissemination of intelligent vehicle safety systems that use information and communication technologies (eSafety Support Website).

duction date was postponed to September 2010 and recent official estimates do not see a large-scale introduction of eCall before 2014 (European Commission 2009a).

Besides the application of the theoretical framework this paper will also focus on the reasons for this delay in progress. But first, the institutional structure in which the negotiations were held and the stakeholders' positions will be explored further in order to rule out the possibility that the European Commission changed its negotiation partners because of structural reasons or the stakeholder positions.

5 The group structures around eCall

The European Commission mandated three different groups to develop the eCall system. Each had specific tasks that built on the previous group's achievements:

1. The eSafety Working Group (eSafety WG) was formed in April 2002 to identify those systems that would be best suited to reduce the number of road fatalities on European Roads and to make one of these recommendations the priority of the ensuing eSafety Forum (eSafety Support 2002e).
2. The eCall Working Group (later renamed in eCall Driving Group or "eCall DG") was established in January 2003 after the selection of eCall. It was mandated to draw up measures that would ensure a pan-European introduction of eCall. It concluded its work after issuing a report with recommendations on this issue in 2006 (eSafety Support no date c).
3. The eCall implementation Platform (EEIP) was founded after three years of bilateral negotiations with the key stakeholder groups. It was mandated in 2009 to guide, coordinate and monitor the progress of the implementation of the eCall service across Europe (eSafety Support no date d).

Although the eSafety Forum is no part of this analysis because no crucial negotiations took part during its meetings, it is an integral part of the expert group structure around eCall as it is the umbrella group that had a coordinative function for the different work-

ing groups founded under the eSafety Forum (the eCall DG was one among 16 working groups).

Diagram one: The expert group structure focussing on eCall



5.1 The eSafety WG

As mentioned in the introduction, eCall was only one of 28 recommendations to save lives on European roads. The eSafety Working Group agreed to name eCall as the priority of the newly-founded eSafety Forum in its sessions during April and November 2002 (cf. diagram one). The group was made up of experts from the European Commission, the automotive and telecommunications industries, component suppliers, service industries, infrastructure operators, consumer organisations, automotive clubs, insurance providers, the European ITS association ERTICO, the European Automobile Manufacturer's Association ACEA and European Council for Automotive Research and Development EUCAR (DG INFSO 2002a: 2). In total, 68 representatives from 37 companies, organisations and governmental bodies (plus 16 representatives from DG INFSO) attended the three meetings of the eSafety Working Group of which attendance lists are available (eSafety Support 2002 a, b, c).

The meetings were chaired by the European Commission's Directorate General Information Society and Media (DG INFSO) and its institutional rules were laid down in the group's ToR (DG INFSO 2002a). Here, especially three specifications formed the frame of the working group: (1) admission restrictions ("mem-

bers are chosen on the basis of their expertise in the domain they represent" with a "balanced participation from private and public sectors") (2) the governance rules ("[a]ll members should be committed to the partnership model") and (3) restrictions on the temporal frame ("The eSafety Working Group will be established for a period of six months starting from June 2002"). Another provision that was not laid down in the ToR but which was nevertheless part of the institutional context in Scharpf' sense (2000: 78) was the need for the working group to find a project that could "sell the whole concept of eSafety" to the public (DG INFSO 2002b: 8). A further factor was the general inclination to connect different initiatives across the European Union sphere: A pan-European emergency call would operate on the widely discussed European satellite navigation service project (Galileo) and thus have the potential to boost the popularity of this initiative. A third factor that influenced the actors in their decision was the approval of the Universal Service Directive in the European Parliament a month before eCall was chosen as the eSafety flagship initiative. This directive instructed the Member States to facilitate the introduction of the pan-European emergency number 112. The number, in turn was a central prerequisite for the technical realisation of eCall.

5.2 The eCall DG

The eCall DG was created in January 2003. In that year, 58 representatives from 48 companies, organisations and governmental bodies (plus six representatives from DG INFSO) were registered in DG eCall (eSafety Support 2003: 33f.). When the eCall DG was terminated in 2006, a total number of 224 representatives from 137 companies, organisations and governmental bodies had become involved in the group (eSafety Support 2006).

The ToR goals aimed at developing and maintaining the eCall operational model and issuing recommendations for the introduction of eCall within a period of 24 months starting from January 2003 (i.e. January 2005 at the latest). The Working Groups are expected to meet at least four times per year. However, the recommendations were only issued in April 2006 (eCall DG 2006).

