MASS SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

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ABSTRACT

Given the high level of acrimony about liberal democracy in Africa, especially the fact that democracy has failed to deliver on either of the twin dividends of good governance or economic prosperity, questions arise as to what reservoir of support there is for the democratic system of government in the Continent. This paper measures and explains levels of support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Measures of support for democracy are developed. Micro-level survey data generated by the 2013 Spring Pew Global Attitudes Survey across six Sub-Saharan African countries are analyzed using OLS multivariate regression specifications and applying country fixed-effects. We find a fairly moderate level of support for democracy, although the levels of support vary across countries. Moreover, while many factors are linked to support for democracy, including economic performance, political performance associated with delivery of freedoms and civil liberties is a particularly crucial ingredient of support. Support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa is largely intrinsic. Sub-Saharan Africans will support democracy which delivers on both its principles and good governance. Implications for sustainable economic development are discussed.

Keywords: Sub-Saharan Africa, Africa, democracy, developmental democracy, Africa self-governance, support for democracy

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INTRODUCTION

On Saturday, July 11, 2009, President Barack Obama delivered a speech to Ghana's Parliament that has continued to reverberate throughout Africa (Gettleman, 2009). It was his maiden trip to Sub-Saharan Africa as the (first African-American) President of the United States, from whom Africans ordinarily expected more (Okunubi, 2011). The widely disseminated speech titled "A New Moment of Promise" embodied what the White House promptly described as the new U.S. Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa.[1] While Obama's speech covered some ground, his discontent with the lingering difficulty in establishing liberal democracy in Africa not only became the highlight of the speech, but it has become the hallmark of the entire trip. Speaking to Africa's sit-tight, "big men" of politics, Mr. Obama declared that "Africa doesn't need strongmen; it needs strong institutions" (Obama, 2009). His choice of Ghana over countries such as Nigeria and Kenya, the latter his ancestral home which competed as venues for the "African address," was supposed to be a poignant statement that the U.S. would lean toward progressive democracies (Baker, 2009; Dinan, 2009). According to Obama, the failure of good governance is at the heart of Africa's underdevelopment and Ghana has made considerable advancements in democratization where most of its neighbors are faltering (Ayittey, 2012; Posner &Young, 2007).

Of the multiple intractable problems which have plagued African nations since their emergence from colonization more than half a century ago, none has been more significant than their failure in self-governance, an outcome of the parallel failure of liberal democracy[2] to take root (Kalu & Kieh, 2014; Mbaku, 2013; Cheru, 2012; CODESRIA, 2011; Kalu, 2010, 2004; Wohlgemuth & Sall, 2006; Ndegwa, 2003, 1997). Still, "democracy is increasingly seen as the only legitimate form of government in Africa" (Leon, 2010; see also Hyden, 1999), pushed by the U.S. and other Western powers that wield the levers of external aid upon which many of the countries are dependent (Moyo, 2010; Glennie, 2008; Siegle, 2007a; Calderisi, 2006). Thus, "the pressure is on authoritarian and hybrid regimes to transition to or consolidate democracy" (Schechtel, 2010: 49).

The result is what can be called the "democracy scramble," "where even the most despotic of African leaders wish to have their leadership affirmed by elections, when they know that regular multiparty elections are not synonymous with good governance, rule of law, and economic development" (Leon, 2010; Ogundiya, 2010).

When a supposed ideal such as establishing democracy in Africa falters as spectacularly as it has (van de Walle, 2002), concerns are bound to arise. The most penetrating of these is the one which continues to frame liberal democracy as an alien imposition antithetical to African cultures and pre-colonial governance practices (e.g., Blum, 2014; see also, Moshi & Osman, 2008; Ake, 1991), hence its failure to implant in Africa. Expectedly, some have suggested the desirability of exploring a more elastic conception of democracy, the kind that could embrace Africa's consensual "democratic traditions" prior to the arrival of Europeans – what some elegantly call "home-grown" or "Africanization" of democracy (Bradley 2011; see also, Ake, 1996, 1993; Diamond, 1989). However, none of this has progressed beyond mere theorizing, while getting liberal democracy to take root, as Linz and Stephan (1996) would contend, remains "the only game in town." With so much acrimony about democracy in the continent, coupled with lack of economic performance, corruption, and other obtrusive vises which point to the failure of democracy to produce the expected "democracy dividend" (Siegle, 2007b; Mamdani, 1996) to the people, an important matter of whether there is mass support for democracy in Africa arises (Hoeffler, Bates, & Fayad, 2013). As extant research contends, mass support for democracy is crucial for attainment, consolidation, and legitimation of the democratic system (Diamond, 2008; Welzel, 2007; Goldsmith, 2001; Canache, Mondak, & Seligson, 2001; Bratton & van de Walle, 1997), even though it may not be an accurate indicator of how deeply democracy has taken root in a country (Inglehart, 2003).

This research examines mass support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa as a basis for evolving good governance that, in turn, should engender economic and sustainable development. It asks the following questions: Is there a reservoir of popular support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa and

what explains that support? Do Sub-Saharan African men and women differ in their orientations on support for democracy? As Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes (2001a) asked, is support for democracy in the region intrinsic or instrumental? That is, do Africans court democracy just for the material deliverables that are expected of democracy, or does Africa's search for democracy run deeper? These questions are at the root of the question of institutionalization of democracy and sustainable development in the region. The research addresses these questions using the 2013 Pew Global Attitudes survey data based on national probability samples from six Sub-Saharan African States: Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda. Each country is a multiparty state that has undergone political reform and by Freedom House democracy indices score (Freedom House, 2014), will be classified as a democracy, although the levels of democratization clearly differ (Siegle, 2007).

