
DEFENSE POLICY AND DOCTRINAL INSULATION

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Abstract

The U.S. Army changed its core battle-fighting doctrine in response to external and internal pressures throughout the 20th Century. Exogenous, material pressures found under the balance of power approach explain a great deal of doctrinal change, particularly through the first half of the Cold War, but these pressures alone were not enough to prevent typical organizational autonomy characteristics from surfacing towards the end of the Cold War due to an inability of the organization to respond to an enlargement of its scope of responsibilities. Thus, while Army decision-makers were cognizant of systemic cues when they modified their doctrine, eventually doctrinal change became a means of insulating the Army from the uncertainties found in fluctuating defense policies.

Introduction

Constitutionally the American Army's purpose derives from the simple phrase in the preamble to "provide for the common defense." Yet the American Army, twelve years older than the Constitution itself, has lived through many iterations of guidance as to what providing for the common defense actually entails. Just as the rest of the federal government has burgeoned over time in response to external and internal needs not covered by that rather sparse document, so has the organization charged with maintaining the nation's land forces.

Even though the ashes of Marxism-Leninism have cooled considerably, the Army still holds fast to its comfortable Cold War purpose and its ensuing doctrine. It was during that time, rather anomalous considered against the entire history of the United

States, that decision makers found it easiest to develop a grand strategy and its subsequent defense policy and supporting doctrine. Is it only in the post-Cold War world, however, that the Army has done the less than battle-focused tasks such as peacekeeping? A longer study of the Army's history outside the Cold War would suggest that the Army's primary purpose during the entire 19th Century, regardless of self-concept and other than the very infrequent episodes of actual battle, was exactly the now familiar role of constable and peacekeeper, a force somewhat removed from the pressures of international relations and sizably tiny. The 20th Century marked not only the modernization of war and the American Army, but also the first time in its history when the international environment drove its existence, transformation, and employment. Just as the external threat was not a driving factor during the 19th Century, and the Army had real missions to accomplish, though with greatly scaled back forces on the frontier, the initial half of the 21st Century portends a similar lack of external drivers, with the globe substituting nicely for the American West (Jervis, 1999). There are still roving bands of terrorists and suspect regimes to fight, but since the diminution of the Soviets, the Army has struggled to reconcile its concept of purpose with systemic dictates, partially by transforming itself to a lighter, more versatile force. A lighter, more lethal force of itself is good for the common defense; using that force because it will be even easier to deploy to places even further removed from any tangible national interest is not.

Basic Argument

This essay examines the 20th Century U.S. Army by exploring its responses to external and internal pressures through the vehicle of doctrinal change and its integration with strategy. A balance of power approach provides one useful tool for understanding doctrinal change given that the United States was a great power throughout the period studied and therefore increases in the offensive capabilities of putative adversaries should have triggered conceptual leaps in doctrine that would also be well integrated with the state's grand strategy and defense policy. Two other approaches that look inside the

organization provide alternatives to this balance of power baseline. An organization theory approach suggests that the organization's need to reduce uncertainty primarily by maximizing autonomy, but also prestige and budget, acts as the primary driver of organizational behavior regardless of integration with strategy. Alternatively, an organizational culture approach suggests that the social and institutional self-concept of the organization derived from historical preferences and successes will affect the doctrine that its leaders design in response to civilian guidance so that it also might not mesh perfectly with strategy, though peculiarities of the American Army dampen some of the more virulent tendencies of both organizational approaches. The general finding from the cases studies is that exogenous, material pressures found under the balance of power approach explain a great deal of doctrinal change and integration, particularly through the first half of the Cold War, but that these pressures alone were not enough to prevent typical organizational autonomy characteristics from surfacing towards the end of the Cold War due to an inability of the organization to respond to an enlargement in its scope of responsibilities. Thus, while Army decision-makers were cognizant of systemic cues when they modified their doctrine, eventually they used doctrinal change as a means of insulating the Army from the uncertainties found in fluctuating defense policies.

Realist and Liberal Foundations of the American Army

A realist approach suggests that all states will have armies with certain capabilities and that over time they will learn and emulate other successful armies (Waltz, 1979: pp. 127-128; Goldman and Andres, 1999: p. 83). Certainly this is the case with the American army that, over its history, copied many procedures and tactics from the French, British, Germans, and Russians in succession. More than any other entity within the state, the Army mirrors what a theoretically realist state would assume. Part of the dilemma in this project, however, is in reconciling the foundations of a realist analysis that focuses on the sameness of states with the notion of American exceptionalism. The belief of

there being a unique American concept and character must be examined as well (Morgenthau, 1993: pp. 143-149; Waltz, 1979: p. 97). Samuel Huntington intimated that, “a gap has always existed between the ideals in which Americans believed and the institutions that embodied their practice” (Huntington, 1992: p. 1). A military force, as Huntington observes elsewhere, has “functional imperatives that conflict most sharply and dramatically with the liberal democratic values of the American Creed” (Huntington, 1957: pp. 15-16). Is it problematic, then, that the American Army is situated in a Lockean liberal republic, obedient to the wishes of its masters, and subject to the passing whims and fancies of the public and their elected leaders? Many liberal thinkers have considered the army as an oppressive tool of the executive. John Locke’s conception of the theoretical state of nature was many times more generous than Hobbes’ dark vision as Locke placed his faith in the legislative body rather than a single sovereign, and more importantly, made a provision for the people to depose said government if it failed to uphold its role as a trustee of life, liberty and property (Locke, 1952: pp. 4-11). Of course Locke’s vision most animated the American Founders, who took the ideas of life, liberty and property and encoded them in the Constitution.

The American Army received a firm liberal imprint from the debates over the Constitution. Due mostly to territorial fortune, this imprint lay undisturbed until nearly halfway into the Twentieth Century. With its Constitutional constraints and peaceful neighbors, the U.S. Army was different from the ground forces of other nations for most of its history. The encroaching world of the Twentieth Century would severely test its liberal character (Edwards and Walker, 1988). The bias against a large standing army and its pernicious effect on liberty was so strong that it was more than 150 years under that Constitution before there stood one on American (and European and Asian, and now, Middle Eastern) soil.

The modern U.S. Army differs in at least three important ways from the heavily studied European armies of the early 20th Century. First, the American army has no feudal heritage and no significant history of meddling in domestic politics compared to

those in Europe (Hartz, 1955). These traits were solidified constitutionally and, in conjunction with its geography, material abundance, and relative isolation until the 20th Century, enabled the US Army to develop somewhat differently than the armies of Europe. Secondly, the U.S. Army existed in a bipolar world during much of the time period of this study. Because of this, the US Army had a single, identifiable enemy that served to focus doctrine. This trait is unique when compared to the European experience, given the shifting alliances that the Continent continuously underwent. Third, the U.S. Army during much of this time co-existed with nuclear weapons, which were welcomed at first but later rejected. The technological challenge that nuclear weapons posed to the writing of doctrine and the future of ground combat were an order of magnitude greater than those with which any other army had to deal. These three differences allow at least a partial reconciliation of realist logic and American exceptionalism. Another way to reconcile systemic dictates and the American Army is to consider how it operates in a liberal democracy that, due to its pluralistic nature, might at times have trouble developing a coherent grand strategy.