One structural reason for this delay can be found in the working group's governance form. The commitment to mutual cooperation meant that all decision taken by the group had to be taken unanimously. This provision and the provision that the chair selected of each Working Group could "invite at their discretion the relevant experts to participate in the groups" (eSafety Forum 2003a) formed a situation in which the high number of representatives mentioned above made efficient working impossible.

Obviously, another provision of the ToR – that the membership of the Working Groups was to be held relatively low to ensure efficient working (eCall DG 2003: 2) – was not obeyed.

In fact, ACEA already proposed in 2004 to add more representatives from key stakeholder groups and to "kick out dead weight" - participants who attended as observers to merely gain information and insight without providing such themselves (DG INFSO 2004a). In the ensuing discussion, a DG INFSO representative claimed that if the industry proposed an "enhanced group" with the same membership the original group should have had, the present group had failed. The Mobile Network Operators Association Europe (GSME) included a similar opinion about the forum's nature in their 2005 position on eCall. It characterised it as a "talk shop", noting that "the nature and organization of the eCall DG militate against [significant progress]" (GSME 2005).

One further provision in the ToR should be highlighted: "All Working Group participants are expected to share the general objectives of the eSafety Forum, and to be willing to actively contribute to its work." (eSafety Forum 2003a: 2). Obviously, this provision could not be put into reality: Towards the end of the projected eCall Driving Group period, it became necessary for the European Commission to issue a Memorandum of Understanding which aimed at recommitting the stakeholder groups to the basic values of the Driving Group (European Commission 2004: 3).[6] This is a clear indication for a lack of commitment and coherence within the group.

[6] The basic value of the policy network in this case is the common goal to work towards the implementation of a pan-European eCall service.

After the eCall Driving Group had been dismantled in 2006, the European Commission held bilateral negotiations with those stakeholders that it had identified as the most important ones because they were directly involved in forming the eCall service chain: The telecommunications and automobile industries, EU Member States and service providers operating as PSAPs. For any of these non-public negotiations, no formal rules were laid down or published and information about them is not plenty. However, indicators of successful negotiations with some of the Member States are seven further signatures of the MoU.[7] Vodafone as the first Network Operator also signed the MoU during this period.

5.3 The eCall Implementation Platform

Beginning from January 2009, the EEIP was initiated to guide, coordinate and monitor the progress of the implementation of the eCall service across Europe. Presumably in order to avoid the expansion of the eCall DG, the membership of the group was explicitly narrowed down to include only those companies, organisations or public bodies that had signed the MoU (EEIP 2009a). However, the provision entitled 99 of those 137 companies that had been present in the eCall DG to participate in the new forum rendering the provision rather useless as a measure to increase efficient working. It rather introduced new hurdles for the success of the new forum: As it did only differentiate between central and peripheral stakeholders with respect to the Member States (of which those that had not signed the MoU could participate in the meetings as observers), key industrial stakeholders from the telecommunications sector were excluded from the negotiations. Only Vodafone, but not the crucial industrial association GSME that was able to negotiate on behalf of the whole sector had signed the MoU so far.

A second innovation that was to prevent a forum equally inefficient as the Driving Group was a change in the forum's govern-

[7] Seven Countries (of currently 20) signed the MoU in 2007 and 2008: Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, the Slovak Republic and Spain.

ance form. It was still consensus-oriented but explicit instructions were made in case consensus could not be reached: A voting mechanism was to be utilised that would follow those rules applied by the Member States in the Council of the European Union[8]. Thus, in theory, the provisions in the ToR paved the way for a more stringent negotiation process.

However in practice, they did not. During the one and a half years, three meetings took place but no substantial progress was achieved.

Table 2: The institutional structures of the eCall negotiation fora

	eSafety WG	**eCall DG**	**EEIP**
Membership	37 companies, organisations and governmental bodies	137 companies, organisations and governmental bodies (until 2006)	99 companies, organisations and governmental bodies
Group Chair	European Commission (DG INFSO)	ERTICO, Belgacom (until 2004), ACEA (from 2004)	ERTICO, one Member State (2009: FI, 2010: CZ)
Key Stakeholder groups	telecom operators, vehicle manufacturers service providers, PSAPs	EU Member States, telecom operators, vehicle manufacturers, PSAPs	EU Member States, telecom operators, vehicle manufacturers, PSAPs
Governance form	Partnership model	Mutual cooperation	Consensus-oriented, if no consensus is possible: qualified majority of the national platforms
Access restrictions	Balanced participation from private, public sectors; Experts chosen by the chairperson	Experts invited by chairperson of the Group	Only companies, or organisations that signed the MoU, national platforms

[8] „If consensus is not possible, the platform will adopt its decisions by qualified majority of the national platforms following the rules and weighting applied by the member states in the Council of the European Union. Associated states will weight in a way defined by analogy in terms of population to the EU member states“. (EEIP 2009a).