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA

Scholars of African democracy owe Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes, and their colleagues of the Afrobarometer Project[3] immense gratitude for their invaluable insights into issues of democratization in Africa. Fourteen years ago Bratton and Mattes posed a question, which although pioneering in Africa at the time, is at once at the core of research on popular support for democracy everywhere: Is popular support for democracy in Africa intrinsic or instrumental? By intrinsic, they asked if citizen support is imbued with "an appreciation of the political freedoms and equal rights that democracy embodies when valued as an end in itself?" By instrumental, they wanted to know if such support "reflect(s) a more instrumental calculation in which regime change is a means to other ends, most commonly the alleviation of poverty and improvement of living standards (2001a). Using data from standard survey items on Ghana, Zambia, and South Africa, and a research design which divided regime performance into the economic (economic assets, jobs, and an array of social services) and political (peace, civil liberties, political rights, human dignity and equality before the

law) baskets, they reported that although "citizen orientation to democracy in Africa are most fully explained with reference to both baskets of goods, in deciding whether to support democracy, African citizens seem to weigh the availability of political goods more heavily than the contents of the economic basket" (2001a). Furthermore, they reported that social background –factors such as age, gender, and education – have little or no impact. Using their results, expectedly, they challenged two long-standing notions about democratization in Africa. The first concerns the 'economistic' argument that in order to survive in Africa, democracies must 'deliver the goods' and therefore, that the market will legitimate democracy (2001a). The second is that educational attainment is a significant factor in determining support for democracy (see literature covered in Evans and Rose, 2007).

Bratton and Mattes' work provides solid platform to begin the current research. Their work took stock of what was learned from the first generation of research on political attitudes in new African democracies in the 1990s. In so doing, it addresses many critical questions, questions such as what Africans mean when they use the word democracy; whether ordinary Africans really fully understand the concept of democracy as to provide informed responses to survey items; issues associated with measurement of both support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy in the African context; and the potential sources of the explanation of mass support for democracy in Africa. Thanks to their work we can say that democracy, until something happens to change its common meaning in Africa, stands for liberal democracy as it is understood in the West (see also Mattes & Bratton, 2007). Moreover, the average African knows what democracy really means as to provide informed responses to survey questions about democracy.

In the years since Bratton and Mattes' work was published, there have been more research on public support for democracy in Africa, although much of that work are project reports based on descriptive data from the Afrobaromter project of which both authors are major participants. Not very much has been done with regard to actual analysis of the correlates of

support for democracy, thus rendering the literature thin. Using Round Three data from 2005, Shechtel (2010) found that the most crucial factor affecting satisfaction with democracy in Africa "is for a government to be seen as handling the tasks and challenges of governing well, followed in importance by the delivery of political goods such as freedom of speech." While not focused on explaining support for democracy per se, the finding re-echoes Bratton and Mattes' report that delivery of political goods is better associated with judgments about democracy than economic goods. Round 5, conducted between 2011 and 2013 (Bratton & Houessou, 2014), reported moderate levels of mass support for democracy in 34 countries. The last of these surveys was Round 6, conducted in 2015 for 37 countries.

Given that Bratton and Mattes' findings are based on data collected about 15 years ago on three Sub-Saharan African countries (Ghana, Zambia, and South Africa), in the least (even though it does much more), we consider and posit the current research as a useful sequel given the dramatic changes in learning about democracy that have taken place in the region over that period (Mbaku, 2013; Kalu, 2010); after all, confidence in published findings or what are considered "settled scientific questions" are a matter of preponderance of the evidence as represented by the cumulative literature from multiple angles (Tessler, Nachtwey, & Grant, 1999; Meier, 1997). Thus, we are particularly interested in the extent to which the results of our research can underscore the trajectory of the major findings reported by Bratton and Mattes. While Afrobarometer data are readily available and can be used in subsequent installments of research along these lines, we have opted to work exclusively with Pew data as both an alternative legitimate data source and as part of the novelty of our study. As we have noted, much of the data which have gone into studying support for democracy in Africa so far have been generated under the auspices of the Afrobarometer surveys. While there is nothing necessarily wrong with data generated by a single organization, having direct comparisons with results of data generated by Pew, an equally powerful survey organization, serves immense scientific purpose in replication and literature building. Secondly, while Bratton and Mattes' work was based on data from three countries, the

current research uses data for respondents from six countries: Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and Senegal, the latter a Francophone country. Ghana and South Africa are two of the three countries in Bratton and Mattes' research. Finally, the paper presents a detailed examination of potential gender differences in support for democracy (see also Logan and Bratton, 2006). Gender differences are particularly crucial at a time when African women are gaining greater freedoms and are beginning to exert their numeric power in democratic governance throughout the continent (Falola & Amponsah, 2012; Hirschmann, 1991).

Based on this literature, we present the following working hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Respondents' perceptions of the status of delivery of political goods such as peace, civil liberties, political rights, human dignity and equality before the law will have a strong positive effect on support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa.

***Hypothesis 2*:** Respondents' perceptions of the status of delivery of economic goods will have little or no effect on support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa.

***Hypothesis 3*:** Factors associated with social background will have little or no effect on support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa.

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

The relationship between governance and economic systems, or what Charles Linblom (1977) famously calls "Politics and Markets" and sustainable development is a celebrated topic in international economics and development. An enduring consensus from this literature affirms the symbiotic relationship between governance and economic systems and system performance (Marglin, 2003). Notwithstanding China's emergence as a major economic power in the last three decades engineered by its unique state capitalism model, it is generally agreed that liberal democracy and market capitalism, compared to any authority system, is the most successful combination for growth and development (Easterly, 2007). While this model

assumes something of the rendition depicted in Figure 1, the discussion for previously colonized nations struggling to find their footing assumes a completely different typology. The focus in these countries is on governance and not markets per se, as governance has severely limited market articulation (Griffiths, 2010).

