Transformation at Last?  
Achieving Radical Military Reform in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

Marybeth Peterson Ulrich  
Associate Professor  
U.S. Army War College

Department of National Security and Strategy  
U.S. Army War College  
122 Forbes Avenue  
Carlisle Barracks, PA  17013  
marybeth.ulrich@carlisle.army.mil  
(717)-245-3272 (w)  
(717)-245-3530 (fax)

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Introduction

Central and Eastern European (CEE) militaries have undergone dramatic changes in the postcommunist era. All have conducted significant downsizing, reoriented their national security strategies and military doctrines to adapt to the post-cold war strategic environment, and achieved the essential elements of subordination to democratic political control. Three CEE states, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland, were granted NATO membership in the first stage of NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement in 1997. Seven more received invitations at the Prague Summit in November 2002 – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania. However, all cases are still victims of their Warsaw Pact legacies which have had a long term impact on their societies, politics, and national security cultures. The greatest challenges exist in states that are adapting national security apparatuses inherited from the communist era. The Baltic states, Slovenia, and to some degree Slovakia, had the benefit of creating their national security systems from scratch.

This article focuses on the current efforts in the Czech Republic and Slovakia to finally undertake radical systemic military reform. Although each state has made significant contributions to NATO missions as either an ally or partner each has done so without the benefit of rational defense planning systems that can set priorities and match resources to defense needs. Communist era bureaucratic management practices have persisted as key national security institutions’ efforts remain uncoordinated. Personnel systems remain unreformed as the “inverted pyramid” structure on-hand in 1989 still lingers. Capabilities are low due to outdated equipment, short falls in human resources, and systemic limitations.

In 2001 both the Czech Republic and Slovakia began an attempt to break the cycle of inefficiency and lack of capability and institute radical military reform. As a long time observer of each case I was fascinated by the scope and ambition of each effort. Factors that had limited such efforts in the past had obviously changed and I wanted to understand the conditions that were finally coming together to effect real change. In each case a reform plan has been put in place and implementation is in the early stages. This comparative study analyzes the strategic context within which the reforms are being carried out and what has transpired to date in each effort. (1)
Backdrop for Reform – NATO Enlargement and the New Security Realities

In order to understand the direction that the Central and Eastern European security structures have taken in the post-Cold War era, it is essential to consider the parallel adaptations that have occurred within NATO. Since 1989, NATO has been engaged in the primary task of adapting its political and military infrastructure to the new threats and opportunities of the European, and now increasingly global, security landscape. Chief among the new opportunities was the possibility of reaching out to the former adversaries to the East to integrate the newly democratizing states into the West’s premier security organization.

Meanwhile, as CEE states surveyed the options available to meet the security needs of their states, the cooperative security approach embodied in NATO suited both their severe resource constraints and their goal of integration into Western institutions. NATO launched its Partnership for Peace ( PfP ) initiative in 1994 laying out in vague terms the criteria and timelines for accession. Participation in non-Article 5 alliance activities, the conduct of a minimum level of military reform in order to develop compatible military forces, and evidence that democratic forces had a firm hold on the domestic politics of the transitioning states were all important factors for accession.

The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were swept into the Alliance in 1997 amid a sort of political euphoria that these former “captive nations” had made the dramatic political and economic transformations, along with some progress toward reforming their national security structures, that merited admission to a key Western Club. This first stage of post-Cold War enlargement had fundamentally a moral and political character. There was not a great expectation that substantive military capabilities be contributed immediately. The common view was that defense reforms initiated in the candidacy and accession periods would proceed with the result of the interoperability and capability gaps gradually closing within a decade or so.

All three “first-wavers” fell far short of NATO military standards at the point of accession. Poland was largely regarded as having the most professional armed forces, with the Czech Republic and Hungary holding
down distant second and third places. The Czech Republic and Hungary have been continually berated as “new allies” for not living up to the commitments established in the accession process to improve their military capabilities. The Czechs have responded with the reform plan detailed in this paper, while Hungary seems to have accepted the moniker of “most disappointing new member of NATO.” (Wallander)

The Impact of 9-11 on the Continued Importance of CEE Defense Transformation

In the period between accession of the “first-wavers” on March 12, 1999 and September 11, 2001 it was widely assumed that at the Prague Summit distinctions would be made among the NATO aspirants based on their varied rates of progress toward achieving the criteria laid out in the individual Membership Action Plans (MAP) that each member was following as its path to NATO membership. Pundits predicted that Slovakia and Slovenia would be welcomed because of the commitment to reform that the Slovaks had demonstrated in the two years leading up to the summit. The Slovenes, though still in need of reforming their defense structures, would be invited because of their political progress and the ease of absorbing such a small armed force into the NATO system. The Baltic states’ admission would depend on the U.S.’s enthusiasm for antagonizing Russia, which had consistently opposed the admission of its former republics. Finally, Bulgaria and Romania’s domestic political situations seemed too tenuous to be resolved with sufficient certainty of the continued dominance of democratic forces by 2002.

However, the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 completely changed the calculus of enlargement. Testifying before Congress in June 2002, Robert Bradtke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs laid out the Bush Administration’s new view, “We want as many allies as possible in the struggle against those who would destroy our way of life and who would threaten us with terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” (Bradtke) He went on to credit all nine candidates (to include Albania and Macedonia who did not receive invitations at Prague) for taking the MAP process seriously and for making “real progress.” (Bradte)
This focus on the primacy of providing capabilities and assets, no matter how small, to contribute to the War on Terrorism coupled with the Bush Administration’s preference to increasingly regard NATO as a “tool box” from which forces and niche capabilities can be drawn upon to contribute to US-led coalitions has resulted in the downplaying of overall military capabilities at the point of accession. Assessments evaluating the progress in the MAP process concluded that none of the nine aspirants had fully met the formal criteria for membership and that the military capabilities of all are substantially weaker than those of the “first-wavers” at the time they were invited to join in 1997. (Moroney, 2002)

Observers predicted that NATO would signal its future direction – toward a more politically oriented Euro-Atlantic talking society or toward a reinvigorated defense organization committed to retool further to maintain its relevance vis-à-vis global threats – with the scope of the enlargement at Prague. A smaller enlargement taking in only the most capable candidates would send a message that accession standards are necessarily high because the Alliance must be careful to absorb only those armed forces that will not dilute the Alliance’s capacity to deploy integrated forces through NATO integrated structures to take on NATO-led missions. A larger enlargement, such as the “big bang” approach undertaken at Prague, was thought to be a signal that NATO was defunct as a military organization. Groucho Marx once quipped, “I’d never join any club that would have me as a member.” Extending invitations to states with armed forces substantially below NATO standards and to some states with uncertain democratic futures, given the negative experience of trying to keep the first wave allies on track, would seem to indicate that delivering military capabilities was no longer NATO’s raison d’être. Allowing such a development would signal further the Bush Administration’s intention to continue to bypass NATO as a key instrument of its foreign and security policy.