5.4 Can the institutional structures explain the change in negotiation partners?

Although the selection phase panel and the two working groups in the negotiation phase basically had the same institutional structures (limited membership, a partnership model as governance form and similar constituencies), a change in industrial negotiation partners took place between the selection and implementation phases. Thus, the institutional structures cannot explain the shift from individual to organised representation during the negotiations on eCall.

6 Central stakeholders' positions

The following analysis will focus on the positions of the stakeholders from the automotive and telecommunications industries, the relevant European Member States and the PSAPs. Their direct participation in the eCall service chain is a good that is essential for the operation of the system - a "critical access good" (Bouwden 2002: 370). The stakeholders that have this good at their disposal have the most influence on the negotiation process. Thus, an analysis of their positions should provide a basis for a further analysis into European Commission's selection strategy of negotiation partners and it can illustrate the reasons for the delay in the eCall negotiations (Scharpf 2000: 83f).

Table 3: eCall cost and benefit assessments as judged by the European Commission.

Key Stakeholders	
Mobile Network Operators	Costs only
Automobile Manufacturers	Mainly costs, some hardware revenues
European Member States	Cost savings, less investments
Public Service	Only costs paid by public authorities and insurances
Service Operators	Revenues for service, cost operation
Minor Stakeholders	
Customer	Lives saved
In-vehicle Hardware/Mobile Phone Producer	Revenues
IT Service/ Infrastructure Provider	Revenues
Insurance Companies	Revenues & Cost savings

The cost-benefit assessment shows that those stakeholders burdened with the cost of the system would not enjoy substantial (if at all) financial benefits.[9]

6.1 Positions of the Telecommunications Industry

6.1.1 The eCall selection phase

During the selection phase the telecommunications sector was represented by Nokia, Vodafone Passo (until 2003 the telematics service division of Vodafone), TDF France Telecom and Orange.

In 2002, all companies represented in the eSafety Working Group were engaged in developing private emergency call solutions[10] and saw that without unified standards and the support of the Member States, business prospects were dim.

[9] The estimate of benefits and costs is deemed too positive by the industry. Insurers, for example do not see any revenues arising from eCall (eCall Steering Group 2005). The upgrade costs of the national PSAP infrastructures that are the main obstacle in Member-State involvement are not considered at all.
Diagram modified from DG INFSO 2004a: 2.

[10] As an example, Vodafone Passo was the telematics Service Provider (TSP) for BMW's ASSIST service, Orange was developing a service that

Accordingly, a Nokia representative described the experiences with an eCall system in the June meeting (eSafety WG 2002a). He argued that customers were not willing to pay for embedded in-vehicle emergency systems but that a public-private joint venture for such a service would be an option. A Vodafone Passo representative focussed on the need of a standardised platform in the car that could become a driver for telematics applications for vehicles (eSafety WG 2002a).

The Mobile Network Operators Association Europe GSME was not present in the panel.

6.1.2 The eCall negotiation phase

When the eCall Working Group was established in 2003, GSME published a position paper voicing harsh criticism of the eCall Working Group's composition. It argued that although "important presumptions" were made regarding network operators, there had been no substantial involvement of the telecommunications industry except for the telematics perspective and made it clear that the eCall Working Group's outcome did not reflect the views of the European mobile operator community (GSME 2003).

Nevertheless, four companies were present in the eCall DG: Vodafone Passo and Orange who had already been active in the selection phase and T-Mobile and Belgacom (eSafety Support 2003: 33f.). Belgacom, the largest Belgian mobile network operator even took over the working group's chairmanship together with ERTICO in hopes for new business opportunities (see above).