Grand Strategy and Defense Policy

Clearly defining strategy and applying it consistently to foreign policy is a problematic endeavor for all states, but particularly for liberal democracies subject to routine elections. Strategy covers a range of options. The highest level, grand strategy, seeks to synthesize the diplomatic, economic, cultural and military practices of a state towards a common goal of satisfying core interests and objectives. Below grand strategy are the policies that flow from each of the elements of grand strategy. With a single identified enemy, those policies generally work toward the same goals; in the absence of that enemy, they may, in fact, work at cross-purposes to one another. While the thrust of this project is not on strategy itself, but rather a bottom-up study of doctrinal integration with strategy, a working, broad definition of what strategy means in the American context must be provided in order to assess doctrinal integration therewith.

Most surveys of strategy in the West begin, and sometimes end, with Carl Clausewitz and his formulations of war as more of an art than an exact science. Clausewitz began by distinguishing strategy and tactics. Strategy was “the use of engagements for the object of the war” whereas tactics were at a lower level and concerned “the use of armed forces in the engagement” (Clausewitz, 1976: p. 128; Sun Tzu, 1994; Handel, 2001; Paret, 1986). More recent academic studies of strategy highlight the difficulty of developing any coherent strategy or of doing so inside of liberal democracies (Betts, 2000). Others lay out possible grand strategies for the United States, though without a Soviet Union, the likelihood of maintaining one, even with a substantial threat of international terrorism, still does not look likely absent another great power (Jervis, 1998; Posen and Ross, 1997).

The grand strategy across the cases, deliberately not developed to a greater extent, can be covered by essentially three categories. First, in the absence of enemies, the grand strategy is typically most sensitive to classic economic considerations found under American liberalism, so that this is characterized as economically driven, a situation found generally in the post-war periods in the study. The Second World War stands alone with an obvious grand strategy of defeating the original Axis powers. The Cold War, once it was firmly established under NSC-68, can be fairly characterized as having a grand strategy of containment that drove the varying defense policies.

While there are notable limitations to developing a coherent grand strategy, or even a defense policy, as part of the democratic system of the United States, the U.S. Army is constitutionally bound to follow the guidance that comes from its duly elected civilian leaders, even if it causes the organization considerable pain. Thus while receiving conflicting and oft-changing guidance is problematic, the Army normatively should attempt to make its warfighting doctrine support the immediate defense policy and therefore the grand strategy. The cases under consideration will give us several examples across varying periods of threat to the United States, either with minimal threat as in the interwar and post-Cold War period, or with considerable threat throughout the

Second World War and the Cold War. Thus, as U.S. grand strategy and its derivative defense policy changed, so should Army doctrine. The integration of the Army's doctrine with those higher levels of guidance is the question to be studied, by using a survey of the Army's conception of doctrine and testing it with three approaches.

What is Doctrine?

Doctrine is the conceptual framework that ties together theoretically and practically what the Army teaches, how it trains its forces, and how it fights in battle. These areas all work together synergistically, generate feedback, and eventually modify doctrine, though it is most sensitive to the capabilities of the forces in other states. Therefore, to assess change in doctrine I will look at three areas:

Purpose – All armies obviously want to win, but they have different conceptions of how to do so. How well is its doctrine integrated with the national strategy? In the absence of national strategy, what does doctrine provide? Does it react to enemy capabilities or does it serve the interest of the organization?

Concept – How does the Army's leadership think about applying force? Is the doctrine oriented offensively or defensively? How does it envision winning on the battlefield, by destroying the enemy's forces or his ability to fight, by deterring, by meeting every threat on every range of the spectrum? Does it favor maneuver or firepower? How does it view the role of the arms, branches, and services? Does technology play a role? What scale of operations and spectrum of conflict do leaders envision?

Structure – How are forces organized to support the first two factors? What is procured to support those? What is taught in the schools and how are they organized? What structures or command relationships exist to link training, operations, and doctrine?


This approach to doctrine differs somewhat but not drastically

from the conceptualizations of other authors. Mostly, this method of studying the Army's doctrine is one level below that of the state that other scholars consider. This approach gets more to the organization's self-concept by looking from the bottom up to its linkage to political guidance given in the way of defense policy. Changes in the U.S. Army's doctrine are most obvious in a single measure, the capstone written statement found in the *Field Manual 100-5* series. This manual is the blueprint for Army doctrine and provides the broad overall guidance required for commanders at all levels (Farrell, 1996). Because of its distribution and the time needed to implement its guidance, it is not changed on a whim, but only when there is significant pressure dictating the change, generally seen as well in the overarching defense policy (1).

Why Does Doctrine Change?

A key question arises as to why would there not be a status quo bias regarding doctrinal change and integration in the U.S. Army. After all, the Army is a governmental organization, a bureaucracy in most regards, and bureaucracies are designed for continuity, not change. They are begun to establish rules and procedures with which they will perform repetitive, routine, orderly tasks (Rosen, 1991: p. 2). Still, the quick survey of Army doctrine, over the past century does show that its doctrine changed at least a dozen times, many of those changes innovative and not just incremental, bureaucratic additions. While there are many elements of continuity through the doctrinal changes under consideration, and a fair amount of status quo, it is not as strong a bias as might be expected. The biggest reason doctrine changed in the 20th Century seems to come from the growth of U.S. Army roles and missions. The scope of possibilities which doctrine had to cover grew across the century as the United States took more of a role in world affairs. The following figure shows the expansion of this scope:

Figure 1: Scope of FM 100-5 Doctrinal Responsibility



*OOTW = Operations Other Than War

Necessary Distinctions

While noting these distinctions from the formulations of other authors the residual approach here is still characterized as testing a balance of power explanation against one in which an organization seeks self-generated ends to explain doctrinal change and integration with higher political and strategic goals. The most noted example for studying military doctrine remains Barry Posen's work. His balance of power and organization theory approaches explain doctrine in terms of three causal forces: purpose, people, and environment. Posen focuses mostly on how the organization attempts to reduce uncertainty, to the extent that it prefers an elaborate offensive doctrine and will only

innovate with civilian intervention (Posen, 1984: pp. 41-59; Zisk, 1993).

Another school of thought typified by Jack Snyder is that militaries want to reduce uncertainty and will therefore seek elaborate offensive doctrines that civilians cannot understand, the implication being if they do not understand it then they will not meddle (Snyder, 1984: pp. 24-25). Scott Sagan suggests that militaries prefer offensive doctrines because it allows them to deny the enemy his preferred offensive doctrine and place the battle at a time and place of their choosing. Sagan also argues that army officers will be perennial pessimists, who, while seeking to maximize the advantage their organization may have at any given point in time, may overly prescribe preemptive strikes and thus lead to more frequent wars (Sagan, 1995: 55-57). All of these scholars demonstrate a military bias for the offensive that also seems to coincide with some less flattering aspects of organizational behavior. Both Posen and Snyder share a realist outlook and some common underpinnings:

- 1) Civilian Intervention is a good thing because it shapes the military towards the objective strategic interest of the state.
- 2) Military organizations inherently prefer offensive doctrines and can pursue their own parochial interests rather than the national good if unchecked
- 3) That systemic conditions shape doctrine.