What actually happened at Prague, however, was more of a mixed and complex message. NATO favored the “big bang” enlargement, yet at the same time insisted that the Alliance was entering a new era of relevance and would be a prime player in the War on Terrorism as well as be a force to put down other global threats. Summit leaders approved the formation of a joint 21,000 Response Force to have initial operational capability no later than October 2004, streamlined the command structure, and adopted the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) that will newly focus the allies,
new and old alike, on making major gains to improve military capabilities in key areas.

What do these developments portend for the prospects of sustaining military reform in CEE within both the new and newly invited allies? There is universal agreement that leverage over new members diminishes drastically once the “golden ring of NATO membership” is achieved. Indeed, some have proposed organizational mechanisms through which under-performing members can be sanctioned and, if non-performance persists, dismissed from the Alliance. (Wallander, 2002: p. 6-7) The adoption of such a mechanism would be a positive lever for ensuring continued progress on improving the defense capacities of the CEE states.

The return of a NATO capable of leading coalitions would also be an impetus for continued reform. An Alliance concerned with the ability of its members to perform military missions in an integrated fashion would be more likely to keep the pressure on members straying from the interoperability standards required to be successful in such operations. The alternative is the scenario that has already played out in US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In these cases the essential capability is the ability to make specific niche contributions to enhance and support the U.S. military machine. To be a player in a security environment where the U.S. does all the heavy military lifting, while ancillary players contribute according to their means, CEE allies will have to develop individual niche abilities in order to participate.

A final motivation to follow through with the military reforms that will yield increased capabilities may be found in states who value the perception that they are “security contributors” to the multi-national challenge of meeting transnational threats – regardless of whether or not they are members of NATO. Ratislav Kacer, State Secretary of the Slovak Ministry of Defense, articulated this view for Slovakia:

The reform of the armed forces is mainly connected with the new reality and new security challenges in the world. We must abandon the Cold War model and adopt the armed forces of a modern European democracy, which has nothing to do with NATO membership, although the success of transformation increases our qualification for NATO. But
Slovakia would have to undergo such a development even without the membership. (CTK)

Kacer added that Slovakia was interested in expressing “the ability of playing an active role in world politics, contributing to the solution of emergency situations, and showing a certain international maturity. I would not like to link this with NATO membership.” (CTK) While the direction and relevance of NATO may still lack certainty in the wake of the Prague Summit, the current international security environment calls for increased capabilities on the part of all states whose interests are threatened by the transnational threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction as well as the challenges of dealing with failed states, resolving post-conflict societies, and nation building. These tasks will require a spectrum of capabilities sustained over an indefinite timeline. The U.S. has neither the resources, nor the wherewithal to take on these challenges alone. It is within this context that the success of military reform in CEE states, and within other states with shared interests is important. This is the spirit within which the Slovak and Czech cases will be explored. The hope is that by studying these cases and following them through the implementation phase, lessons for other CEE states who have experienced intractable problems in carrying out comprehensive military reform, yet seek to contribute some capabilities toward countering regional and global threats will be learned.

**Slovakia – Slovak Republic Force 2010**

**Background Leading to Reform**

The Army of the Slovak Republic (ASR) has only existed since 1993 when Slovakia became an independent state, but its historical legacy follows a line of succession back to the Czechoslovak Army (1989-1993 and 1918-1938), the Czechoslovak People’s Army (1948-1989), and in the Partisan resistance to the Slovak German puppet state in World War II. Problems of organization and reorganization have plagued the ASR from its inception as it was forced to deal with the challenge of building a national security structure out of the assets inherited from the division of Czechoslovakia in 1993. The Slovaks shouldered the greater burden of
reorganization of the two new states since they received only one third of the joint assets and had to create not only their national security institutions, but their entire governmental structure from scratch. This posed such practical challenges as finding the requisite office space to staffing the myriad positions throughout government and the security community. (Ulrich, 2002) The overwhelming challenge proved to be adapting the former Warsaw Pact legacy organizations, doctrine, and management systems to the needs of the new sovereign state. (Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, 2002: p. 3)

Although the Slovak government was on record for supporting accession to both the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1993, little was done to advance these objectives until the Meciar government was voted out of power in 1998. Bold reform plans can be found dating to the first few years of the Meciar regime, however, no evidence of substantive implementation throughout those years exists. (Samson, 2002: pp. 146-147) From the start, Slovakia was a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a body created to facilitate consultation and cooperation with the former Eastern bloc on political and security issues. Slovakia signed its Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Document in early 1994 and participated in three rounds of accession discussions in 1996.

Slovak politics under Meciar was incoherent in that public pronouncements supported the rational and practical view that Slovakia must maximize its opportunity to be integrated into European institutions, but in practice the government was disinterested in facilitating the conditions that would facilitate such gains. Emblematic of the lip service paid to European integration aspirations was the turning over of the reins of the Ministry of Defense to the extreme nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS) even though the party openly opposed the goal of NATO membership. (Szayna, 2000: p. 74) Meanwhile the development of a domestic political environment conducive to reaching consensus on issues of national security, or any issue for that matter, was thwarted by Meciar’s refusal to let opposition politicians fully participate in the political process. (Szayna, 2000: p. 74) The international community’s repeated citings of the Meciar government for violating democratic norms led to its pointed exclusion from the first post-cold war wave of new allies whose selections were announced at the 1997 Madrid Summit.