However, the European Commission defined the eCall system as a cost-only application for Mobile Network Operators (cf. table three) because it aimed at focussing on the low-cost solution of eCall as an emergency service only - without any additional services. The private industry had planned to use the eCall in-

allowed machine-to-machine communication over a wireless network without human intervention (M2M Connect; launched in 2004) and Nokia had been developing car telematics services with its Smart Traffic Products subsidiary since 1998.

vehicle platform as a basis for additional services that could generate the revenues in an otherwise unprofitable emergency call system (d'Oultremont 2003: 4, 7). Presumably as a consequence of this decision, Belgacom withdrew from the chairmanship and eCall DG as a whole in 2004 (DG INFSO 2004b: 2). It did not sign the MoU, either. Neither did the other three companies mentioned or the GSME.

In a 2005 position the association reiterated its opposition to the Working Group pointing out that in the group there were too many different interests, many direct competitors that were refusing to make estimates about costs for obvious reasons, that many representatives in the eCall DG had no clear mandate from their organisations (possibly referring to the Mobile Network Operators present in the negotiations) and that some organizations had left the project again (possibly referring to Belgacom) (GSME 2005: 3f.). However, it included in its position an annex with technical inputs on the eCall communication chain indicating that it was no longer refusing cooperation completely. It also became a member in the standardisation bodies. In the following two years it recommended an in-band modem/application for the transmission of the MSD (GSME 2006) and issued a reply to the standardisation fora's liaison statement on eCall Data Transfer (in which they had recommended another transmission method) (GSME 2007). In both statements GSME emphasised that the positions were no endorsement of the European Commission's approach to eCall and the ongoing negotiations but rather a "pragmatic response to it" (2007: 2).

However, GSME signed the eCall MoU in September 2009 after two main events had paved the way for it: In March of the same year, the standardisation panels and the European Commission released the specifications for the vehicle-PSAP-communication confirming the GSME demand to handle the MSD transmission via an in-band solution that could be realised on the existing cellular networks (eSafety Support: 2009b). In fact, the European Commission had made this GSME demand a basic requirement for the selection of the transmission method (Qualcomm 2008: 7). Secondly, only one month before the GSME signature, the European Commission announced in com-

munication that the heat was going to be turned up on the mobile network operators by issuing a recommendation to the Member States to set up guidelines on the transmission of emergency calls (European Commission 2009b: 10).

6.2 Positions of the Automobile Manufacturers

6.2.1 The eCall selection phase

During the selection phase Ford, PSA Peugeot-Citroën, Renault, BMW, DaimlerChrysler, Volkswagen, Fiat and ACEA were present as stakeholders from the automobile manufacturing sector.

Although ACEA was present, the individual manufacturers were the ones that explicitly supported the system (eSafety WG 2002a, 2002b). ACEA did not make any official statements. Reasons for the automotive manufacturer's support lay in hopes for new business opportunities because every manufacturer represented in the eSafety WG had dealt with the development of emergency call systems in their own telematics services in the past:

- DaimlerChrysler was operating an emergency call as part of its TELE AID-system.
- The emergency call application in BMW's Assist system was also fully operational.
- PSA had a fully developed an emergency call service which was to be introduced nine months later.
- Fiat was developing a system to optimize the efficiency of rescue operations in the EU-supported project AIDER (2001- 2004) and together with Renault, PSA Peugeot-Citroën, Seat, Volvo and Opel it was engaged in the EU-funded project E-MERGE (04/2002 - 08/2004) aiming at harmonising existing emergency call systems (ERTICO 2002: 1)
- Ford, Renault and Volkswagen had developed their emergency call systems, introduced them but by 2002, they had

been stopped operations due to a lack of demand in the European market.

This short list of activities illustrates two central motivations for the carmakers to throw their weight in for eCall: On the one hand, a lot of money had already been spent on private solutions that had largely not paid off and the European Commission had dedicated funds to develop an emergency call system before.

Now the automotive industry demanded pan-European standards, co-ordination between the Member States and interoperable emergency systems to multiply the demand for the system and bring down the costs (Folz 2002: 3, eSafety Forum 2003b). The eSafety Forum obviously seemed the right place to address these issues.

6.2.2 The eCall negotiation phase

After the eCall DG was established ACEA, representing the interests of the European automotive manufacturers, took over the negotiations. Although all manufacturers that had been represented in the eSafety WG as well as Toyota and Volvo were present in the eCall DG, no speeches or position papers were released from the individual companies. The negotiations were conducted via ACEA and it was also via ACEA that the European manufacturers signed the MoU.