Their arguments imply that a military that seeks its own interest serves its state badly since it will break the link with grand strategy. Of course this begs the question as noted earlier as to whether or not the state can actually develop a coherent grand strategy. Neither do these authors account for an endogenous, cultural argument that the defense is simply not the way a warrior class does business. The American Army poses a different question, since, as previously noted, homeland defense has been nowhere on its task list until very recently. Finally, my argument assumes a gentler view of the aspects of military professionals, largely due to American characteristics as typified by Carl Builder (Builder, 1989; Betts, 1991).

As Elizabeth Kier develops her argument, military culture becomes an intervening variable between civilian decision makers and doctrine (Kier, 1997; Porch, 2000). Unlike Posen and Snyder, she suggests:

- 1) Systemic conditions do not directly shape doctrine
- 2) Domestic implications of military policy often shape civilian decisions
- 3) Military organizational culture intervenes between civilian leaders' interpretation of systemic conditions and the output of doctrine

Kier examines the same time period in the British and French armies. She contends that functional logic does not hold since both offensive and defensive doctrines can serve to increase a military's autonomy, budget, and prestige. Interests do not come directly from either the functional needs of the organization or the systemic environment; instead, Kier claims that military power is about the allocation of power within society as much as it is about state survival. She rightly posits that military culture intervenes between civilian decision makers and doctrine; her argument further suggests that the military culture responds to the external environment of the organization, which can be primarily the domestic political environment. It revolves around the question "who within the state has the support and control of the armed services?" (Kier, 1997: p. 20). While this argument is persuasive in the case of the interwar French, where the Right wanted a professional army to guard against the Left, and the Left a conscript army to guard against the Right, it fails to apply to the United States. This might be due to Hartz's liberal tradition with no feudal past in America, a factor that imputes a solid liberal core with only minor deviations to each side of the political spectrum.

It could also be that America has no contiguous enemies. Before the Cold War, the Army was reduced after every conflagration to skeletal levels and played a minimal role in domestic politics. The United States, until the Cold War,

possessed neither internal nor external enemies nor a large standing Army. By the time the Cold War arrived, the strict civilian control of the military had become inculcated, only to be reinforced by bipartisan Soviet fear. Both Democrats and Republicans shared not surprisingly similar views and beliefs as to the military's role. Like the realist versions, Kier's construct fails to speak directly to American exceptionalism. While her view of culture as an intervening variable is one which I share, I share it more in a realist sense. The Army has a culture that reinforces both functional and material needs. It seeks autonomy but has strong normative constraints and takes its role in providing the public good of defense seriously, even if to the detriment of integrating professional doctrine with political supervision.

For an overview of the implications of these three approaches, some broad factors can be compared. Consider the following table:

Table 1: Theoretical Overview

	Balance of Power	Organization Theory	Organizational Culture
Values Sought	Security	Organizational Autonomy	Social and institutional self-concept
Groups Controlling	Civilian Leaders	Military Leaders	Military Leaders
Civil-Military Relations	Normal: Subservient Military	Problematic: Aggressive Military	Not Problematic: Obedient Handymen
Interest Fostered	State	Organization	Organizational Norms
Modes of Behavior	Somewhat Rational	Selfishly Rational	Tradition Bound
Source of Behavior	External and Material	Internal and Material	Internal and Ideational
Key Drivers of	1) Nature and	1) Seeking of	1) Basic Values,

Doctrinal Change	Level of Threat 2) Intelligence on Capabilities of Putative Adversaries defined as new offensive doctrine, technological innovation, and cumulative resources	Autonomy through Specialization, Prestige, or Budget 2) Technological Advances 3) Use of Traumatic and Ambiguous events to gain autonomy	Norms, Beliefs and Formal Knowledge of the Organization 2) Historical Preferences and Successes 3) Learning from Wartime Experience
Integration of Doctrine with Strategy	Doctrine should be integrated deferential to the state's defense policy and strategy	Doctrine may separate from strategy as an insulation mechanism	Doctrine will serve the organization's self-concept more than the state's policy and strategy

Hypotheses

Balance of Power can best be characterized as the approach in which “states respond to potentially dangerous increases in power of their putative adversaries” (Posen, 1984: p. 21). The change in the offensive military capabilities of another state will be tested with three measures: new offensive doctrine, technological innovation, or an increase in cumulative resources (Van Evera, 1999: pp. 7-11). This approach generates two major hypotheses. First, if another state increases its offensive capabilities, then defense policy and doctrine will be integrated in response. This hypothesis would also suggest that both defense policy makers and the U.S. Army respond well to changing capabilities that threaten U.S. interests, and also that minimal civilian intervention is required for doctrinal change. Conversely, when the offensive capabilities of a potential enemy decrease, defense policy and doctrine may drift apart in the absence of a unifying threat. Due to this trend, the Army is not particularly innovative without systemic pressure. When the system is indeterminate, internal features can surface.

The organizational approaches suggest that doctrinal change serves the organization regardless of threat situation by reducing uncertainty through autonomy or by serving the social and institutional self-concept derived from historical preferences and successes. Both of these carry negative consequences for doctrinal integration with strategy. The approaches will be tested using two major hypotheses, one from organization theory and one from organizational culture. First, under organization theory, the Army will pick a doctrine regardless of threat situation, normally offensive, with which to maximize autonomy and insulation rather than integration with defense policy. It will use ambiguous and traumatic events to pursue a self-defined agenda. It will also likely fail to change doctrine except when prodded by civilians (Posen, 1984: pp. 47-49). Secondly, under the cultural view, if “the set of basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs, and formal knowledge that shape collective understandings” does not resonate with systemic cues, doctrinal change will not be integrated with defense policy (Kier, 1997: p. 28). In the American case, however, those cultural effects are tempered by an Army self-concept of skill, military art, fire superiority, and people rather than machines, systems, and platforms, with a nearly sentimental focus on the people element (Builder, 1989: pp. 33-34).

Given Builder’s observations, it is possible that the nastier version of organization theory found in the third hypothesis does not apply as well to the U.S. Army as to European armies or to the Air Force and Navy. There are certainly many episodes that reflect a healthy dose of self-interest, however, and part of the task is to illuminate those tendencies which organization theory suggests should be present, particularly across the period studied given that as a great power the U.S. Army’s doctrine should be sensitive mostly to systemic cues. Another point of interest is the offensive bias in American doctrine, which seems to predate reasonable organization theory explanations and is a constant, even in Active Defense, ever since 1892’s pre-doctrine and 1905’s manual, existing at a time when the Army’s role was not primarily that of war-fighter. This would indicate that bias is a

cultural one, though it differs from Kier's conception, since U.S. offensive doctrine was designed to be used with citizen-soldiers long before the large standing army came about, and not as a tool for the military to pick domestic political sides.

Because the United States was a great power throughout the time frame studied, this baseline will provide an adequate testing of those hypotheses. It is to be expected in cases lacking significant external pressure that organizational explanations might offer more causal value. The survey of each doctrinal iteration will test these baseline predictions and determine the usefulness of the balance of power and organizational approaches across a varied time period of 80 years. A great power's doctrine should be integrated with its defense policy and subsequent military strategy, in times of threat certainly, but also in times of relative peace, even despite the already mentioned problems with developing grand strategy during peacetime. If doctrine and strategy are not integrated, then organizational tendencies have taken hold which could endanger the well being of the state.