The Meciar period seriously affected the evolution of all Slovak
institutions in general, and of the national security infrastructure in particular. (Ulrich, 2000a) By 1998, opposition forces tired of bankrupt economic policies, eager to restore the rule of law, and determined to integrate Slovakia into the EU and NATO, coalesced into a united front and defeated Meciar in the 1998 parliamentary elections. The new Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda had led the opposition coalition and pledged to make admission to NATO and the EU the centerpieces of Slovak foreign policy, root out corruption, restore democratic principles and rebuild the economy. (Ulrich, 2002b)

Political will to undertake reform and to commit scarce economic resources to it is a key factor for substantive reform. This did not exist in Slovakia prior to 1998. The conditions for substantive reform of Slovak national security structures finally began to take shape in the Dzurinda government. Slovakia had lost five critical years and squandered a golden opportunity to become a NATO member. Within a year of taking power, though, the Dzurinda government approved in June 1999 a program for preparing the country for NATO membership called PRENAME (Program for Preparing Slovaks for NATO Membership). (Bilchik, 2001: p. 251) This program was a marked departure from past declarations of interest in NATO membership in that it required all government ministries to coordinate their activities undertaken to support the state’s candidacy for NATO membership.

Several western defense assessments were completed which agreed that numerous serious deficiencies plagued the defense establishment. On the heels of the British and American assessments came a negative NATO Planning and Review Process (PARP) Assessment in February 2001. The Dzurinda government concluded that “an extraordinary effort had to be initiated if there was to be any hope of creating the conditions for successful reform and the changes in strategy, doctrine, organizational designs, and operational concepts that would be required.” (Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic: Force 2010: p. 3) In March 2001, Prime Minister Dzurinda directed that such an effort be undertaken.

Scope of Current Reform Effort

The Minister of Defense published Ministerial Order Number 9 in March 2001 outlining the objectives, priorities, and organizational structure that
should characterize long term reform. The order stated that the goal was to transform the ASR into a small but capable force interoperable with NATO and appropriately structured, trained, and equipped to meet the national security needs of the state. A Senior Level Steering Committee was established along with subordinate working groups to develop a Long Term Plan for the total reform of the ASR. The Minister of Defense State Secretary was appointed committee chairman and the Chief of the General Staff was named deputy chairman. The Deputy Chief of the General Staff supervised the work of five working groups charged with proposing reforms to the force structure, personnel system, logistics system, and process of integrating the Ministry of Defense and General Staff organizational structures. (Svec, 2002: pp. 8-9)

The Role of National Security Documents

Slovakia had been slow to put in place a comprehensive set of quality national security documents to guide the transformation of national security institutions. This was a key factor limiting the success of previous reform efforts. The Slovak Ministry of Defense published *The Defence Doctrine* (1994) followed by the *National Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic* (1996), and the *Concept of Reform to 2003*. However each of these policy and doctrinal statements was developed in the absence of an overarching national security strategy. They therefore lacked both a logical hierarchy and the consensus found in mature national security systems. US Department of Defense external evaluators criticized these efforts as not adequately addressing the defense requirements and concepts of their era. The 1999 *Defense Assessment of the Slovak Republic* said that key elements essential to provide the conceptual foundation for future military reform such as a broad National Security Strategy, and a subsequent National Military Strategy were missing. (Defense Assessment of the Slovak Republic, 2000: p. viii)

Consequently the specific mission given to the five working groups driving the reform process begun in 2001 was to develop a comprehensive set of national security documents as a key step to comprehensive reform. The documents to be developed included:
Key to the overall enterprise was the drafting and approval of the Military Strategy, since this document would serve as the basis of the detailed planning process getting underway. As the reform team was being organized the National Council of the Slovak Republic approved Slovakia’s first Security Strategy in March 2001. This document was unique in that it engaged key national security stakeholders in its drafting and for the first time articulated long term Slovak interests. (Ulrich, 2002a) The Defense Strategy was subsequently approved in May 2001. This document elaborated on the defense policy component of the Security Strategy and provided the conceptual framework for the development of the Military Strategy.

The Military Strategy surveys a variety of threats and developed different scenarios each of which would require different force structures and capabilities depending on the nature of the threat. The Military Strategy concludes that the probability of a major armed conflict requiring a unilateral Slovak capacity for national defense is low, while there is a moderate probability that a regional armed conflict requiring a unilateral capacity could occur. Acknowledging and accepting the risk of not allocating the vast majority of resources toward low-probability threats made possible the decision to put forth a strategy that recommends downsizing the inherited force structure to gain savings that could be applied to such near term priorities as enhancing NATO compatibility and interoperability, reforming the personnel system to emphasize the roles of junior officers and NCOs, introducing training management systems to improve unit training, and funding quality of life issues to help recruit and retain the force. (Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic. 2001: pp. 14-15)

The Military Strategy recognizes that the most likely threats will call for forces prepared to participate in ‘cooperative security’ responses rather than territorial defense, and assumes that Slovakia would not face an aggressor.
alone. (Western Advisor to Slovak General Staff Interview, July, 2001). Despite reservations of some members of parliament that the Military Strategy was too vague, the National Council unanimously approved it on October 25, 2001. From March 2001 to the Military Strategy’s approval seven months later the assumptions of its working drafts outlined above served as the conceptual guidance to the working groups as they fleshed out their specific proposals and completed the complementary documents, Organizational Structure of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, the Program Force Model 2010 document, and The Long Term Plan of Structure and Development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic. Ultimately all of these inputs served as the basis and rationale for the overall plan to reform the ASR – Slovak Republic(SR) Force 2010.

**Drafting the Plan – The Importance of Leadership, Process, and Players**

Observers agree that prior to March 2001 and the launch of Slovak Republic: Force 2010, reform efforts did not benefit from collaborative participation across relevant ministries or between the General Staff and the Ministry of Defence. Furthermore, the half dozen earlier attempts at reforms depended on the efforts of Moscow educated military leaders who were neither committed to implementing real change nor had the relevant skills to conduct such a review. (J. Pivaric interview, 2001) SR Force 2010, however, would be approached quite differently. In the few years leading up to SR Force 2010 General Milan Cerovsky, Chief of the General Staff, methodically assigned western-educated officers to key positions in the Slovak Army and MOD. These officers were then hand-picked to lead up the various working groups that shaped the various dimensions of SR Force 2010.