Figure 1.



Analysts generally agree that the historic realities of colonization and neo-colonization have complicated this model in much of the developing world by placing the onus on development squarely on good governance (Griffiths, 2010). While many of these countries call themselves democracies, the realities on the ground are anything but democratic as the conditions conducive to development of democracy are noticeably absent (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009). In each country in Sub-Saharan Africa, a ruling elite appears to have a stranglehold on political power and in order to maintain control and perpetuate that power, have adopted existentialist tendencies that preclude institutionalization of democracy and good governance. One of these tendencies is the use and overextension of rigid central governmental arrangements that crowd out the private sector. The consequence has been the undevelopment of the sector and the absence of the sector's potential contributions in development. Closely aligned with this centralization tendency is perpetuation of themselves in power. In Sub-Saharan Africa, this has spawn sit-tight leadership where a few "big men" snatch political power and never let go. While the big men may be staying in power or ensuring that their surrogates retain power largely because of self-preservation, the

masses, either by imposition or default, having really not known any alternative, have come to believe that only such men could govern. The result is a government of men and not of laws where public institutions are not developed. Because much focus is on procuring and maintaining political power by any means, including murder, bribery and corruption, and resource mismanagement, good governance and innovation suffer and a cycle of dependency sets in (Cohen, et al. 2008). When analysts and other commentators point to good governance as the basis of sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa, this is exactly the condition they decry.

This is also the reality that set the stage for Barack Obama's vision of "A New Moment of Promise" for Africa. Not surprisingly, Obama warned that "Africa doesn't need strongmen; it needs strong institutions" (Obama, 2009). Our focus on mass support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa features prominently into this potentially new moment of promise for Africa. In fact, some would suggest that it may well be the single most important factor for instituting liberal democracy in the region, as public affairs research links policy choice to mass public opinion (Witt & McCorkle, 1997). If Sub-Saharan Africans reject democracy because of its disappointments so far, the region has little chance of achieving good governance. Without good governance, there is little chance for sustainable development. This causal chain is clear and amplifies our focus on support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Our inquiry is based on data generated by the 2013 Spring Pew Global Attitudes Survey, conducted between March and April, 2013. The surveys relied on national probability samples giving every adult in the country 18 years or older an equal chance of inclusion. Although the Pew survey typically targeted many nations, 5, 043 respondents in six Sub-Saharan African countries (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda) were included. These six countries are by no means representative of all of Sub-Saharan Africa, but they include

some of the most significant countries of the region. Of course, Nigeria is the most populous and arguably largest economy. Pooling the survey data for these countries is appropriate since the same multi-stage cluster sampling and stratification techniques were employed throughout to generate the country samples. Moreover, while Pew used the telephone random digit dialing technique in some countries, face-to-face interviews were utilized throughout the six countries. Any systematic errors specific to each country, especially with respect to the conduct of the surveys will be remedied with our research design incorporating country fixed-effects.

Measuring Support for Democracy. Bratton and Mattes (2001a) suggest that the best way to ask questions about popular support for democracy is in concrete terms and in the form of comparisons with plausible alternatives." Accordingly, our measure of support for democracy uses a 3-count additive item, as follows: Question #15 on the survey asks: And which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? (1. Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; 2. In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable; 3. For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have). We coded option 1 as support for democracy. Question #88 on the survey reads: Some feel that we should rely on a democratic form of government to solve our country's problems. Others feel that we should rely on a leader with a strong hand to solve our country's problems. Which comes closer to your opinion? We coded the choice of democratic form of government as support for democracy. Finally, question #89 on the survey asks: If you had to choose between a good democracy or a strong economy, which would you say is more important? The choice of a good democracy was coded as support for democracy. Combining these three items yields a composite measure of support for democracy. The value ranges from 0 to 3, 3 signifying the highest level of support for democracy. Eigenvalues showed unidimensionality on the three-point scale.

To align the analysis with the literature, we segment the independent variables into four categories: the political basket,

the economic basket, social background, and instrumental variables.

The Political Basket. We use two different measures to capture delivery of political goods. The first is the standard abstract, widely used single survey item which asks how satisfied the respondent is with the way democracy is working in the country, with four composite response choices that analysts usually reduce to two categories of satisfied or dissatisfied. The second is a 7-count additive scale construct tapping different attributes of political performance. Bratton and Mattes (2001a) and Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) "posit that a performance evaluation construct is the correct framework for determinants of satisfaction with democracy. The performance evaluation construct holds that Africans act rationally to advance their interests and if people see leaders and governments as effective at delivering desired goods and services, then they will give backing to liberalized regimes" (quoted by Shechtel, 2010). Question #86 on the survey required respondents to rate how well different attributes of democracy are working in the country. The options were: 1. You can openly say what you think and can criticize the (state/government); 2. Honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at least two political parties; 3. There is a judicial system that treats everyone in the same way; 4. The military is under the control of civilian leaders; 5. The media can report the news without (state/government) censorship; 6. You can practice your religion freely; and 7. Law and order is maintained. We coded this item such that each respondent will score a "yes" (1) or "no" (0) and then developed a 7-count scale of "performance of democracy". We label the variable as "democracy works 7-count". The count on "democracy works" will range from 0 to 7, the latter being the highest level of performance.

The Economic Basket. Included in the economic basket are unemployment, poverty status, country economic well-being, and personal economic well-being. Employment status is coded as 1 if unemployed; 0 otherwise. Poverty status is coded as 1 if poor; 0 otherwise.[4] The measure of country economic well-being is a 3-count scale comprising the following questions: 1. Now thinking about our economic situation, how would you describe

the current economic situation (four options collapsed into good/bad)? 2. And over the next 12 months do you expect the economic situation in our country to improve? And 3. When children today in our country grow up, do you think they will be better off or worse off financially than their parents? Personal economic well-being is a two-count scale combining the responses to these questions: 1. Now thinking about your personal economic situation, how would you describe it (combination of four good/bad)? 2. Over the next 12 months do you expect your personal economic situation to improve?