Findings

This study looked at the decision making of senior Army officials over the course of 80 years as they changed the Army's capstone doctrine. Doctrine was not fixed or immutable, but instead a living conceptual document that reflected the principal essence of the organization. The Army was not as stagnant as might be thought, and looking at these twelve iterations over a considerable swath of time shows the organization changing under a variety of pressures. Consequently, the *Field Manual 100-5* series is a valuable tool for studying pressures on the Army as an organization, both external and internal, international and domestic. The basic concept in doctrine that this study sought to capture however, was its theory of warfare, that is, how the Army's leaders thought the Army should be employed on the battlefield and whether or not that concept was integrated with or divorced from defense policy.

In this regard, the Army's core doctrine was fairly well attuned

to systemic conditions based on the Army leadership's projections as to the level and nature of threat and the offensive capabilities of putative adversaries. When other armies that threatened U.S. interests were innovating and developing new doctrine, weapons, and cumulative resources, Army leaders responded generally with alacrity. Yet despite this sensitivity to systemic factors, some of the features of organization theory and cultural approaches played a significant causal role in hampering doctrinal integration with civilian guidance. These organizational approaches generally surface most readily in the absence of systemic drivers, though surprisingly, also during the last few iterations of doctrine in the face of the threat from the Soviet Union.

During that critical period beginning after Vietnam, the Army, unable to cope with fluctuating defense guidance, specifically developed a doctrine that insulated it from defense policy and focused its efforts nearly squarely on operational excellence on a conventional battlefield. The Army's theory of fighting wars became its self-concept to the exclusion of what it saw as excessively variable strategic guidance. This runs counter to what a baseline balance of power analysis would suggest, given the Army's success on various battlefields that should indicate a close integration with defense policy and the grand strategy of a great power. The Army was sensitive to balance of power considerations, and those drove its increase in warfighting proficiency. But it was only through insulating itself that the Army could in the latter period of the study increase its warfighting proficiency by shielding itself from unpredictable domestic guidance. Consequently, a danger to the state, though not excessive, may exist when its primary armed force has divorced its concept of warfighting from the state's strategic concerns.

To survey the relevance of this paper, first I will provide an overview of the tested cases by comparing actual and predicted outcomes of integrating doctrine with defense policy under a balance of power baseline. In analyzing those cases, I will consolidate evidence from the case studies to demonstrate how

the external growing pressures on the organization to widen its scope and simultaneously respond to uneven guidance eventually forced it to seek relative independence, though still sensitive to threats from other states. Next, I will assess those themes in light of the September 11th attacks on the United States and suggest likely implications. Finally, I will address several relevant policy issues based on the causal and historical trends found in this study and draw a general conclusion as to the danger of divorcing doctrine from strategy.

Review of Outcomes from BOP Baseline Predictions

To synthesize the empirical findings, the following table is provided:

Table 2: Case Chart

Cases	Policy/ Grand Strategy	Defense Policy/ Strategy	Predicted Doctrine	Actual Outcome
A.1923	Economically Driven	Retrenchment	Divorced	Divorced
B.1939	Economically Driven	Isolationist	Divorced	Divorced
C.1941	Preparation for War	Buildup	Integrated	Integrated
D.1944	Defeat Axis	Total War	Integrated	Integrated
E.1949	Economically Driven	Atomic Deterrence	Divorced	Divorced
F.1954	Containment	Massive Retaliation	Integrated	Integrated
G.1962	Containment	Flexible Response	Integrated	Integrated
H.1968	Containment	Flexible Response and Counter-insurgency	Integrated	Integrated

I.1976	Containment	Realistic Deterrence	Integrated	(Divorced)
J.1982	Containment	Conventional Retaliation	Integrated	(Divorced)
K.1986	Containment	Conventional Retaliation	Integrated	(Divorced)
L.1993	Economically Driven	Projection Force	Divorced	Divorced

The first four cases all fit squarely with the baseline predictions from the balance of power approach. After the First World War, the United States returned very nearly to only self-regard and thus did not need a grand strategy other than pursuing economic growth. The United States did stay involved on the world stage economically throughout the 1920s, but defense policy fell by the wayside with muted debate over universal military training and rapid post-war demobilization. Despite dire predictions of combat on the North American continent, the lack of plausible enemies led to organizational concerns mostly shaping the 1923 version of doctrine. This case belies the cultural explanation most, given the relative lack of change from its previous version and the minor amount of learning that was taken from the Great War, such that the organization was able to retain a notion of relying on the man with the rifle, and even the horse cavalry, to the exclusion of most other factors. This internal cultural reliance would not likely have been integrated with defense policy, had there been one, and rather had to rely still on mass mobilization in time of need, though the military's call to train many men in the United States to stand more ready than they would be under then-current mobilization plans went largely unheeded.

The doctrine published in 1939 likewise falls prey to a similar lack of both grand strategy and defense policy. The Army had barely survived the Great Depression, partially by hiring out its officers to the Civilian Conservation Corps, and as such, no outside powers pressed for significant U.S. development in doctrine. Army leaders were aware, however, of the capabilities of other states, as seen particularly in the planning against the

British and Japanese in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Still, with a defense policy that can only be characterized as isolationist, the Army's lack of doctrinal developments and eventual minor effort in 1939 still indicate cultural effects at work as the major explanation, particularly those proclivities that retained a romantic notion of horse cavalry and individual soldiers fighting bravely on against equally stoic foes.

The versions of 1941 and 1944 are easy cases for a balance of power approach and show strikingly how well doctrine responded to changes in adversaries capabilities, even well short of war. Whereas 1939's doctrine only hinted at mechanization and combined arms warfare, 1941's doctrine made an enormous conceptual leap in warfighting capability with a rapidly assembled document developed mostly from the innovations in doctrine and technology demonstrated by the Germans against a series of hapless European foes. The Army then took these concepts and tested them in maneuvers across the southeastern United States before producing the document that would be used to train millions of mobilized soldiers. Grand strategy was becoming clearer at the time, as President Roosevelt made it rather transparent throughout those two interim years that the United States would support the Allied cause. That the Germans had made no aggressive overtures toward the security of the United States provides even more causal weight to a balance of power explanation, given that this conceptual leap in doctrine was made without that direct threat and based almost solely on the capabilities and not the intent of the most advanced state at the time. 1944's case is an even easier explanation for doctrinal integration with defense policy and grand strategy, given that the United States was actually at war with the Axis powers with a stated goal of total victory, in Europe first, followed by Asia.

The next four cases cover the first half of the Cold War and show the United States in a novel position with only one peer competitor. The first case, however, was one in which United States grand strategy was not particularly focused on military policy given the prevalence of the United States as the sole atomic and dominant economic power, thus relying mostly on

sheer deterrence and benevolent intentions. The Army, without a single focused enemy, despite some of its projections as to the likely capabilities of the Soviets, largely kept its successful 1944 wartime doctrine in place, word for word, in the 1949 edition, minus the Air Corps and with some minor role for atomic weapons. This supports another non-integration with strategic concerns example, as the cultural explanation explains most of this reticence to develop given the previous war that offered mainly success stories in terms of organizational learning as to the value of raw attrition. Additionally, the nascent Department of Defense system at this time was rethinking how to formulate defense policy, with the Army being the out party compared to the other services, at least initially, even as it tried to implement, again, universal military service.