“Old-school” officers opposed to sweeping reform still serve, but their influence in the drafting of the plan was marginalized in several ways. First, such officers were not given positions of responsibility on the reform teams, and, second, both the military and civilian leadership sent clear signals that dissenters were “not on board” and active steps to thwart the process would not have a positive impact on such an officer’s career. Such an approach was effective in an environment where it was well understood that a likely
result of the reform effort would be the downsizing of the swollen top ranks of the officer corps. However, given the tenuous political situation in Slovakia many of the reform-minded officers expressed concern that a shifting political wind could move them out of their positions of influence and facilitate a climate where the conservatives could become ascendant again.

Another key feature of the SR Force 2010 planning process was the presence of an outside team of American consultants that the Slovak government hired to assist the Slovak defense community in the drafting of the comprehensive reform plan. Cubic Applications, Inc. received a multi-year contract to help structure and implement plans for total military reform. It completed a comprehensive report in December 2000 based on four months of studying the Slovak defense system up-close which then became the basis for designing both the methodology and substance of the planning process begun in March 2001. (Howard interview, 2001) The top civilian leadership in MOD eagerly acknowledged the crucial role that the American consultants played. State Secretary Josef Pivaric noted that it has been easier to reach consensus on particular proposals in play in the reform process when US experts stand behind them. He added, these are “fantastic experts and experienced” of such high quality. (Pivaric interview, 2001)

Clearly, the presence of the American team was a critical ingredient to the whole process. Expertise was inherent in the group of outside consultants that was simply not present among the “native” members of the Slovak defense community. The American consultants were careful, too, to forge good working relationships with other influential outside advisors to the Slovak defense community. The key individuals in the Slovak case were the British Brigadier, French Lt. Colonel, and German Colonel assigned to advise the Chief of the General Staff, Land Forces Commander, and Defense Planning Groups respectively. When it came to key decisions in the reform process related to the professionalization of the ASR these players usually had coordinated positions and advice which made it easier to reach consensus on the range of issues being considered in the comprehensive reform planning process. (Howard interview, 2001)

Observers of the reform effort uniformly note that it benefits from a favorable leadership environment from the top echelons of the national government through the military and the Ministry of Defense. There is a broad consensus across political parties on the priority of integrating Slovakia into European security and economic institutions. The concept of
SR Force 2010 was successfully pitched as a way to achieve these objectives by overhauling defense structures and concepts in order to create a more NATO-compatible force. Dzurinda infused the MOD with experienced international bureaucrats by assigning seasoned Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) hands to MOD leadership positions. The Minister of Defense, Josef Stank, as well as MOD State Secretary, Ratislav Kacer, had served in key MFA roles. Stank was previously the Slovak Ambassador to Prague where he observed the Czechs become selected for and accede to NATO. Kacer had worked on international security issues at MFA and accepted a transfer to the MOD with the understanding that his role was to lead a resistant bureaucracy through major reform. These civilian leaders, along with General Cerovsky whose key role has already been noted, remained engaged in the planning process and truly led the effort at every stage.

The particular methodology of the planning process is another feature worthy of greater study in-depth. The Steering Committee met monthly to assess the progress of the individual working groups and the development of the overall plan. General Milan Cerovsky, Chief of the General Staff, as well as the State Secretaries for Defense, Members of Parliament, and NATO Ambassadors were active participants in the steering committee. Those involved with the process noted that often these high-level participants would become personally engaged in the various debates that ensued about the way ahead across the gamut of issues considered.

Slovak officers, senior Slovak defense officials, members of the American CUBIC team, and other western advisers agree that the process of conducting the comprehensive strategic review has in and of itself resulted in significant changes that are already having an impact on how the Slovak defense community conducts its business. A key problem prior to the launch of the SR Force 2010 strategic review was the integration of the General Staff and Ministry of Defense. The General Staff and Ministry of Defense had only recently been co-located in Bratislava and were attempting to overcome years of uncoordinated efforts. Parallel directorates existed in each entity that rarely worked together to achieve results in common areas of responsibility. The strategic review, however, was set up in such a way that representatives from the MOD and General Staff were forced to serve on the various working groups together. In many cases individuals with common responsibilities had never even met. The common enterprise of serving on the working groups has helped to promote
cross-institutional communication and has had some positive effect on integrating the MOD and General Staff.

An Overview of SR Force 2010

_TO ESTABLISH, BY 2010, A PROFESSIONAL, EFFECTIVE, BUT AFFORDABLE, ARMED FORCE ORGANIZED, EQUIPPED AND TRAINED TO COMPLY WITH THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC, MODERNIZED TO BE INTEROPERABLE WITH NATO MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS._

,Objective – Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic -- Force 2010, p. 15

SR Force 2010 is a departure from all previous Slovak attempts at reform because of its scope – the effort is total affecting all aspects of the ASR and its oversight; its political support from above – the Slovak government has given its full support to the effort; its political support from within – key Western-educated officers are staking their careers on its success; and, finally, its acceptance of realistic assumptions in terms of its matching of reform objectives with economic resources.

Another key concept to understand about SR Force 2010 is that it embodied Slovakia’s hopes for NATO membership. The timeline governing the working groups’ activities appears to have been developed to be synchronous with key milestones in the months leading up to the issuance of the second wave of NATO invitations in Prague in November 2002. Indeed, one could make the case that the Slovak strategy for “earning” its way to a NATO invitation was to invest its resources in the detailed articulation of a credible defense reform plan leaving the challenges of actual implementation to the months and years subsequent to invitation’s
Key Elements of SR Force 2010

Economic Assumptions

Previous reform efforts were severely under funded and conducted without the benefit of a strategic planning process that effectively and realistically matched objectives with economic resources to carry them out. This led to inappropriate, incomplete, or stalled implementation. SR Force 2010 was developed with a reasonable annual funding level in mind. The defense planners received assurances from the government that 1.89 percent of GDP was a defense spending level that they could expect the government to maintain through 2005. From 2006 onward the expectation was that defense spending would increase to a minimum of 2 percent of GDP. (SR Force 2010, 2002: p. 19)

Force Structure and Modernization

The threat analysis conducted in the military strategy called for the development of a force structure that would transform the ASR into a smaller, but high quality force capability of contributing to a range of collective security operations across the entire spectrum of war. A major goal of SR Force 2010 is to reduce the overall manpower levels from the current level of 40,000 (includes civilian employees) to approximately 24,000 personnel with the possibility of further reductions as the final force structure evolves. (SR Force 2010, 2002: p. 48)

Accomplishing the Force 2010 force structure goals will require integrating and streamlining the current MOD and GS structures to eliminate redundancy. Much of this reorganization was implemented beginning in October 2001. Departments and positions have been redesigned, eliminated, or created. However, creating a culture where the GS and MOD effectively carry out their shared tasks in an integrated
fashion requires a transformation of attitudes and ethos.