However, accommodating the conflicting interests between those vehicle manufacturers that supported eCall and those that were not interested in such a service, ACEA took a more cautious stance towards eCall than the manufacturers in the selection process. Although ACEA was seemingly supportive of eCall, it made three very ambitious prerequisites for its engagement: (1) There should be public commitment for a parallel PSAP-upgrade in at least the five major markets in Europe, (2) the system implemented had to be a harmonised system, and (3) a low-cost hardware had to be developed and the financing of this hardware should be secured by those who benefited most from the service (referring to Member States, insurances, customers) (ERTICO 2004: 3).

Despite preconditions that were nowhere near fulfilment, ACEA took over the Working Group chairmanship when Belgacom withdrew from the group. Not the belief in the system but rather deliberation that the chairmanship meant more formal powers (such as the right to draft the group's reports) and with it, more control over the negotiations would have been behind the decision to take over this responsibility.

Following, ACEA successfully campaigned to introduce eCall as a "standard option", i.e. an optional system that the customer could select in each new type-approved vehicle (for a certain surcharge as customary for selected options) instead of making it standard equipment from the date of its market launch onwards to regain some of the investment costs associated with the system (eCall DG 2006: 13). Also, to meet the requests of those of its members that had already implemented private eCall solutions, ACEA campaigned for the retention of those systems that had already been introduced in the market. As a consequence, the European Commission mandated the standardisation organisation CEN to work on standards that could integrate these private so-called "third party systems" in the eCall service chain (CEN TC 278 Working Group 15; draft work item 278246 "eSafety – Third party emergency support services").

When the MoU was published for signature, ACEA was the first signatory from a key stakeholder group. From an economical point of view, the signature did not make sense for automobile manufacturers that committed themselves to equipping their vehicles with hardware that did not work in the vast majority of the European market because emergency calls could not be sent or received. Similar to taking over the chairmanship of the eCall Driving Group, the signature had strategic reasons. ACEA signed the MoU but attached preconditions similar to those mentioned above to its further engagement (ACEA 2005b).[11] It was now in the position to demand action from the other key stakeholders (ACEA 2005a: 7 ff.; eSafety Support Office 2009a; ACEA 2009)

[11] These preconditions were: Member States and other key stakeholders should sign the MoU; a Business Model should be agreed upon; Positive business case needed to be proven (ACEA 2005b).

and it could justify its own passivity with the steps that had *not* been taken by other stakeholders (particularly the Member States).

6.3 Positions of the Member States and PSAPs

The European Member States and the position of their respective PSAPs will be subject to a combined analysis as PSAP are financed and organised by each Member State.

6.3.1 The eCall selection process

During the eCall selection process, only two Member States were directly present (the Czech Republic and Germany). Others were represented by representatives of their national PSAPs (the Netherlands) or City Councils (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland [UK hereafter]). However, most Member States and PSAPs from the most countries were not involved in the selection process. Despite their low participation, the European Commission justifies the choice of eCall that it "was requested by the European PSAPs" because various private solutions had only gained a very low penetration of the market (DG INFSO 2008) and the emergency call could obviously not be operated as a private industry solution-only. Thus, a private-public partnership was necessary to implement the pan-European emergency call (DG INFSO 2002b: 8).

6.3.2 The eCall negotiation phase

In general, the eCall project in its function as pan-European emergency system can only be realised if the 27 Member States of the European Union committed to the system and upgraded their emergency service infrastructure to be able to receive, visualise and act on emergency notifications developed on basis of the relevant technical specifications determined by the standardisation institutions ETSI and CEN. The investments required for this infrastructure upgrade vary between the Member States. Similarly, the benefits of eCall differ among the Member States as advantages of the service fully develop in rural areas

with a low density of population. Therefore, on the level of the Member States, there is no concerted approach to the project. Each national government has developed a differentiated position reflecting its individual situation.

As of September 2010, 20 EU Member States, Norway, Switzerland and Iceland have signed the MoU.[12] Among them are Germany, Italy and Spain. Because these states together with the United Kingdom and France are commonly referred to as key Member States that need to commit to eCall, it is their positions that will be examined in the following.[13] Whereas the reasons for the refusal to sign from the UK and France are well documented, the rationale behind the signatures of Italy, Germany and Spain could not be reconstructed as easily.