In the 1954 case, the Cold War was engaged at full throttle, given the Korean conflict and the subsequent NSC-68 that had quadrupled the defense budget. The United States now had a grand strategy that would take it through the end of the Cold War. Under containment, all of the varying policies were designed to contain the Soviet Union across the military, economic, diplomatic and cultural spheres. Defense policy under the Eisenhower administration, however, was problematic for the Army, given the Administration's reliance on massive retaliation as the defense policy. The Army had very little flexibility under this system, though the now nuclear capable and conventionally massive Soviets did spawn a healthy concern for nuclear battlefield capabilities in the 1954 edition of doctrine, as well as in the subsequent Pentomic divisions. Some facets of organization theory began to surface during this period as the Army found itself trailing the Air Force and the Navy in prestige, budget, and influence. Still, 1954's doctrine can be fairly characterized as integrated with defense policy given its movement towards the European nuclear battlefield, even if many Army leaders saw from the beginning that this strategy lacked flexibility.

The doctrine of 1962 marks a sharp departure in defense policy from the Eisenhower Administration's guidance. Under

President Kennedy's Flexible Response, military policy was to counter Soviet influence across the spectrum and not just on European loam. This expansion of scope, to include focus on the lower end of the spectrum, was a welcome addition to the Army's repertoire in many regards, given that it gave the Army a tangible and achievable mission on conventional and low intensity, unconventional battlefields. The 1962 edition of doctrine welcomed the expansion in scope and incorporated detailed chapters in counter-insurgency in addition to the high intensity and atomic battlefields. As such, it was well integrated with defense policy at the time. Still, there is also a healthy amount of organization theory in Flexible Response as well. The Army was beginning to understand better the inter-service competition inherent in the new Department of Defense system and also welcomed increased roles and missions that expanding the scope of responsibility would give the organization in terms of specialization.

The doctrine of 1968 does not add significantly to scope of doctrinal responsibility. The grand strategy remained the same, with a Soviet-centric focus, though the war in Vietnam took up a sizeable share of defense policy as well, such that a focus on destroying the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong on the ground in South Vietnam was the driving strategic goal. The Army was largely successful in accomplishing this mission, partially at the counter-insurgency level, but mostly at the conventional tactical level, by maximizing attrition of enemy forces but failing to break their admirable will. The war indicates a sizeable amount of organizational influence, both from the cultural view, that valued learning from the wartime experience and direct ground combat, and from an organization autonomy view that suggested the Army could continue to gain prestige and influence by executing the assigned strategy, if only with greater numbers of troops. Yet, this case also reflects a fair amount of integration with defense policy, perhaps to the Army's detriment, as the goal in Vietnam was never realized despite reliance on sheer attrition. As such, it also reflects a concern with balance of power factors, given the offensive doctrine found in Vietnam.

In all, 1968's version of doctrine reflects almost in equal parts the influences of each approach, though all of these did in fact push toward integration with defense policy instead of pulling in the expected opposite directions. In summary, the middle four cases studied show one case of non-integration with strategy in the immediate aftermath of World War II given the lack of relative drivers at that time. The other three cases show a relative integration with defense policy and strategy, though in the last two iterations not solely for balance of power reasons. A creeping concern with maximizing the autonomy of the organization was growing and would continue throughout the next period.

1976's version of doctrine still fell under the grand strategy of containment but saw the post-Nixon Administration refocused on realistic deterrence in Europe and elsewhere, with much less of a concern for lesser conflicts. 1976's doctrine was also, more than any other iteration studied, the work of one man, General William DePuy. While partially insulated from defense policy through the creation of the new Training and Doctrine Command, DePuy was nonetheless very attuned to the capabilities of other states in the system, and he learned greatly from the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. From this benchmark, DePuy pushed his doctrine known as Active Defense toward first battle dominance through firepower. The belief underlying first battle dominance was that if the first battle could be won decisively, then the conditions for either later victories or negotiation could be set. Active Defense also had a nearly European focus to the exclusion of other theaters, something of a cultural after-effect of Vietnam. DePuy's doctrine reserved a large role for nuclear weapons, though it also laid the groundwork for conventional dominance that was to follow. As such, DePuy's doctrine is fairly well integrated with defense policy at the time, though as much by accident as by intentional flow from a grand strategy through defense policy to doctrine. This version marks the first true break from what balance of power would predict, as the Army's doctrinal efforts at the time came largely from a specialization function found under organization theory and a learning approach designed to preclude another Vietnam by maximizing the scale of the first victory in

the next war such that it would not be a protracted affair.

1982's edition of doctrine marks the last conceptual leap in this study and would only be improved on in a minor fashion by its two successors. Moving beyond the first battle firepower focus of Active Defense, 1982's Airland Battle shifted the focus to maneuver and to the operational depth of the battlefield. It was designed to defeat not only the first echelon of Soviet forces but also their second, and possibly third echelons, and thereby disrupt their warfighting ability without necessarily attriting every troop. As such, Airland Battle changed doctrine in three major ways: by shifting from firepower to maneuver, from the first echelon to the second and beyond, and from attrition to maneuver. The shifts in emphasis were designed specifically based on the capabilities of the Soviets, indicating a keen sensitivity to the capabilities of aggressor states. Yet the doctrine was developed largely free of interference from defense policy. Similar to General DePuy's Active Defense, Airland Battle was the product of relatively few minds working fairly autonomously. As such, Airland Battle cannot fairly be characterized as being integrated truly with the defense policy of conventional retaliation, and in fact, the development of the capabilities found in Airland Battle shaped defense policy to a much larger extent than the converse, such that doctrine began to reverse the posited chain of influence. This indicated a fair dose of autonomy through specialization, as well as cultural preferences for conventional combat and leadership of men, even if the doctrinal writers were well attuned to systemic conditions. Likewise, 1986's Airland Battle continued this trend, with another expansion in the scope of responsibility to respond to the lower level contingencies again, the lingering visions of Vietnam having receded somewhat from memory. Developed in much the same manner, Airland Battle 1986 also shows the organizational tendencies emerging as the training and education bases began to implement the 1982 concepts on a large scale.

The doctrine of 1993 was the next extension of Airland Battle, and reflected culturally the success of the previous edition of doctrine as seen in Panama and the Persian Gulf War. These


validations of the concept of operational shock found in Airland Battle and its training and education systems were seen as all that was necessary to carry the Army forward onto the battlefields of two near-simultaneous, major regional conflicts. Faced with force cuts and no driving enemy, 1993's edition was the first in decades without a unifying grand strategy, and with a minimal defense policy, described first as the projection force, but later as engagement and enlargement. An organization facing ambiguous international conditions will likely pursue the successful rules it had in place. As such, 1993's doctrine remained focused on the higher end of conventional conflict, again developed with little or no guidance from the administration, given the change in administrations during its development, such that its warfighting ethos, encoded after so many Cold War iterations, was not easily adapted to operations other than war occurring much lower on the scale of contingencies. Again, this iteration of doctrine reinforced organizational tendencies although in the light of a new administration and changed systemic conditions did not influence the development of defense policy as much as did its two predecessors.