The plan also calls for centralizing training under the Training and Support Command and adopting a new military structure formed around a light infantry brigade, a mechanized infantry brigade, an artillery regiment, an engineer battalion, a signal battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, an NBC battalion, an electronic warfare battalion and a command support battalion. *(SR Force 2010, 2002: p. 22)*  Air Force operations will be streamlined to consolidate tactical fighter and transport operations at a single base and helicopter operations at another base.  Other air force operations will be streamlined and consolidated at single locations.  Base closures will result from the force structure reorganization of both the land and air forces.  Equipment modernization emphasizing a greater mix of lighter, wheeled vehicles and multi-role more modern aircraft will also gradually be undertaken with more resources flowing to this objective after 2006.

**Supporting Programs -- Personnel Reform**

Fundamental transformation of personnel systems has eluded most postcommunist militaries and been a major cause of these armies’ lack of capabilities.  Top-heavy rank structures consume defense budgets and prohibit the development of more rational structures that match needed skill sets and experience levels to the appropriate positions across the force.  Colonels still outnumber Captains in the ASR by a hefty margin.  *Force 2010* calls for radical change that will reduce the number of senior grade officers and increase the number of junior officers and NCOs.  Yearly targets have been set in order to reach the desired force structure by 2010.  The 2002 goal was to reduce the officer corps by 1000 by the end of the year.  Observers report that while carrying out such reductions is inherently difficult, the Slovaks are on track.  Careful management of this particular element is key to the success of the overall plan.  The method of reducing the force must be perceived as fair and transparent.  Slovak defense leaders must be careful to balance their multiple goals of reducing, recruiting, and retaining. *(Gledhill interview, 2002)*

The ASR has also simultaneously taken on the additional challenge of eliminating conscription and moving to an all-professional force by 2006.  This requires a reconceptualization of officer and NCO roles as currently
practiced in the ASR along with conversion of present grade structures to accommodate junior, mid-level, and senior NCO positions.

The ASR has set for itself the ambitious objective of radical force restructuring while simultaneously trying to systematize a merit-based promotion system, establish a program for separating career personnel, rationalize its compensation system, and institute a recruiting system. Inevitably, serious challenges lie ahead as the attempt to simultaneously implement these reforms gets underway.

**Supporting Programs -- Leader Development and Military Education**

SR Force 2010 institutes systemic leader development into the ASR. This constitutes radical change. Under the current system, military education is technically oriented and focused on the development of military specialists. The reform plan will introduce leader education at all levels of the professional military education system. The plan also calls for consolidating the various military academies into a single National Defense Academy beginning in 2003. (SR Force 2010, 2002: p. 50)

**Supporting Programs – Sustaining and Stationing**

The top logistical priority is to transform ASR logistics structures to ensure compatibility with NATO systems. The present 26 logistics bases will be reduced and consolidated into five bases by 2010. A Logistics Command will be created as a material management center and various services will be studied to see which can gradually shift to the civilian sector.

The requirements analysis conducted in the course of the Force 2010 planning process concluded that of the 89 separate military installations in Slovakia, only 40 should be retained. According to the Force 2010 defense planners this number is sufficient to meet the ASR’s essential needs for housing, training, and support of SR Force 2010.

**The Czech Republic – The Concept of Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic**
Background Leading to Reform

Like its Slovak cousin to the east the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR) can trace its roots to predecessor forces – the Czechoslovak People’s Army (CSPA) and the Czechoslovak Army (CSA). While the fledgling ACR’s personnel and equipment were drawn from these previous entities, the whole strategic context of employing defense resources had dramatically changed in the postcommunist era. The new democratic political leadership directed that a purge of the officer corps be conducted to eliminate communist sympathizers. The controversial “lustration” process that ensued removed political officers and many officers of the military defense intelligence service. However, some contend that many good officers were swept away in the purge. Additionally, 150 of the 156 general officers serving at the time of the “Velvet Revolution” were dismissed. (Ulrich, 2000: p. 28)

Early reform initiatives resulted in substantive downsizing, reorganization, and redeployment of the ACR in light of the changed strategic environment. When the communist regime fell in 1989, the CSPA was in the midst of drawing the force down from 200,000 to 93,000 to meet the limits imposed in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. (The Army of the Czech Republic, p. 1) The split of the country in 1993, therefore, complicated a reorganization process already underway. In January 1993 at the birth of the independent Czech state, the ACR numbered 106,447. Later that year the government approved a plan to draw the force down to 65,000 troops. This number was achieved in 1997. In recent years the force structure has fallen to its current level of 57,000.

