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Abstract

Despite considerable recent experience and attention, effective civil-military cooperation in peace operations remains elusive. This paper explores the US Armed Forces' approach to relationships with civilian relief organizations including UN agencies, US government agencies, and NGOs. It derives several hypotheses from organizational theory and tests them in a case study of the planning and execution of peace operations in Somalia from August 1992-May 1993. In this case, the military's organizational interest in reducing uncertainty best explains the generally uncooperative way in which civil-military relationships developed in Somalia. This conclusion implies that policy makers in current and future peace operations may need to press the military to be more proactive and persistent in cooperating with civilian relief organizations.

Introduction

During the past decade there has been a dramatic increase in the number of peace operations performed by the US Armed Forces. This increase has heightened awareness among policymakers and scholars of the challenges of civil-military interorganizational relationships. (1). At first blush, it appears that the civil-military exchange, or partnership, holds great promise for easing human suffering and restoring stability in ineffective states: the military brings an unmatched ability to provide security, logistical support, and rapid planning, while civilian organizations often offer financial resources, a more complete understanding of the local situation, and expertise in providing relief and beginning the long-term process of state-building.

As recent experience has repeatedly demonstrated, however,
interorganizational cooperation is far from assured—conflict or an absence of coordination have been more common. At the time of this writing, peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo have no foreseeable end, postcombat nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq have thus far fallen short of the expectations of many, and examples of duplication, confusion, and conflict abound. Much of the writing on civil-military interaction in peace operations notes this lack of progress (Weiss 1999; Pirnie 1998). Why, despite a great deal of experience and reflection, are soldiers and civilians not better at working together in peace operations?

This paper will address this puzzle by examining the question of what determines the nature of the US Armed Forces' relationships with civilian relief organizations in peace operations. My approach will be to test four groups of hypotheses, derived from organizational theory, about these relationships through a case study of the military's interaction with US Government agencies, UN agencies, and nongovernmental organizations during operations in Somalia from August 1992-May 1993. It includes four sections. First, I will discuss the theoretical foundations of the analysis and explain my hypotheses. Second, I will provide a brief history of the military's involvement in Somalia. Third, I will examine the military's interaction with civilian relief organizations in the planning and execution of operations in Somalia and assess the utility of my hypotheses in explaining the outcomes of these interorganizational relationships. I will conclude by discussing the possible policy implications of these findings. Many lessons about civil-military relationships have been drawn by policy makers and the relief community based on the perceived shortcomings of the Somalia mission; it is worth asking if these lessons, and the policy implications which flow from them, are reasonable.

Theoretical Foundations

In addition to its clear policy relevance, the study of civil-military interaction in peace operations is of theoretical interest. The literature on relationships between organizations is not nearly as developed as that on behavior within organizations, but interorganizational interaction is increasingly common and important in a variety of fields: “The dominant problems of the organization have become managing its exchanges and its relationships with the diverse interests affected by its actions (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, p, 94).”
The major organizations participating in peace operations make up what DiMaggio calls an “organizational field,” a “set of organizations that together accomplish some task in which a researcher is interested (DiMaggio 1983, pp. 148-149)” (2). For peace operations, key tasks will vary somewhat according to the nature of the problems prompting intervention; however, the general tasks of establishing security, delivering humanitarian assistance to those in need, and facilitating a return to normalcy by encouraging the development of basic governmental institutions are common to all (Natsios 1996, pp. 50-66). While these requirements provide some sense of overall direction, the organizations in the field are likely to pursue their own interests as well, perhaps to the detriment of common goals. Organizational theory views these interests primarily in terms of accomplishing the organization’s core tasks and thereby increasing prestige with salient publics (Thompson 1967, pp.33-34). Prestige gained from satisfying clients translates into increased size, wealth, and power for the organization.

In order to accomplish core tasks, rational organizations seek above all to reduce uncertainty brought about by technology (internal uncertainty) or their environments (external uncertainty), attempting to gain control of enough information to perform core tasks in a satisfactory manner. Dependence on other organizations is often a major source of uncertainty; organizations therefore strain towards autonomy and resist reliance on others: “We expect all organizations to seek the same state—self control (Thompson 1967, p. 168).” Most organizational scholars find the motivation to reduce uncertainty by increasing autonomy so powerful that it often trumps the desire for size and wealth.