Too Many Fluctuations

The major finding of this project comes from the linkage and lack of linkage between defense policy and Army doctrine. The scope of doctrinal responsibility depicted in Figure 1-1 came from both the external environment and from the defense policy that demanded capabilities across the larger spectrum. Yet that defense policy was not a constant throughout, and at times varied widely, even from one year to another, particularly during changes in administrations. Essentially, the fluctuation and range that could plausibly be expected in a defense policy was too much for Army decision makers to handle. Given that the Army had nearly complete ownership of doctrine, much more so than personnel strength, budget, technology, or weapons systems, it used doctrine as a tool to gain certainty in the face of possible radical changes in civilian guidance. Consider the following figure which overlays the central thrust of defense policy and doctrine separately on the previously developed doctrinal scope of

responsibility:

Figure 2: Defense Policy and Doctrine



Granted, the placements of the central thrust of both measures on this chart is somewhat subjective, yet their placement resonates generally with the findings of this study and the visual depiction helps illuminate the key proposition. As detailed in the summary above, defense policy changed throughout the period of study somewhat dramatically at key junctures, particularly during the Cold War. Initially, lacking interest in foreign affairs, defense policy was concerned mostly with protecting regional

corporate interests or coastal defenses, while the Army maintained something of a warfighting focus. The Second World War saw a necessary fusion of all levels of war in the face of a determined and capable set of enemies. The post-war saw an increasing reliance on nuclear weapons that the Army tried to follow but could not fully, also partially inducing some instances of organization theory expectations, particularly under the Eisenhower administration. The Kennedy administration brought a radical change to defense policy with Flexible Response and moved away from massive retaliation, followed by later focus on Vietnam that was nearly equal to the focus on the Soviets. Defense policy returned to the Soviets exclusively after Vietnam, but by then, the organization, which had attempted to adjust to two previous extensive changes had sought insulation through doctrine in order to reduce uncertainty. While the 1976, 1982, and 1986 versions seem to match neatly with defense policy, they were developed largely absent of civilian guidance and in the 1980s cases actually provide some amount of reverse causation. Likewise, the final doctrine continues the insulation path, despite a radical change in defense policy.

This chart helps highlight the initial sensitivity to balance of power concerns as perceived by the Army through its civilian generated defense policy. Eventually, though, the organization followed what organization theory would predict and sought autonomy. This relative even keel in doctrine as depicted can also indicate some of the cultural ethos of the organization, as its always felt most comfortable fighting the mid to high intensity battle against conventional foes.

American Exceptionalism?

In this study, doctrine was found to have developed eventually with minor regard for defense policy although grand strategy served as a cognitive device through which Army leaders still focused on putative enemies if not their own civilian bosses. Douglas Porch's incisive critique of Elizabeth Kier's work noted that Kier conflated doctrine with strategy, or grand strategy. More so than in the French case, American Army doctrine is

definitely not strategy. Doctrine as the US Army defines it and as outlined in the course of the study, essentially stops at the operational level of war, with a minor nod to strategy in the varying prefaces. For the U.S. Army, doctrine is largely a playbook for how to think, train and fight battles and campaigns; consequently, the Army is largely agnostic on strategy. Regardless of the strategic guidance for either defensive or offensive operations, the Army will generally find an operationally offensive way to accomplish the mission. The Army seems to remain satisfied with operational excellence and eager to leave the discontinuities found in not fully integrating all of the elements of national power to someone else.

Part of this inability to fuse the Army's doctrine with more strategic linkage comes directly from the American system of government. The Army is a loyal organization that follows its orders, yet it can receive a variety of conflicting guidance from the various components of government. Executive guidance may conflict with legislative budget priorities. Bases might be closed, and broad strategic guidance could conceivably change radically every four years. Partially to insulate itself from these potentially wavering strategic priorities, the Army essentially develops its own view of what the threat is, what the threat will be, and what it needs to do to meet it. Because the American system is wonderfully transparent, civilian decision makers are mostly kept informed of the Army's priorities and views of how to fight a war and provide tacit or explicit approval beforehand. In any case, as demonstrated, the Army rarely makes drastic, radical changes, and in the United States, there are several systems of oversight involved at least in terms of all of the material support systems of the Army, if not its doctrine.

Operationalization of Strategy

In many ways, the separation of the Army's doctrine from strategic concerns can be characterized as the operationalization of strategy (2). This is acutely problematic since when "strategy is not consciously formulated, it emerges by default. Instead of being the driving force in war, strategy becomes a mere by-

product or afterthought. In prolonged wars, this is a recipe for disaster, since even extraordinary tactical and operational successes may not add up to a winning strategy” (Handel, 2001: p. 354). In the U.S. case, Vietnam fits this description closely. The outcome of that conflict was one of the factors that inadvertently reinforced more separation of operational doctrine and strategy given that strategy had failed miserably. Similar examples are the Germans in both the First and Second World Wars. Always the superior force man for man, even the stunning victories found under *blitzkrieg* could not sustain a strategy that essentially challenged the entire world, despite considerable success in conquering virtually all of mainland Europe.

The greatest danger in divorcing doctrine from strategy is not surprisingly found in Clausewitz as he argues that “No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it” (Clausewitz, 1976: p. 579). This statement summarizes the primacy of politics over the lower functions of war. War without political aim and will is simply random killing that can only be classified as immoral. Derivatively, doctrine developed in the absence of political aims, no matter how efficient and artful on the battlefield, also lacks the same moral considerations, regardless if applied under either a realist or liberal schema.

As noted in this study, the Army remains largely agnostic on strategy and prefers to insulate itself with an operational focus, particularly in the absence of clear or wavering strategic guidance. While it is still highly debatable whether or not strategy can even be accurately described let alone formulated, the gap between doctrine and defense policy was not so troubling during the development of the seminal doctrines of 1976, 1982 and 1986. This was due mostly to the nature of bipolarity and the very obvious nature of who exactly constituted the enemy against which to plan. This trick of fate allowed the danger of divorcing doctrine and strategy to pass relatively mildly for that time period, yet the full implications of the danger became readily visible in the absence of the predictable, comfortable Soviet

presence. As indicated before, doctrine continued at a steady state of maintaining operational conventional warfighting excellence while the external international system dictated otherwise. While the danger of political aims of a state not driving the concerns of its warriors is the primary danger from divorcing doctrine and strategy, there are at least four other major negative implications.

Threatening Signals

First, an army not attached firmly to the political goals of its state is likely to develop an aggressive, offensive doctrine. In the U.S. case, this was a cultural relic at least from the 19th Century and not directly a factor of an organizational quest for autonomy (3). Yet this very type of doctrine can send rather clear and dangerous signals internationally that state does not want to send. This case was typified in Airland Battle, viewed by the Europeans as overly aggressive and likely to provoke the Soviets. As seen particularly in the case of 1939's and 1941's doctrine, a state does not even have to be under direct threat to see clearly what the offensive doctrines of other states can do, and thus provoke responses (Miller and Lynn-Jones, 1989; Mearsheimer, 1983). While conventional deterrence did seem to work, it was not until after a shaky initial period and could have gone horribly wrong. This anomalous Cold War example was one in which the Army's leaders understood the grand strategy intent of containment, yet through their own means moved aggressively past that with the operational shock of Airland Battle. These signals cannot but help other states to focus on their own shortcomings and consequently seek remedies more readily than they otherwise would.