In the first years of its postcommunist transition the Czech Republic was considered a model of reform with steady growth, low unemployment, and a stable center-right government. (Rhodes, 2000) The Czech Republic’s overall relative success compared to the other former Warsaw Pact states vying for NATO membership along with its active participation in the Partnership for Peace program earned the Czechs a NATO invitation at the 1997 Madrid Summit. By 1997 incomplete and mismanaged structural reforms led to an economic downturn, from which the Czech economy is only recently emerging. (Interfax, 2002) Like its democratizing
neighbors economic prosperity is uneven and democratic political institutions are still developing. Political interests, corruption, incompetence, and public apathy are all features of the Czech political landscape. (Ulrich, 2002c: p. 57)

While the Slovak *SR Force 2010* was largely driven by its goal to earn a NATO invitation, the Czech reform plan is largely rooted in the realization that as a new ally it enjoys all the rights of a NATO member nation without the requisite capabilities to meet its obligations to the alliance. (*Reform of the AF of the Czech Republic*, 2001: p. 10) In 2000 and early 2001 the Czech Republic received negative assessments both from NATO and separate evaluators from the U.S.’s Office of the Secretary of Defense. NATO specifically took the Czechs to task for not fulfilling alliance commitments. In the NATO assessment, *National Chapters 2000*, evaluators noted:

> Although the Czech Republic is allocating substantial sums of money to upgrading of its armed forces, the planned resources will not suffice to meet all requirements laid down in the Force Goals. Many major upgrading and modernization programs will be implemented only during subsequent defense planning cycles. If the Czech Republic wishes to be able to meet its alliance obligations and commitments in a better way, it will have to reprioritize its plans and reallocate available resources in order to ensure a more balanced and timely implementation of its modernization programs. (*Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic*, 2001)

Czech political leaders, who historically have paid minimal attention to military affairs and who have long neglected the transformation needs of the ACR were embarrassed by the public disclosure of the assessments and moved to correct the situation. As a result of Governmental Decision 489 taken on May 14, 2001 Prime Minister Milos Zeman appointed Major General Jaroslav Skopek to head a special commission charged with developing a plan to create small, modern, sustainable, and deployable armed forces that balanced national interests with NATO obligations and resource allocation with likely threat scenarios. (Skopek, 2001) Early on reformers realized that fulfilling such a task would require comprehensive defense reorganization. In May 2001, Major General Skopek and his team
established the Center for the Preparation of the Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, which became the hub of reform activities.

**Scope of the Current Reform Effort**

The Center’s task was to complete a comprehensive defense review aimed at completely reforming the defense planning system, professionalizing the ACR and improving the prestige of the ACR in Czech society. (Reform of the Armed Forces – Objectives and Principles, 2002) The governmental commission was assigned four fundamental missions as departure points. The reformed armed forces must (1) Be capable of securing the vital and strategic interests of the state as set forth in the Security Strategy; (2) Fulfill the commitments and obligations of the North Atlantic Alliance; (3) Operate within the context of limited funds; and (4) Operate within the context of limited manpower. (Reform of the Armed Forces – Interdepartmental Comments, 2002) The main proposed changes include overhauling force structure, instituting an effective personnel management system, implementing a rational defense planning process, rethinking the current basing situation, and modernizing equipment and support to service personnel and units. (Skopek, 2001)

**The Role of National Security Documents**

It is important to note that the various reform and reorganization attempts between 1989 and 1999 occurred without the benefit of either a national security strategy or a national military strategy to guide these processes. The government approved the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic and the Military Strategy of the Czech Republic in February and March 1999 respectively on the eve of the Czechs’ accession to NATO. Prior to the issuance of these documents, a series of defense concepts and national military strategies was produced; however, none was approved by Parliament until 1997. Furthermore, each document was developed in the absence of an overall national security strategy reflecting the political guidance of the state’s political leadership. In the months preceding the Reform Center’s establishment, the Strategic Defense Review (SDR) was being worked in the MOD as an internal initiative. At the same time General Jiri Sedivy was conducting a parallel, but uncoordinated study in the General Staff – Vision 2010. (Interview, senior western defense attaché)
When the political leadership launched the more comprehensive effort both studies were put on hold. One seasoned Czech defense observer quipped, “In a paper war the Czech Republic would do great. We have lots of documents. But one doesn’t know what the other is doing. Skopek’s job is to come up with an overall concept.” (Pick interview, 2001)

Those who have observed the Czech Republic’s fits and starts in the reform echo the same bottom line – none of the restructuring processes has resulted in a qualitative change in the capabilities of the ACR. “Due to scattered resources and low efficiency of spending, their operational capabilities do not fully match the requirements and nature of operations which the Czech army can be expected to participate in.” (Reform of the Armed Forces: Analysis of Required Capabilities, 2001) Total systemic overhaul of the Czech national security system was needed.

**Drafting the Plan**

As in the Slovak case, Czech defense planning efforts to date had not been characterized by collaboration across the relevant ministries and between the General Staff and Ministry of Defense. The most fundamental flaw of all previous efforts was the inability to marry objectives with the resources to achieve them. Indeed, the national security system was unable to facilitate the degree of cooperation needed to even come up with an institutional consensus on what the ACR’s priorities should be. The stovepipe system of managing national security, a holdover from the communist system of management, severely restricted processes aimed at organizational change. Piecemeal reform was attempted at various points in the system on an ad hoc basis. For instance a Nuclear-Biological-Chemical (NBC) company was identified as a particular need and funded, but this unit was a stand alone entity outside the general force structure of the ACR. (Interview, senior Czech officer, July 2001) The Center’s mandate was to overcome the systemic inertia and prioritize objectives against which resources could be applied to effect qualitative change in ACR capabilities. This mandate led to the identification of the defense planning structure, itself, as a key priority in the reform effort.

Unlike previous efforts, the current reform effort has the support of the key players in the Czech political scene. Major General Skopek was
granted unprecedented government powers and access to carry out his task. He reported directly to the Prime Minister and enjoyed the personal support of President Vaclav Havel who used his influence to bring the leaders of the various political parties on board. (Interview, senior Czech officer) Furthermore, Major General Skopek was allowed to assemble a team of the “best and brightest” including many western educated officers to put together the plan.