As the first major state, *Italy* signed the MoU in October 2005 but has not shown much activity before or after its signature. The introduction of the prerequisite for eCall, the pan-European emergency number 112, has not been introduced in Italy since issues regarding EU infringement procedures in case of the non-availability of mobile phone caller location information to emergency services and the structure of regional PSAPs are still open (eSafety Support Office: no date b). According to those lists of participants that are available, representatives of Italian public authorities rarely attended eCall DG meetings or meetings of eCall sub-working groups. Also the Implementation Platform does not seem to have boosted the engagement of Italy. Whilst a representative of the Ministry of Innovation and Technology was present at the kick-off meeting, no one was present in the following meeting or the eCall Summit in October (EEIP 2009b, 2009c,

[12] The Member States having signed the MoU are (in chronological order of their signature) are: Finland (2004), Switzerland, Sweden, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Slovenia, Cyprus (2005), Norway, Iceland (2006), Austria, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Czech Republic, Netherlands (2007), Slovak Republic (2008), Estonia (2009), Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Malta and Romania (2010).

13They are referred to as crucial Member States because of their economic and industrial status as key production and sales markets and as they are the most populated ones that give them the more political weight in the EU (the highest number of votes in the Council of the European Union and the highest number of Members of the European Parliament)

eSafety Forum 2009; no data available for the third and fourth meeting). From these observations, it can safely be assumed that there is no priority accorded to the eCall project in Italy and most likely, the country will not contribute too actively to the progress of the system in the future.

Germany signed the MoU during its presidency of the Council of the European Union in June 2007. A German position paper from 2003 states that while the eSafety Initiative was supported; there were several open issues that needed to be solved. For Germany, only information relating to the actual incident should be included in the MSD for reasons of privacy protection and it opposed detailed technical regulations for the eCall system. It also called for further involvement of other Member States, a benefit evaluation of the whole system, whereas eCall should be seen in the context of other vehicle related innovations and a proof of the compatibility for cross-border and transit traffic (BMVBS 2003:13, 18). From the point of view of the German representatives, these positions must have been fulfilled when it signed the MoU. A demonstration of eCall's cross-border compatibility conducted by the German automobile club ADAC in Germany, Austria and Italy (ADAC 2007) may have played a major role in deciding to commit to the system. This trial had been successfully completed just two months before Germany signed the MoU and combined with the political weight that the ADAC threw in to promote the introduction of eCall on the German and European level it may have provided the decisive argument for Germany to commit to the MoU.[14] Since its signature, Germany has been actively engaged in the panels but it continues to call for more engagement from other Member States and key stakeholders (e.g. Hahn 2009).

In 2006, *Spain* explained its position during a PSAP meeting in Madrid. It had conducted a trial proving that eCall triggered an unusually high amount of false alarms and a survey on road acci-

[14] For its commitment, the ADAC won the 2009 EENA 112 Award sponsored by the European Emergency Number Association (EENA):"In addition to implementing the [cross-border feasibility] trial […], ADAC assiduously promoted the benefits of eCall in a number of publications." (ADAC 2009).

dents in Spain concluded that those accidents in which eCall could save the lives of undiscovered crash victims occurred in rural regions without mobile network reception. Thus, the eCall application could not have initiated the rescue chain. Additionally, Spain reported coordination difficulties as PSAPs were administered locally in the region and doubts about the capacities to process high numbers of automated emergency calls, budgetary restraints and privacy protection issues were raised (Álvarez 2003:4, KfV Kuratorium für Verkehrssicherheit 2007: 60). However, Spain signed the MoU in September 2007. Reasons for this could be a positive cost-benefit analysis for Spain conducted in 2006 by the Spanish Technological Institute Foundation for Security in the Automobile (FITSA 2006: 58f.) and/or the MoU signature of Germany may have acted as an opinion former for Spain as Germany faces the same challenges regarding its PSAP infrastructure. However, Spain has remained critical of the system and has thus since offered little support since its signature (McClure 2007: 16).

As mentioned above, two key Member States, the UK and France have not signed the MoU.

After DG INFSO published a study claiming a positive business case for the whole of Europe in 2004, the *British* Department for Transport (DfT) commissioned a study on the potential effect of eCall in its specific national context. The study focussed on the question whether the MoU should be signed. It concluded that due to the UK's relatively safe roads and improving trends in safety, there would be no positive business case for eCall (McClure and Graham 2006: 5). Other important caveats were related to calls from the European Commission to promote the introduction of eCall with fiscal incentives and the deployment plan proposed by DG INFSO (European Commission 2008a: 3), concerns that other ways of using national funds to reduce accidents and deaths on British roads might be more cost-effective, that the upgrades of the British PSAPs could not be achieved within the timeframe of the European Commission and that a market for the emergency call system might develop without government intervention and funds (Highways Agency 2009: 6).