Social Background. The social background factors included in the analysis are gender, age, education, religion, marital status, and urbanism. Gender is a dummy variable coded as 1 for women; 0 for men. Age is a continuous variable with the actual age of the respondent. Education is a four-category continuous variable coded 1-4, with each higher number indicating progressive/more education. Religion is a dummy variable coded as 1 for Muslim; 0 otherwise. Marital status is coded as 1 if married/cohabiting; 0 otherwise. Urbanism is coded as 1 for urban respondents; 0 otherwise.

Instrumental Variables. Two instrumental variables of democracy are added to the analysis. The first is an abstract measure of the respondent's orientation toward freedom and liberalism generally. Question 71 in the survey asked: How important is it to you that people have access to the internet without government censorship? Responses of "very important" and "somewhat important" are coded as 1, while "not too important" and "not important at all" are coded as 0. We hypothesize that respondents who are ordinarily more conscious of freedom and liberalism will support democracy more readily. The second is a 4-count scale we used for capturing respondents' levels of "Westernization".[5] We expect pro-West respondents to support democracy more than others less prone to accepting outside (American) values and influences.

Country traditions and experiences are relevant to discussing democracy, especially in Africa where the interaction of colonialism and local customs have produced mixed track records in several areas (Hyden, 1999; Mamdani, 1996). Accordingly, a final relevant feature we introduce into the

analysis is country fixed-effects. Throughout the analysis, country dummies are entered that hold respondents from each country together, systematically controlling for country-specific factors that may impact the dependent variables. The dependent variable produces a continuous variable. Accordingly, we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to estimate the multivariate models. We conduct two levels of analyses. The first group addresses the question of the level of support for democracy. Here, we first use descriptive statistics to probe both the entire sample and individual countries for support for democracy. Then, we apply multivariate analyses to try to identify factors that are associated with support for democracy. Here, again, two levels of analyses are conducted. The first are macro-level specifications for the entire sample. The second are models that explain support for democracy within countries. Since the hypotheses associated with the effects of the variables are directional, we use both one- and two-tailed tests of significance. Given our robust sample size, our analyses of inter-item correlations revealed only moderate correlations that allow for efficient estimation of our regression models (see Appendix).

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

The profile of the 5,043 respondents across the six Sub-Saharan African nations is displayed in Table 1. The data in Table 1 show a good spread both from individual countries and across the variables of interest in the study. Men and women are almost evenly distributed in the sample. The profile captures what can be expected of a stratified random sample in Sub-Saharan Africa: Older adults of about mid age by the region's life expectancy standard of 56 at birth (World Bank, 2012). The average age of the respondent is 35 years old, with the men (36.1) being slightly older than the women (34.7). Men are far more likely to be employed than women, and women are both poorer and more likely to be married than the men. Moreover, there is evidence and clarification of the much discussed advantage men have over women on educational attainment. As the data reveal, women are less likely to have formal education, although the gender gap is not noticeable at the primary/grade-

Table 1
Sample Composition and Descriptive Statistics for Variables

Respondents	All Respondents	Men Only	Women Only
All	5043	2537	2506
Ghana	799	408	391
Kenya	798	458	340
Nigeria	1031	517	514
Senegal	800	358	442
South Africa	815	408	407
Uganda	800	388	412
Variable	**Weighted Means**		
Age	35.4	36.1	34.7
Unemployed	59.7%	53.2%	66.2%
Married/cohabitating	50.3%	56.7%	57.3%
Education			
None	11.8%	8.9%	14.6%
Primary	23.5%	20.3%	26.8%
Secondary	47.1%	49.7%	44.5%
University	17.6%	21.1%	14.1%
Religion (Muslim)	30.1%	28.4%	31.8%
Poverty status	58.2%	56.4%	59.9%
Urban	41.9%	40.8%	43.0%
Westernization (4-count)	2.69	2.69	2.58
Satisfaction with democracy	58.5%	58.8%	58.3%
Democracy works 7-count	4.89	4.92	4.86
Internet liberalism	65.4%	70.1%	60.7%
Personal economic well-being (2-count)	1.16	1.19	1.14
Country economic well-being (3-count)	1.54	1.57	1.51

school level. The second type of gap, besides access to formal education, occurs at higher levels of educational attainment, where men clearly have an advantage over women. As would be expected, the men in the sample are more enthusiastic about internet liberalization and also tend to welcome "Westernization" more readily than the women. The respondents rate country economic well-being particularly low. The mean for all respondents is a mere 1.54 out of 3 (about 51 percent). Finally, reported levels of satisfaction with democracy are fairly

moderate. About 59 percent of the respondents reported satisfaction with the way democracy operates in the country. The picture is slightly different with the democracy works 7-count measure, where the mean score for all respondents is 4.89 (or 69.8%). Thus, the respondents are more likely to rate democracy as working when measured with specific items than with the single item of satisfaction with democracy.

HOW MUCH SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY?