Successful implementation also depends on the placement of key leaders throughout the Czech defense bureaucracy. Minister Jaroslav Tvrdik, who is not connected with any particular political party, was brought in to be an agent of change. The 32-year old former ACR lieutenant colonel replaced Defense Minister Vladimir Vetchy who had been embroiled in various acquisition scandals. (Interview, senior western defense attaché, July 2001) His military expertise certainly surpassed that of the 8 mediocre ministers who preceded him, but some worried that his recent service at the relatively junior rank of Lt. Colonel may make him too beholden to the generals who may be the main obstacles to reform. (Pick interview, 2001) Stefan Fule, who held the top deputy position to Defense Minister Tvrdik, was brought in from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he had responsibility for security issues and had served previously as Ambassador to Lithuania. He brought his “outsider” perspective to the ministry and took aim at eliminating the duplicitous organizational structures in the MOD and GS. He was confident that he could navigate the turf battles to convert the defense ministry into a machine “that if you put a coin at the top, would get a product out.” He argued, this does not always happen – or at least quality outputs are not the norm. (Fule interview, 2001) Finally, some observers questioned whether General Jiri Sedivy, Chief of the General Staff, could really be a change agent. He had overseen multiple failed defense planning processes and his Vision 2010 effort did not adequately match resources with requirements. He argued against big change in the past saying that such change cannot occur without proper guidance from the government. (Interview, senior western defense attaché, 2001)

American consultants working for Cubic Applications, Inc. also supported the Czech reform effort. The team is smaller than the one in Slovakia, but was more embedded in the reform process. When the comprehensive reform plan was launched in May 2001 one Cubic consultant was already on the scene supporting a contract to help with the
development of the Strategic Defense Review. When the Center began its work, the Cubic consultant moved to the MOD to assist the reform team. (Interview, Cubic team member, 2001) Observers note that the Czech approach to outside consultants has been to limit their involvement to ensure that Czech expertise is built up in the process. The Czechs were also concerned that the planning products were “home-grown.”

Stefan Fule remarked in a July 2001 interview that attempts at military reform in the Czech Republic had failed in the past due to the lack of political support, the lack of personal courage to make hard decisions (such as implementing painful personnel reforms), the favoring of political over professional leaders in the ministry, and the lack of an overall vision to drive the change. (Fule interview, 2001) The reform effort begun under Defense Minister Tvrdik represented a rare window of opportunity when many of the factors that had previously been absent came together. It turns out, though, that the opening was narrow and may have closed markedly with the government’s decision in May 2003 to drastically reduce the Army’s budget as part of an overall austerity package. This action led Tvrdik to resign in protest, citing an inability to successfully carry out reform with the reduced resources.

An Overview of the Concept of Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic

THE OBJECTIVE OF THE REFORM IS TO MAKE THE CZECH ARMED FORCES A COMPACT, INTRINSICALLY BALANCED AND EFFICIENT PART OF THE ALLIANCE’S FORCES, CAPABLE OF FULFILLING TASKS ACROSS A BROAD RANGE OF OPERATIONS AND ALL OVER THE AREA OF INTEREST OF NATO.

Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (AF CR) – Objectives and Principles (2001)

The key themes that echo through AF CR are rational defense planning, the improvement of the operational capabilities of the ACR, professionalization, improving the acquisition system, and streamlining the organizational structures and command and control system. Overlaid on the
entire effort is the realization that a transformation in thinking must occur in every aspect of the Czech national security system. Indeed, the AF CR planners have included as part of their plan programs that educate defense personnel and the civilian public on the necessity of reform in general, and, more specifically, on the need for plan to be implemented in its entirety.

**Key Elements of the Concept of Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic**

**Economic Assumptions**

It is impossible to conduct long term defense planning without a predictable flow of economic resources. One critical contextual feature of AF CR had been the decision of the Czech government to commit to a defense spending level of 2.2 percent of GDP through 2004. However, with the government’s decision to cut all ministries’ budgets, Czech planners had to adapt the reform plans to the new projected level of 1.9 percent of GDP.

**Force Structure and Modernization**

AF CR documents emphasize that the Czech’s accession to NATO necessitated a revamping of the ACR’s force structure in order to fulfill alliance obligations. It is interesting to note that strategic documents approved on the eve of NATO accession and more than two years into the preparation for membership phase did not consider such responsibilities. In this respect, the Czech defense planners have been well behind the Slovaks. The re-tooled NATO-compatible force requires sufficient down-sizing and reorganization so that the forces that remain are well-led, sufficiently funded, and have the benefit of quality training. A particular problem has been the creation of ad hoc units to serve in NATO peacekeeping missions that do not fit into an overall concept for the development of the ACR. (Reform of the Armed Forces – Required Capabilities, 2001: p. 5) The Tvrdik reform plan set the objective of drawing the ACR down from 57,000 to a force structure of 34,000-36,000 troops with a civilian work force of 10,000. (Schroeder, 2002: pp. 3-4) Early indications are that Defense Minister Miroslav Kostelka’s revised plan will make up the shortfall in
funding with deeper cuts to reach a new end strength of 23,000 professional soldiers and 7,000 civilian employees.

As in the Slovak case, the reform plan calls for the creation of a Training and Doctrine command that would centralize and ensure the consistency of training and doctrine across the ACR and allow for the reduction of headquarters staffs. The ACR will be separated into deployable forces and in-place or territorial forces composed of units with different levels of readiness. The reformed ACR will consist of a mechanized and combined air division with subordinate brigades. The long term plan is for the Air Force to acquire supersonic aircraft, however, financial constraints will defer the achievement of that goal for at least 6-8 years.

A major reorganization calls for the Ministry of Defense and General Staff to ferret out distinct responsibilities. The MOD will be structured as a political-military body focused on strategic management tasks and the formulation of national defense policy. The General Staff will be a subordinate body responsible for the professional management of the ACR.

**Supporting Programs – Personnel Reform**

As in the Slovak case, radical personnel reform was never accomplished in the ACR. AF CR puts a “principal emphasis on personnel, whose quality will determine whether the armed forces will acquire the required capabilities or not.” ([Reform of the Armed Forces – Objective and Principles, 2001: p. 12](#)) The intractable “inverted pyramid” that had senior officers out manning junior officers and NCOs will be righted. The Tvrdik plan reserved 20 percent of the slots for officers, 25 percent for warrant officers and 55 percent for NCOs. The NCO target represents the proportion of conscripts currently comprising the ACR. The number of officers was to fall by 4800 to reach a total of 7000. The number of civilian employees will be slashed by more than 50 percent. ([Reform of the Armed Forces – Objective and Principles, 2001: p. 12](#)) The Kostelka plan is likely to keep the same ratios in place with deeper reductions across the board. A significant challenge will be recruiting the approximately 5500 soldiers annually to fill in the lower and mid-levels of the personnel pyramid while eliminating many positions at the top.
The plan calls for the creation of a human resources management system that will lay out a clear career path for ACR professionals that details expected compensation and quality of life benefits, sets out criteria for promotion, links pay to increasing levels of responsibility, describes education and training opportunities, and principles for assigning personnel. Long festering housing issues will be addressed with the institution of a housing allowance for defense personnel. Programs supporting the quality of life of military, civilian, retired personnel and their families will also have a high priority. (Reform of the Armed Forces – Objective and Principles, 2001; Schroeder, 2002: pp. 5-6)