Additionally, a strikingly offensive doctrine, if nearly the sole focus of an Army, can exacerbate a security dilemma. If an Army builds its entire essence around an offensive mode of warfighting, and then demonstrates those capabilities across a variety of scenarios, it cannot fail to be noticed by other states. Consequently, while Airland Battle and its derivatives led the Army to apparently easy victories in Panama and both Persian

Gulf Wars, this demonstration seemed to indicate, that at least for the United States, the offense was easier than it had been before, even in places where the United States had to deploy troops over great distances (Jervis, 1978). While one should not read an invasion by 20,000 troops of a Caribbean country near the United States or the weakness of Saddam Hussein's military as validation that the offense is easy, those situational factors only partially mitigate the fundamental concern. Conveniently, at the time, there was no state actor left to engage in a serious security dilemma with, though those actions would have exacerbated underlying tensions had such been the case. As such, the Army provided its portion of the possibly de-stabilizing policy with its distinguishable offensive doctrine that it developed internally. Civilian leaders then had the opportunity to advertise the Army's capabilities widely on the world stage. Without the precursor of offensive doctrine, civilian leaders could not have done the same.

Foot-dragging

The second danger of divorcing doctrine and strategy comes from foot dragging, or the resistance than can be found when the military is given missions that do not fit its self-identity. On a larger scale, the positive aspects of the American Army's culture, namely the norms and institutions of the political systems and the Army's own culture and heritage of continuous, unchallenged, constitutional civilian control, make its threat to democracy a rather moot question. The U.S. Army also lacks Kier's concern with the domestic arrangements of which party is in power and the subsequent relationship with the people. While there are some fears of growing Republicanization of the officer corps and of recently retired generals speaking on behalf of presidential candidates, the Army generally considers itself a profession and more reflects the humble servant notion found in Builder (Snyder and Watkins, 2002). Yet, there are still areas of concern under civil-military relations. As was seen in the cases, civilian intervention was not necessary to provoke doctrinal change. Indeed, there was only scant evidence that any civilian leaders paid any attention to how the Army designed doctrine. In the

American system it appears that civilian leadership will engage with the military and each other in contentious debates as to base closures, force end strength, the number of divisions, weapon systems, social policies and military pay among others, but rarely does it ever seek to tell the Army “how to fight.” Perhaps this is a true sign of Army professionalism or official’s trust in it, given that its core competency is left to its own design, something analogous to not telling a medical doctor how to perform an operation. This trait, however, also reinforces the divide between the Army’s operational excellence and overall lack of strategic integration.

On the grander scale then, foot-dragging is not a sign of an imminent coup. On a smaller scale, however, it can hamper an Administration's short-term policy. The drawback found in foot-dragging was perhaps most perceptible in the short war over the Balkan province of Kosovo inside of sovereign Serbia. As was indicated, an Army with a warfighting culture had not adapted well to a strategy of engagement and enlargement under the Clinton Administration. Advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff ruled out ground troops for the “war” before taking action, thus reducing strategic options. Once troops were actually needed to move to Kosovo, most notably in Task Force Hawk, the Apache helicopter detachment, there also appeared to be a considerable amount of foot dragging (Halberstam, 2001: pp. 463-467). Additionally, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, was not allowed to talk to the President directly, was ordered to not discuss ground options on television, and found himself very much at odds with the Army and the Army Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as he attempted to reconcile conflicting guidance from a variety of sources (Clark, 2001: pp. 273-283). Leading into the Balkan crises, a variety of Army leaders released reports as to the combat readiness of their units, with the implication being that peacekeeping task had degraded the wartime mission readiness of their units such that a lengthy re-training period would be needed once the unit returned from the seemingly unending occupation of southern Europe. While the wisdom of the United States being involved at all in a place that Chancellor Bismarck found worthless is certainly questionable, this

resistance to strategic options and mission orders runs counter to the American constitutional arrangement and liberal imprint of the Army and could portend a future similar set of problems, even under Republican budgetary munificence.

The Downside of Culture

A third drawback follows from foot-dragging and takes a broader look at the effects of a warfighting culture, in particular the lack of flexibility that this feature builds into the organization. The current military structure, though reduced in size but increased in scope, is left over from the Cold War; likewise, the culture built into the organization by the Cold War remains and results in dissonance with the new roles and missions. Following Builder's argument, the Army wants to see itself in the last year of WWII, or defending the Fulda gap, or invading Panama, or winning either Gulf War with dramatic armored advances and helicopter assaults across the desert. It does not want to see itself propping up an illegitimate democracy in Haiti, dividing a variety of belligerent ethnicities in the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, or handing out meals in any country on the African continent. This warfighting focus is necessary and maximizes operational effectiveness regardless of strategic consequences, yet again, might not support the broader strategic goals of an administration. The Army and most of its Special Operations Forces have performed exactly those envisioned missions by conducting combat operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan. The resonance with cultural values is certainly partially to credit for the amount of success thus seen.

In many ways, this Cold War culture, derivative of so many years of a constant threat, has cut into the "obedient handymen" concept and built in a cultural resistance to lesser missions. The danger here lies in over-socialization of the officer corps to threats. Most evidence does not suggest a war-mongering class of officers, however, but instead points to a general reticence to war combined with a desire to fight well if needed. This set of warfighting skills, however, perhaps does not cover all of the of needed skills to support national policy and therefore causes the

organization to lack flexibility. Particularly in the latter cases from Active Defense on, Army doctrine shaped young officers through their schooling and training, and as they advanced in rank found it hard to think outside of the Airland Battle framework. This apparent self-limitation of the Army's repertoire is partly a function of our American system of vacillating defense guidance that led to the Army's operational focus. Generations of officers have grown up thinking operationally, and perhaps find it hard to make the switch to advising on strategy and grand strategy once they reach the higher levels of service, relying still on a notion of how to fight a brigade or a division or a corps across the depth of the battlefield in a certain scenario but with a less certain vision as to reach the desired overall outcome of the use of force.

Losing Touch with the People

The final drawback to the operationalization of doctrine and the ensuing institutional isolation puts a personal face on the problem. Clausewitz outlined the trinity of the government, the military, and the people working together to enact policy. While the breaking of the link between the government and the military has been discussed, the current state of Army doctrine also threatens to break the link with the people as well. Despite American tradition and a long history of the expansible Army, the citizen-soldier is as dead as the Massachusetts Minuteman (4). Granted, the Army Reserve and National Guard have performed yeoman's work throughout history, yet they do not generate the self-concept of the active force. This development reinforces distance between a professional Army and its guarded citizenry. The actual strengths of the Army, adjusted as a percentage of the American population, are closer today to the strength levels of 1938 than any other year in the past century. A basic grasp of history obviously suggests that this percentage is rather low, and it is highly likely that of 286 million Americans, most of them will not know one of 480,000 soldiers. Forced to abandon the expansible Army in the aftermath of Vietnam and under Cold War pressures, the Army also lost touch with the American people since the introduction of the All Volunteer Force, which

not coincidentally mirrors the operationalization of strategy era. This evolution begins to cast some amount of doubt on Builder's earlier observation as to the Army's own history of being closest to the people, expanding and contracting with the threat (5). It may have taken the All Volunteer Force instead of conscripts to make the complexities of Airland Battle work; this example, however is one in which the Army took its raw materials and incorporated them into doctrine, not one in which the Army fought for a certain doctrine and then sought to shape conscription policy, essentially the opposite of Kier's French case.