The data in Table 2 display the patterns of support for democracy. The data for the entire sample reveals a mean average of 2.03 for support for democracy. Translated, this is about a 67- percent support level. Moreover, these data suggest that men and women's support levels revolve around the same 67 percent threshold, with both groups not differing in their levels of support. Thus, the data indicate no gender gap in support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. The rest of the data in Table 2 reveal patterns of support across the countries. While respondents from individual countries tend to vary in their levels of support, several key observations can be made about the patterns of support. First, the levels of support for democracy generally are lowest in South Africa (Mean=1.67 or 56%) and Nigeria (Mean=1.73 or 58%), while Uganda shows the highest levels of support (Mean=2.33 or 78%). Secondly, there are small gender disparities in Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, Nigeria, and South Africa. However, these disparities are not robust. Even then, it is important to note that the weak gender disparity in Kenya actually favors women. The data raise some salient questions that should be of interest to scholars of African democratic governance. First, why is support for democracy so low in South Africa relative to the other countries? Secondly, what accounts for the robust inter-country differences evident in these data? While one may speculate about these issues, it is obvious that there are strong country currents flowing through them.

EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

The multivariate analyses estimating the effects of the independent variables on support for democracy are displayed in Table 3. The F-Ratios indicate very good fit for the models. We have reported standardized regression coefficients to make comparisons across categories of the OLS analyses easy. We begin with the results for the political basket, measured by the 7-count measure and the single item measure of satisfaction with democracy. We hypothesized that the political basket will have a positive and robust effect on support for democracy. The results support that contention. In fact, except for the effect of Westernization, the results suggest that the effects of this factor rival all others in both its intensity and consistency. The 7-count measure produces a positive and significant effect throughout, although its effect is clearly weaker than that of the single item measure. The separate models for men and women reported across also reveal similar results. Moreover, these results suggest that the effect of satisfaction with democracy is gendered: satisfaction with democracy has a slightly more powerful effect for men (beta = .11, $p<.001$) than it does for women (beta = .08, $p<.001$) on support for democracy.

We now switch to the results of the economic basket, including unemployment, poverty status, country economic well-being, and personal economic well-being. We hypothesized that delivery of economic goods will have little or no effect on support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the least, we expected the political basket, to be a more powerful predictor. The results for the four items of the economic basket listed above support the hypothesis. Except for the measure of country economic well-being, these economic factors are largely dormant in these specifications, including the separate models for men and women. Even then, the effect of the variable appears completely gendered, where only women who see country economic prosperity would use it as a basis for support for democracy. Taken together, the results of the political and economic baskets fully support Bratton and Mattes (2001a: 474) contention that although "citizen orientation to democracy in Africa are most fully explained with reference to both baskets of

goods, in deciding whether to support democracy, African citizens seem to weigh the availability of political goods more heavily than the contents of the economic basket".

Our final hypothesis concerns the effects of social background. Again, based on extant research, we hypothesized that social background will have little or no effect on support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. At least, we expected the effects to be less salient than those of the political basket. The results support the hypothesis only to the extent that the effects of social background pale in comparison to those of the political basket. However, many of the factors of social background produced robust effects. Gender, education, and urbanism are clearly irrelevant. However, age, religion, and marital status are all important. Older adults tend to support democracy more than their younger counterparts, and married and cohabiting couples equally support democracy more than single respondents. Religion has the expected negative effect (Tezcür, et al., 2012), but it comes with the nuance that that may be particularly true for Muslim women.

Besides the results of the country dummies which reconfirm that South Africa, men and women, have the least support for democracy compared to any of the other five countries in the study, and Uganda has the highest, the results for Westernization deserves close attention. The results in Table 3 suggest that this is a most robust factor in explaining support for democracy. It clearly speaks to the power (and importance) of Western influence in the region. With respect to the rankings of the six countries on support for democracy, we can observe the rest of the results. These results rank Uganda as highest, then Ghana, Senegal/Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa as the country with the least support for democracy. The notion that South Africa produces the least support for democracy is consistent with Bratton and Mattes (2001a).

Regarding gender, the results for men suggest that Ugandan men rank tops in support for democracy, followed by Ghana men, Kenya/Senegalese men, Nigerian men, and then South African men as the least likely to support democracy. With women, again, Ugandan women rank highest, followed by Senegal, Ghana/Kenya, Nigeria, and then South Africa.

Table 2
Support for Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa

All			Ghana			Kenya			Senegal		
All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
2.03	2.05	2.02	2.19	2.21	2.17	2.22	2.19	2.27	2.15	2.19	2.12
(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(0.8)	(0.9)	(0.8)	(0.9)
67.7 %	68.4 %	67.4 %	73.0 %	73.7 %	72.4 %	74.0 %	73.0 %	75.7 %	71.7 %	73.0 %	70.7 %

All			Nigeria			South Africa			Uganda		
All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
2.03	2.05	2.02	1.73	1.76	1.71	1.67	1.71	1.62	2.33	2.34	2.34
(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.1)	(1.1)	(1.1)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.1)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.8)
67.7 %	68.4 %	67.4 %	57.7 %	58.7 %	57.0 %	55.7 %	57.0 %	54.0 %	77.7 %	78.0 %	78.0 %

Note: Numbers are means for support for democracy; Figures in parenthesis are standard deviations; Percentages on the third row are means on the first row expressed as proportion of 3.

Comparing the size of the standardized regression coefficients shows how relatively far behind Nigerian and South African men and women are in support for democracy compared to the rest of the countries. Finally, the results for education deserve some attention, because the theory anticipating its effect is strong. Some literature has speculated on the potential effect of education on support for democracy (Evans and Rose, 2007). The results we report here support Bratton and Mattes' (2001a) contention that education is not a relevant factor, at least not for Sub-Saharan Africa.