Supporting Programs – Leader Development and Military Education

AF CR does not seem to place the same priority on instituting leader development into the Czech military education system that SR Force 2010 does. The military education system comes into the reformers’ sights, but the emphasis at this point seems to be on reducing faculty positions and consolidating the various university-level military institutions into a single Defense University. There will also be a greater opportunity for civilian educated university graduates to earn an officer’s commission. (Reform of the Armed Forces – Objective and Principles, 2001: p. 12) Reforming the Czech military education system has proven to be extremely difficult. Little progress has been made to date and AF CR may take only a few initial steps toward correcting this critical component of the Czech national security system.

Supporting Programs – Sustaining and Stationing

Logistical reform is focused mainly on streamlining the logistics support system and ensuring that stocks of supplies and materials are optimized to the needs of the reformed ACR. The Czechs are looking at balancing in-sourcing and out-sourcing logistics services to optimize efficiency and cost. The basing plan will undergo a comprehensive review with substantial reductions projected while other facilities are upgraded or created from scratch to serve the needs of a modern, professional force. The plan calls for deferring the first set of modernization priorities until 2005. (Reform of the Armed Forces – Objective and Principles, 2001)
The Way Ahead – Implementation and Preliminary Conclusions

Though SR Force 2010 and AF CR are only in the early stages of implementation, there is a widespread belief that the reform efforts now underway will yield results. After a decade of stasis, Slovakia and the Czech Republic may finally get national security outputs based on rational defense planning systems that set priorities congruent with the political guidance inherent in key strategic documents, and which subsequently shape and transform defense structures in a realistic way that balances each state’s limited resources with its defense aspirations.

However, successful implementation faces many obstacles. Indeed, the Czech Republic is squarely facing the challenge of continuing with implementation of its reform plan, while simultaneously scaling it back due to the cutback in resources. Systemic bureaucratic change depends on reformers throughout the defense system to ensure that implementation is carried out throughout every relevant branch, directorate, and unit in the field. The comprehensive reforms call for building up such capacities, but the fact that such experts will not yet be in place at the onset of the reform’s implementation is a significant risk.

Observers point to several key areas that may prove to be the most problematic. Modernizing and rationalizing the management of defense in Slovakia by forcing the MOD and GS to work together is difficult. “Talking the talk” of integration is much more difficult than “walking the walk.” The introduction of a mature Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) that facilitates the process of long term defense planning is another significant challenge. Slovakia is only now working through this system for the first time.

Some within the small community of civilian Czech national security experts contend that the Army is incapable of reforming itself. Those of this view believe that a NATO invitation in-hand only led to complacence – that once the ACR was in NATO, as an institution it was less willing to work for reform. (Gabal interview, 2001) This view suggests that only sustained external pressure from both NATO and Czech political leaders will sustain the reform efforts. The proposed reform represents a major change in Czech
society and culture that must involve the total participation of the Czech people and their political system. In the Czech case more so than in the Slovak case the reform aims to improve the standing of the Czech military in Czech society. The ACR seeks increased prestige and the creation of the perception among Czechs that its military is a relevant institution engaged in significant missions worthy of the state’s limited resources. The myriad of personnel issues in play in both cases is foreboding. Accomplishing force level reductions while recruiting to the lower ranks and trying to retain at the middle ranks is a monumental task. Furthermore, this must be achieved while reconceptualizing the roles and functions of each member of the rank structure and establishing career paths and conditions of service.

Finally the importance of personal leadership at every level of the effort - from the highest echelons of the government to the Lt. Colonels and Colonels charged with reorganizing directorates to the junior officers and NCOs assuming positions of leadership – cannot be underestimated. Wholesale reform will require wholesale implementation. Pièce-mêle implementation of a large complex interdependent plan dependent on simultaneous implementation of its various components will doom the efforts. The presence of committed leaders supported with the human and material resources to carry out their mission is a critical element of success. The absorption of the defense cuts and the departure of Defense Minister Tvrůdek dealt a severe blow to the Czech reform efforts. He took several key reform leaders with him and those that remain face the task of implementing reform with significantly less resources. It remains to be seen if this loss combined with the scaling back of the government’s commitment will deal a fatal blow to the effort.

**Conclusion**

Neither the Czech Republic nor Slovakia has yet achieved their shared goal of instituting radical military reform. Success will depend on maintaining the domestic political consensus within the government and the armed forces that is currently still at high levels compared to earlier points in the postcommunist era. Continued external pressure is also vital. NATO can exert leverage due to its interest in policing interoperability standards so that the Alliance can improve its capabilities. The EU, which has its own ambitions to be a relevant actor on the international security stage, can send
the signal that abandonment of national security responsibilities in order to single-mindedly pursue economic goals is not desirable. Finally, the U.S. can persist in its external assessments in order to enable its CEE allies to make meaningful contributions to the War on Terrorism.

Slovakia must avert the tendency to become complacent in the wake of Prague, while the Czech Republic must convince its allies that its post-accession complacency has been reversed. Obstacles will certainly challenge each. Czech planners are struggling to overcome the one-two punch of the economic toll of the Summer 2002 floods and the Summer 2003 defense cuts. Slovakia’s fragile governing coalition must sustain its support for military reform and its commitment to spend 2.0 percent of GDP on defense.

The prospect for CEE states making significant contributions toward abating regional and global transnational threats and securing their fledgling democracies is great if they can stay the course on military reform. The newly named allies should be particularly interested in studying the pitfalls and progress made by the Czechs and Slovaks outlined in this survey. There is no common path that can be universally prescribed to each state in search of the gains resultant from comprehensively reforming its national security structures, but the study of these two cases suggests that there are common ingredients whose presence and integration across the state’s political, military, and societal spheres are more likely to lead to success.

Notes


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