Positive Connotations

While the negative implications of divorcing doctrine and strategy are serious, there are at least three positive implications. The first stems from the two doctrinal leaps in warfighting effectiveness seen across this entire study. The first leap, the transition from the arms to combined arms, was driven almost purely by the Germans and the reaction that their *blitzkrieg* provoked. This conceptual leap is most readily explained under a balance of power approach, given that the Germans represented the most capable state in the system at the time. The second conceptual leap took place largely without civilian guidance through the intellectual renaissance sparked by Active Defense and realized in Airland Battle. This instance was an equivalent jump in warfighting effectiveness as it transitioned from raw attrition to a more artful maneuver-based disruption of enemy systems through operational shock. This leap, however, was internal to the Army, and although spurred by concern with the Soviets, was also based partially on factors inside the organization as indicated previously. Perhaps this second increase in warfighting ability shortened the suffering of victors and losers alike, though it has also caused considerable consternation for Allies unable to keep up and enemies who must resort to asymmetric means. Nevertheless, this doctrinal good, the increase in the core competency, came out of the Cold War and out of insulation, particularly the method of thinking about how to design doctrine and then how to fuse it with military

education, training, and feedback.

The second positive implication that comes from the operationalization of strategy lies in the nature of decision making in a liberal democracy. As part of a pluralistic system, the Army's resistance to other than warfighting missions becomes part of the consideration when debating use of force for other than security related missions. While the Army normatively should try to accomplish all missions that its civilian leadership directs, the fact that it is a slow, conservative organization can induce some amount of constraint into an Administration's decision-making. It is plausible, from a balance of power perspective, that imperial policing is most likely to rouse future challengers and also probably not a mission that the American people would support if they were aware of it. It is also somewhat evident that while military forces can deploy to various locales to provide immediate assistance, they are not likely to solve the problems stemming from underlying social, political, and economic conditions within borders (Mandelbaum, 1996: pp.16-32). As such, if the Army's cultural resistance to expanding the empire at least causes some consideration during executive decision making, then it is much closer to serving its historic charter of providing for the common defense of the American people, as opposed to provoking balancing due to the international signals sent by military over-activity.

A third positive implication is that under this insulation strategy the Army retains a very high level of proficiency in its core warfighting skills. Across the period studied, had the Army's doctrine moved perfectly in synch with defense policy as designed by civilian leaders, then the Army of the 1930s would have given up the art completely, the Army of the 1950s would have been solely nuclear, and the Army of the 1990s emasculated as imperial constables. In each case the Army and its warfighting skills were needed in the ensuing decade. A complete tailoring to the dictated defense policy at any one point in time can unforeseeably and severely limit the options years down the line, another indication of why formulating an integrated grand strategy, defense policy and doctrine is a particularly difficult

task. Having a quality force with a smaller basic set of fairly fungible warfighting skills serves as a stability mechanism to a much greater extent than having a force with a wide range of responsibilities but no deep expertise. This option is also superior to one in which a force is tailored to one specific scenario and thus develops a less fungible set of abilities. In many ways this resembles a strategy of maintaining the core function, similar to picking an index fund designed to track rather than beat the market. This stability in itself offers some amount of flexibility to decision makers domestically since the quality of the fighting forces will be known and relatively constant, not subject to some set of experiments. At the same time, this predictability sends clearer signals in the international arena such that other states might perceive less danger than they would from forces that radically change every few years.

Conclusion

Regardless of selected policies, and despite its external and internal struggles, the Army will continue to serve the American people in its constitutional role. The Army has performed exceptionally well on the battlefield at the operational level; whether or not a coherent, overarching strategy emerges remains to be seen. Over time the Army has been required to serve and reconcile multiple sets of two masters. It had to serve pressures from the international system and from the domestic politics realm, a face-off between Hobbes and Locke. It had to serve defense policy and its own quest for excellence through doctrine. Within the organization, it had to reconcile tendencies towards organizational autonomy with its own culture of being obedient handymen. Finally, it had to reconcile American tradition that held the expansible, citizen-soldier Army as the model with the modern need for a ready, professional standing force. Christ's parable suggested that no man could serve two masters without neglecting one for the other. Indeed, the Army was not able to serve all of these masters equally well, and chose doctrinal insulation as the favored one. Given the available options, this was perhaps the best choice.

Notes

1. Farrell suggests that published doctrine is not good measure of what the organization is actually doing on the ground. This is a valid point that I will address in the paper, but still I would suggest that written doctrine flows from what a significant number of units experiment with before doctrine is published. Of course, once published, doctrine arguably should then be disseminated and followed Army wide. Across the cases I study, published doctrine takes on the role of generator of what units are doing in the ground primarily from the 1976 edition forward, though the prior editions do capture the ground truth *ex post facto*.
2. Handel called this phenomenon “tacticization of strategy” from which I developed “operationalization” to describe the U.S. Army’s view of it more accurately.
3. The doctrinal affinity for the offensive in the U.S. Army seems to predate any valid application of autonomy seeking expected under organization theory. It was present when the Army was tiny with no budget and no enemy before World War I. It was also present during the interwar, the Second World War, the Cold War, and remains today. Aspects of organization theory come and go in the American Army, but the offensive bias remains. Along cultural lines as well, the bias for the offensive is present with or without citizen armies; it was thought that American men possessed the requisite qualities to attack whether they were draftees or regulars. If anything, the constant predisposition with the offensive probably indicates a cultural explanation tied around the construction of military identity, a topic beyond the scope of this project.
4. The National Guard and the Reserves certainly count as citizen soldiers and perform many vital support functions in case of call up to active service. This was partly as a function of the post-Vietnam reforms such that important go-to-war functions were placed in the reserves, forcing public attention to the war effort

immediately. The notion of entire maneuver divisions of National Guard going into combat after a short train-up has been largely abandoned though. Still, the Army has managed to incorporate the National Guard into some of its less desired missions such as peacekeeping in the Balkans and on the Sinai peninsula. From all accounts, the National Guard performed those missions with aplomb.

5. One of the more disturbing features of being separated from the people is found in the nature of volunteers. Potential volunteers who have a plethora of options in life are not likely to join a branch of military service, particularly given the generational impact of the All Volunteer force coupled with fewer veterans from the larger wars in history. In particular this trend leads to a near complete absence of society's elites in the Army and other services, given that they can completely opt out of the system, especially since most of the elite universities in the United States have banned ROTC from their campuses. The Army, as a service, loses potentially bright candidates and simple recognition in the elite sector, perhaps leading to further civil-military gaps in the future as elites rise to positions of prominence. The Army's warfighting excellence is not hampered by the absence of elites, but its long-term health may be.

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