Table 3
OLS Effects of Predictors of Support for Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa

Variable	All Respondents	Men Only	Women Only
Political basket			
Democracy works 7-count	.04*	.04+	.04+
	(2.54)	(1.77)	(1.92)
Satisfaction with democracy	.09***	.11***	.08***
	(6.26)	(4.87)	(3.87)
Economic basket			
Unemployed	.02	.01	.03
	(1.09)	(0.35)	(1.39)
Poverty Status	.02	.03	.01
	(1.59)	(1.58)	(0.72)
Country economic well-being	.04*	-.01	.09***
	(2.52)	(0.28)	(3.43)
Personal economic well-being	-.02	.02	-.06*
	(1.04)	(0.75)	(2.27)
Social background			
Gender (woman)	-.01	-----	-----
	(0.37)	-----	-----
Age	.04**	.04+	.04*
	(2.66)	(1.65)	(2.07)
Education	.01	.00	.02
	(0.46)	(0.13)	(0.72)
Religion	-.05*	-.04	-.05+
	(2.41)	(1.61)	(1.85)
Married/cohabitating	.05***	.05*	.05*
	(3.21)	(2.27)	(2.29)
Urban	.02+	.03	.02
	(1.65)	(1.21)	(1.06)
Instrumental variables			
Internet liberalism	.01	.01	.01
	(0.68)	(0.44)	(0.46)
Westernization	.13***	.12***	.14***
	(9.13)	(6.13)	(6.64)
Country Dummies (South Africa)			
Ghana	.20***	.19***	.22***
	(11.27)	(7.23)	(8.63)
Kenya	.19***	.18***	.22***
	(10.83)	(6.63)	(8.74)
Senegal	.19***	.18***	.23***
	(8.80)	(5.76)	(6.73)
Nigeria	.09***	.07*	.09***
	(4.09)	(2.49)	(3.19)

Uganda	.27***	.25***	.30***
	(14.58)	(9.21)	(11.28)
Intercept	0.84***	0.91***	0.73***
R^2 (X100)	10.2	9.3	11.4
Adjusted R^2 (X100)	9.8	8.7	10.7
F-Ratio	29.66***	14.25***	17.61***
N	4,991	2,507	2,484

Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.
+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. (Two–tailed).

EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY WITHIN COUNTRIES

We now turn to the last part of the analyses showing the performance of the independent variables in predicting support for democracy within countries. The F-Ratios in Table 4 indicate that the variables are successful in predicting support for democracy within countries. The analyses produce some notable differences across the countries. The model for Ghana shows that satisfaction with democracy is the most robust factor, although Westernization also produces a weak positive effect. For Kenya, Westernization and marital status are important, while the 7-count measure produces an unexpected negative sign. In Senegal, satisfaction with democracy, age, and Westernization produce significant effects. For Nigeria, it is satisfaction with democracy, country economic well-being, personal economic well-being, religion, and Westernization. Performance of democracy, unemployment, and Westernization are important in South Africa. Finally, in Uganda, both measures of the political basket, unemployment, religion, poverty status, and marital status produce significant effects. The results in Table 4 indicate that either measure of the political basket is an important factor in support for democracy in every country except Kenya, where the effect of the 7-count measure is negatively signed. These results also show that Westernization is significant for all countries except for Uganda. Religion and personal economic well-being are negative forces in Nigeria. In South Africa, unemployment is a particularly positive force for democracy.

Finally, in Uganda, religion, marital status, and poverty status are all positively linked, while unemployment has a

negative effect. Indeed, while these intra-country specifications tell their individual stories, the sizes of the standardized regression coefficients for some variables should be of interest. In Nigeria, for instance, satisfaction with democracy, country economic well-being, and Westernization overwhelm everything else. In South Africa, performance of democracy, unemployment, and Westernization are prominent. In Uganda, performance of democracy and marital status stand alone, while in Senegal, it is satisfaction with democracy and Westernization. For Kenya, Westernization is supreme, while in Ghana, it is all about satisfaction with democracy. It is instructive that not even in one of these country specifications did education become relevant.

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

This study is based on data from six Sub-Saharan African countries. Not only does the data set contain the two largest economies in the region, namely Nigeria and South Africa, but together, the six countries contain 345.54 million (37.2%) of the region's 936.1 million population (World Bank, 2013). As incisive as the results may be, the usual cautionary caveat must still be invoked in handling them, especially in ensuring that they are not overly generalized to places where data have not been sourced. Still, the study makes valuable contributions to the literature. In particular, it addresses many of the fundamental hypotheses which are at the core of the inquiry into mass support for democracy in Africa. In so doing, it adds to the cumulative literature on the subject by confirming what others have previously said, providing nuanced glimpses into new areas, and raising fresh questions in others.

The results indicate moderate support for democracy generally, although levels of support for democracy not only vary markedly across countries, but the effects of individual factors on support for democracy equally differ somewhat across countries. Collectively, though, delivery of political goods rivals both economic and social background explanations for support for democracy. These findings are consistent with the results of the most salient research on this subject. Another result we found