DG INFSO maintains that the figures used to calculate the British study were faulty and thus, the UK should reconsider its position (European Commission 2008a: 3) and in 2010 Commissioner Kroes stated that the DfT had created a Task Force "to revisit the case and study the way forward towards eCall deployment" (European Parliament 2010). However, the UK has renewed its position several times (SBD 2008; Akass 2010), adding in its Road Safety Strategy that the calculations in the Commission's cost-benefit studies were "remarkably thin evidence for making an important decision on the Europe-wide implementation of a safety system" (Broughton et al. 2009: 115). So, although the Commission draws an image of ongoing decision-making processes in the British government, the decision to not to commit to eCall has been taken and will not be reviewed until new information becomes available (Donoghue 2009).

France has not signed the MoU for two major reasons: (1) it is sceptical towards the prerequisite for eCall, the E112 location-enhanced mobile emergency number. Implementing this number, France faces problems assuring the efficient handling of emergency calls and processing foreign-language calls (European Commission 2008a: 2). (2) France adopted the position that investments into PSAP-upgrades would amount to using the taxes of the general public for a service from which only vehicle owners could benefit. It rather proposed not to use the single European emergency number and to leave the deployment of eCall to the private sector (European Commission 2008a: 2). In its latest Communication, the European Commission directly addressed these reservations and argued that also users of Public Transport Systems and vulnerable road users and thus all citizens could potentially benefit from eCall (European Commission 2009b).

Besides these arguments, the opposition towards the MoU corresponds with the corporate interests of France's largest car manufacturer PSA Peugeot Citroën. The company introduced a private emergency call solution into the European market in 2003. In the negotiation process, the MSD transmission method via text messages developed by PSA Peugeot Citroën had been backed by the French government in the ETSI and CEN standardisation working groups and during the discussions in the eCall

DG (eSafety Support Office 2008). But this solution was not chosen as the European eCall standard (McClure 2007: 16; ITS Solutions 2008:17). So, reasons for France to refuse the signature may be not just in the national but also in the nation's industry's' interest.[15] Despite its refusal to sign, the French government is present in the panels that determine the development of eCall.

The analysis above sheds light onto the case-study related research question: Which factors led to the observed delay in the negotiation process on eCall?

Although it is not unusual to observe delays in the implementation of roadmaps in any sector, the analysis into the reasons for the delay of the implementation of eCall brought to light an interesting phenomenon: While weak institutional governance rules in the negotiation phase made it easier for its members to block progress, the lack of support of crucial negotiation partners was the central reason for the slow progress of the negotiations on eCall. This lack of support can be explained by the lack of support of various Member States and a shift of interest representation from individual companies to European industry associations that were less enthusiastic about the system than the individual companies had been.

Thus, the decision of the European Commission to rely on the interests of particular companies that did not represent the European sector interest in the negotiation phase and the difficult decision to prepare a system for voluntary introduction that would involve a financial burden for nearly all Member States are the reasons behind the lack of progress of eCall.

[15] This assessment is supported by a statement by DG INFSO Commissioner Kroes in reply to a Parliamentary question on the status of eCall: "France is concerned about the costs, mainly to upgrade their Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs), and supports the deployment of private solutions that are not based on the single European Emergency number, 112." (European Parliament 2010).

6.4 Can the stakeholder positions explain the change in negotiation partners?

In both, the case of the telecommunications sector and the automotive sector the stakeholder positions can not fully explain the change in negotiation partners.

In the first case, the European association GSME was opposed to the system from the beginning (as the various position papers show). Thus, telematics divisions of individual telecommunications companies represented their own interests during the selection process. What the stakeholder positions can not explain is why the European Commission entered negotiations with the European association after representatives from the companies had left the negotiations in the negotiation phase. Why did it not attempt to keep the companies already committed in the negotiation process by making concessions on the system architecture?

ACEA was present in both phases. But as described, individual companies dominated the opinion formation during the selection phase. It was only in the following phase that the negotiations with ACEA became the centre of the negotiation process with the automotive sector. This shift can not be explained with the stakeholder positions.

7 Private interest representation during the eCall negotiations

Arguing with Bouwen's "logic of access" theory, the reasons for the shift in negotiation partners from individual companies to industry associations can be explained by the potential of the stakeholders to provide exactly those "access goods" that the Commission needed in the respective phases.

In the selection phase, detailed knowledge about the impact of specific systems and actions on the European road safety record was needed to compile the 28 recommendations and detailed knowledge on the exact impact of each of these actions was required to identify the first priority for the eSafety Forum. According to the categorisation provided by Bouwen, industry associations or Member States could not provide this knowledge as

for specific details they were "too far away from the market" (2002: 369).

During the negotiation phase, however, the Commission needed partners that had a mandate to negotiate on behalf of the whole sector and that could provide information across national borders. Industry associations that aggregated the various interests on the European level could provide this IEEI best. Thus, ACEA and GSME became more valuable partners than the individual companies from the first phase.

This assessment reflects Bouwen's conclusions on the information demand of the European Conclusion: Both, expert knowledge from individual firms and IEEI from European industry associations were highly sought after.

The change in negotiation partners however, is a central reason for the slow progress of the eCall negotiations. While the companies involved in the selection phase saw a business opportunity in eCall and consequently threw their weight behind the selection of eCall, the industry associations also represented companies that did not see these opportunities. Thus, their stance towards eCall was more cautious (ACEA) or opposing (GSME). This stance and the lack of commitment on the side of crucial Member States was the reason for the slow progress on eCall.

7.1 Applicability of the "logic of access" theory on non-business interests

In both, his first paper on the "logic of access" theory and the empirical test of his framework Bouwen raises the question whether the "logic of access" theory could be applied to non-business interests. In the context of the case study, this question could be raised relating to the selection of public interest representatives (Bouwen 2002: 384; 2004: 360).

It can be argued that in this case, there was a supply-demand-interdependence between the Member States and the European Commission similar to that of European Commission and private interests because initially the eCall system was designed to be introduced on a voluntary basis. Thus, the Member States needed access to the policy-making-process of the European Commis-

sion because they would not have had a chance to express their interest during the established legislative process. On the other side, the Member States possessed a critical "access good" that the European Commission needed because they were responsible for the funding of the eCall infrastructure upgrades and for the introduction of the system in their respective regions.

Since it can be proven that the demand and supply side were dependent on each other in this case, the negotiations between the European Commission and the Member States can be explained with the "logic of access" theory.

However, a systematised analysis into the role of Member State representatives in expert groups would be needed in order to derive universal statements about the applicability of the "logic of access" theory on this field.[16] This analysis is not the focus of this paper.

8 Conclusions

This paper showed that the modified "logic of access" theory can be utilised to explain which companies or associations gain access to the expert groups set up by the European Commission. It was also shown that in this case non-business interests can be analysed employing the "logic of access" theory. And it was shown that when the European institutions experience a shift in need of access goods, a change in partners providing these goods can be done but is not always advantageous.

In the case of eCall, the Commission would have been better advised in making the European industry associations their primary negotiation partners from the beginning. Providing expert knowledge on the right choice of actions to halve the number of deaths on European roads may have taken longer (due to association-internal agreements) but a selected priority could have been implemented more efficiently. Of course, had the industry associations been asked for their participation but declined a more

[16] According to Gornitzka and Sverdrup, expert groups are routinely made up of representatives from Member State governments, thus a systemised analysis into this question would be reasonable (2008:5).

active engagement (which could be inferred from the analysis of the GSME position), questions arise about the European Commission approach to the system.

As a reaction to the virtual deadlock in the negotiations eCall was transferred onto a broader base when it was included in the directive on the framework for the deployment of intelligent transport systems in Europe (Directive 2010/40/EU). It is supported not only by DG INFSO but also by DG Energy and Transport (lead), DG Research, DG Enterprise and Industry and DG Environment. The directive sets out that the European Commission can determine technical specifications for the introduction of systems described in its action plan and/or annexed in the directive. Twelve months later it has the right to legislate the introduction of these systems on the basis of its technical specifications for those stakeholders that either choose to introduce the system or that are mandated to do so by further legislative actions.

So, choosing an approach that turns away from the rather unsuccessful voluntary approach to mandating eCall for some stakeholders may well be the only tool left to the European Commission to implement eCall on a pan-European basis after all.

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