Table 4
OLS Analysis of Predictors of Support for Democracy in Six Countries

Variable	Ghana Only	Kenya Only	Senegal Only	Nigeria Only	South Africa Only	Uganda Only
Political basket						
Democracy works	.06	-.06+	-.03	-.03	.16***	.13***
7-count	(1.49)	(1.65)	(0.89)	(0.81)	(4.32)	(3.35)
Satisfaction with	.08*	.04	.10**	.14***	.06	.09**
democracy	(2.12)	(1.03)	(2.66)	(4.34)	(1.53)	(2.46)
Economic basket						
Unemployed	.01	.03	-.01	.02	.12**	-.08*
	(0.34)	(0.85)	(0.23)	(0.64)	(2.95)	(2.25)
Poverty status	.02	.05	-.05	.02	-.02	.08*
	(0.53)	(1.38)	(1.18)	(0.75)	(0.59)	(2.33)
Country economic	.00	-.07	.04	.15***	.08	-.01
well-being	(0.00)	(1.47)	(0.75)	(4.09)	(1.62)	(0.30)
Personal economic	.06	.04	-.06	-.08*	-.02	-.03
well-being	(1.39)	(0.89)	(1.22)	(2.39)	(0.34)	(0.81)
Social background						
Gender (women)	.00	.05	-.01	-.03	-.04	.01
	(0.05)	(1.38)	(0.35)	(0.88)	(1.37)	(0.21)
Age	.03	.03	.07+	.03	.04	.02
	(0.66)	(0.83)	(1.78)	(1.36)	(1.16)	(0.64)
Education	.04	-.01	.02	-.01	.05	-.04
	(0.93)	(0.35)	(0.46)	(0.29)	(1.22)	(0.92)
Religion (Muslim)	-.01	-.02	-.01	-.09*	-.00	.09*
	(0.31)	(0.51)	(0.19)	(2.43)	(0.06)	(2.45)
Married/cohabit	.06	.07+	.03	.02	.04	.12***
	(1.57)	(1.81)	(0.65)	(0.45)	(1.01)	(3.32)
Urban	.05	.04	.01	.04	.03	-.01
	(1.34)	(0.95)	(0.21)	(1.46)	(0.91)	(0.29)
Instrumental variables						
Internet liberalism	-.04	.06	.04	-.03	.01	.04
	(0.97)	(1.51)	(1.10)	(0.98)	(0.37)	(1.23)
Westernization	.07+	.10**	.13**	.21***	.17***	.04
	(1.77)	(2.79)	(3.17)	(6.17)	(4.74)	(0.95)
Intercept	1.34***	1.83***	1.71***	1.03***	0.09	1.80***
R^2 (X100)	3.4	3.4	4.2	10.4	9.9	8.9
Adjusted R^2 (X100)	1.7	1.7	2.5	9.1	8.3	7.2
F-Ratio	1.95*	1.98*	2.46**	8.32***	6.18***	5.42***
N	780	797	795	1023	803	793

NOTE: Entries are standardized regression coefficients. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.
+p<.10; *p<.01; **p<.01; ***p<.001. (Two–tailed).

consistent with previous research is the notion that education is not key to explaining support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Some of the new findings which our research contributes to the literature include: 1. Gender differences, particularly the suggestion that factors which affect support may have different levels of effect for men and women; 2. Religion, especially the fact that Muslim women may not support democracy at the levels that Muslim men do; 3. Westernization, especially the fact that Sub-Saharan Africans who are more accepting of Western ideas are more likely to support democracy; and 4. Country factors, especially isolation of the most important variables associated with support for democracy in particular countries.

These results have important implications for theorizing on mass support for democracy and sustainable economic development at least in the six countries studied. First, as Bratton and Mattes (2001a) have argued, support for democracy appears to be largely intrinsic. Based on the results reported above, we found little backing to sustain the latent supposition that support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa is driven primarily by the material things democracy can provide. On the contrary, it appears Sub-Saharan Africans will support democracy that manifests democracy's principal creed of personal freedoms and civil liberties, and ushering in good governance. Thus, the roots of democratic support in Sub-Saharan Africa run much deeper than the peripheral permutations of "stomach democracy" would suggest. Delivery of economic performance should ordinarily be expected as part of the total package, but it is not at the root of Sub-Saharan Africa's support for democracy.

Some research has theorized heavily about the expected effects of education on support for democracy, linking into the celebrated idea that an "informed" citizenry is necessary for the advancement of democratic ethos and good citizenship generally. In fact, some have made it a *sine qua non* for support for democracy. The theory is no doubt sound, but as Bratton and Mattes (2001) declared fourteen years ago, education is not an essential feature in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, and the research we report here reiterates that basic fact in unmistakable terms. Thus, while education is important for community building generally, Sub-Saharan African countries cannot

depend on it solely when it comes to unraveling support for or advancing democracy. Finally, there is the matter of Westernization. There is a strong positive relationship between disposition to accepting Western influences and support for democracy. As the results suggest, this is one of the strongest effects on support for democracy. This speaks to the importance of continued constructive engagement by the United States and other Western powers in the region, and perhaps positions the question of the new scramble for Africa between the United States and China at the center of the future of democratization in Africa (Alozie & Thomas, 2016; Makwerere & Chipaike, 2012).

What does all this mean for achieving sustainable development in the region? Our results show that the roots of democratic support run deep in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, that Sub-Saharan African states have not developed viable democracies is not for lack of the basic ingredient of mass support for democracy. Nor is it for a lack of understanding of democracy and its basic tenets. Indeed, it is not for lack of trying. Most analysts agree that the historic realities of colonialism and neo-colonialism have unleashed a sterile environment upon which democracy and good governance cannot take root. The manifestations of this harsh environment are evident in the pervasive elite corruption and resource mismanagement and waste that continue to fester throughout the region. It has now become clear that sustainable economic development will remain a mirage unless concrete steps are taken to harness Sub-Saharan Africa's reservoir of support for democracy to enthrone good governance. And many in the region have taken notice. One concrete effort has been the establishment of the Mo Ibrahim African leadership prize awarded to a former African Executive Head of State or Government who demonstrates unusual excellence in leadership which transforms his or her country while in office. The award, which carries a remarkable cash prize of $5 million U.S. dollars over 10 years and $200,000 per year for life was designed as an incentive to motivate African leaders to perform well once in office. Incidentally, only four awards have been made since 2007, including a 2007 honorary prize awarded to Nelson Mandela of South Africa. The prize was not awarded in 2009,

2010, 2012, 2013, and 2015 as the prize committee did not find suitable investitures. Many decry the paucity of award winners as indicative of the leadership deficit in Africa (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2016). Even with this failure, the idea that support for democracy runs deep holds out hope for stable self-governance and sustainable development.

Another penetrating effort that has shown immense improvements in leadership and good governance in Africa that must continue if this reservoir of support for democracy is to be channeled into good governance and sustainable development is the unrelenting impulse of the West to tie foreign assistance and all bilateral agreements to concrete achievements in democracy and good governance. As we have noted above, this arrangement has come under pressure in recent times with China's emergence as a major player in the region. The West has accused China of lowering the expectations of these countries as a way of breaking the West's monopoly in the region. China's role must not become a zero-sum, where what China gains the West loses. It must be engineered as a combined effort that forces Africa to continue to seek good governance. Of course, the fact that China itself is not a liberal democracy and practices state capitalism complicates these calculations enormously. Surely, China cannot impress upon Sub-Saharan African countries to make advances toward political and economic models that it has not embraced itself.

Perhaps the last issue we must mention is the one that has been a matter of constant dialog between industrialized and developing countries. It is this: for years now, developing countries have protested the role developed countries have continued to play as incubators of stolen commonwealth by greedy African leaders. Since these countries gained their independence in the 1950s and 1960s and by all accounts, this stash has mushroomed to hundreds of billions of dollars. These are resources that could have been deployed to yield multiplier effects in these poor countries but that are instead smuggled away and laundered in foreign lands. For instance, recovery and repatriation of these stolen funds is a major foreign policy push by the Nigerian government as this manuscript goes to press (Abubaker, 2015). However, the magnitude of this problem

requires much more than a single nation parading the world stage to "beg" for return of its stolen wealth. A concrete arrangement that allows these resources to be repatriated to these countries without further grandstanding could help bridge this gap between support for democracy, enthronement of good governance, and achievement of sustainable development.

NOTES

This paper uses data from the 2013 Spring Pew Global Attitudes Survey. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors only and have no connection to Pew, its agents, or institutions. A previous version of the paper was presented at the 57th Annual Meeting of Western Social Science Association, April 8-11, 2015, Portland, Oregon. We thank the meeting participants, Alvin Mushkatel, and the anonymous reviewers for their feedback that have been worked into this final version. Please direct all correspondence to Nicholas Alozie, Faculty of Social Science, College of Integrative Sciences and Arts, Arizona State University, 7271 E. Sonoran Arroyo Mall-MC 2780, Mesa, Arizona 85212-6415, USA. (alozie@asu.edu).

1. The speech was considered a significant enough "message to Africa" that it was carried live in the Plenary Hall of the African Union (AU) Secretariat at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. See http://bechamilton.com/?p=1012.
2. By liberal democracy we mean the presence of personal freedoms and civil liberties, free and fair multi-party elections, alternation of governments, rule of law, and press freedom.
3. The Afrobarometer Series, a joint project of Michigan State University, the Institute of Democracy in South Africa, and the Center for Democracy and Development in Ghana, was launched in October 1999 and reports the results of national sample surveys on the attitudes of citizens in selected African countries towards democracy, markets, and other aspects of development. Five rounds of surveys already completed cover 2000,

2003, 2005, 2008, and 2011-2013 (Bratton & Houessou, 2014).

4. Question 182a asked: have there been times during the last year when you did not have enough money to buy food for your family? We liked the cleanliness of this question as a measure of affordability. Although the income variable was included in the survey, we had two concerns regarding its ability to capture affordability across the countries. The first is that it was denominated according to each country's local currency. We could standardize by translating to some international value using a currency such as the dollar, but that brings the second concern of whether we could capture real consumption positions with the translation. We proceeded with the "poverty" variable instead of income.
5. Questions 48, 50, 51, and 52 in the survey provided the following choices: It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading here, Or it's bad that American customs are spreading here (48); I like American ways of doing business, Or I dislike American ways of doing business (50); I like American music, movies and television; Or I dislike American music, movies and television (51); I admire the United States for its technological and scientific advances, Or I do not admire the United States for its technological and scientific advances (52). These are all "yes" or "No" questions, where "yes" is coded as 1, and "no" is coded as 0.

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Appendix Correlation Matrix

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1	.												
2	.35*	.											
3	-.01	-.01	.										
4	.05*	.05*	-.05*	.									
5	-.04*	-.06*	-.14*	-.23*	.								
6	.01*	.03*	.04*	.01	-.31*	.							
7	-.05*	-.06*	.13*	-.08*	-.18*	.08*	.						
8	.01	.03*	.01	.29*	-.18*	.08*	-.15*	.					
9	-.09*	-.09*	.04*	.05*	-.15*	-.07*	.12*	.01	.				
10	.01	-.01	.02	.01	.22*	-.03	-.11*	-.06*	-.12*	.			
11	.08*	.05*	-.09*	-.16*	.28*	-.04*	-.08*	-.11*	-.08*	-.12*	.		
12	.07*	.05*	-.08*	-.13*	.24*	-.09*	-.07*	-.11*	-.04*	.11*	.17*	.	
13	.16*	.26*	-.03*	-.05*	.05*	.04*	-.07*	-.08	.10*	-.01	.12*	.09*	.
14	.11*	.17*	-.03*	-.10*	.08*	.08*	-.09*	-.02	-.16*	.05*	.12*	.09*	.61*
15	.11*	.15*	-.02	.04*	-.04*	-.03*	-.00	.05*	.01	-.03*	-.01	.12*	.07*

Legend: 1 = Democracy works 7-count; 2 = Satisfaction with democracy; 3 = Gender; 4 = Age; 5 = Education; 6 = Religion; 7 = Unemployed; 8 = Married/cohabitating; 9 = Poverty status; 10 = Urban; 11 = Internet liberalization; 12 = Westernization; 13 = Country economic well-being; 14 = Personal economic well-being; 15 = Support for democracy. Column 14 Row 15 = .04*
*Significant correlation.