It is the desire to reduce uncertainty that makes the Armed Forces uncomfortable with peace operations. They place the services and staffs in a situation where they are not performing or training for what organizational leaders see as their core task of high-intensity combat. In peacekeeping, as opposed to high intensity combat, missions are more ambiguous, and soldiers are faced with a complex array of challenges and political constraints associated with the “nation-building” which inevitably marks these operations. Furthermore, having a long-term impact on a state or society hinges on the efforts of actors outside the military organization, such as civilian relief organizations and local leaders: “Such missions raise the specter of
open-ended commitments under circumstances in which every other party involved possesses the ability to extend the quarrel indefinitely while no one possesses the capacity to bring it to a conclusion (Bacevich 1995)" (3). The military is therefore likely to see commitment to most peace operations as not being in its organizational interest (Feaver 1998; Snider and Watkins 2000). When ordered to execute such an operation, the military is likely to view its interests as avoiding lengthy deployments of large numbers of troops and avoiding casualties—the ideal peace operation from an organizational standpoint is short, simple, and safe.

Because most US government agencies, NGOs, and UN agencies in peace operations are involved in the vague, complex tasks mentioned above, the Armed Forces may be reluctant to support them. They instead may prefer to focus on accomplishing narrowly-defined “military tasks” and avoid long-term exchange relationships with most civilian organizations. Tasks such as administering a local justice system, training civilian police, or election monitoring fall outside the military’s normal area of comfort and expertise, and it is likely to see them as burdensome “mission creep.” Similarly, tasks that involve a high risk of armed confrontation with local elements, such as securing convoys through particularly dangerous areas, could draw the Armed Forces deeper into an operation than they want to be. From the military’s perspective, agreeing to perform these missions, which put troops in substantial danger or significantly increase involvement in an operation, will likely be seen as a losing proposition. Doing so may elevate public expectations of the operation’s possible impact on the target state, risk escalation to combat, and ultimately lead to a longer deployment and continued distraction from the military’s core tasks.

A contrary theoretical argument—asserting that it may be in the military’s interest to be more forthcoming in assisting civilian organizations—can also be made. A complicating factor for the military is that in order to please its clients, the US government and the American public, thereby ensuring its prestige and future resourcing, it may need to be seen as contributing to the larger goals of peace operations (Bacevich 1995, pp. 62-63). The Armed Forces are often the only possible source of the support that civilian relief organizations want or need. If the military is unresponsive, these organizations may be able to threaten its organizational interests in autonomy and future budget share through public appeals or private complaints to the government (4). Regular meetings and standardized
coordination measures may be an effective way for the Army to mitigate the likelihood of negative publicity stemming from civilian organizations’ complaints.

If US government leaders clearly want the military to become broadly involved in a peace operation, the failure to do so could result in the loss of resources or an increase in civilian oversight (Feaver 1998). Contributing to the success of a peace operation could also demonstrate the continued relevance of the military, especially the Army. A perceived failure to support the Kosovo campaign due to a lack of strategic agility helps explain the Army’s current efforts at “transforming” into a lighter, more mobile force. If peace operations will be common in the future, it may be in the Armed Forces’ interest to show that they are essential to mission success.

Additionally, minimizing the length of a deployment may require that the mission have some impact on the target state; if the conditions that give rise to a peace operation do not change, that operation will probably continue. Facilitating civilian success may be the military’s quickest way home. The US military therefore finds itself pulled between wanting to do little and needing to do something. Some interdependence may be a necessary evil, and the wise selection of civilian partners becomes critical.

In addition to these two competing theoretical explanations for how the military will approach its relationships with civilian organizations, organizational theory points to other factors that may influence its decisions. Specifically, I will focus on the history of interorganizational interaction and the structure of civilian organizations as variables that may have some explanatory power. In terms of interorganizational history, an organization that trusts another to deliver on its promises takes on less uncertainty when entering into an interdependent relationship (Gulati 1999, pp. 1446-1449). It seems intuitive that this trust will be based in large part on past interactions: “prior satisfactory performance tends to suggest satisfactory performance in the future, and we might expect the organization to prefer to maintain an on-going relationship rather than establish a new one for the same purpose (Thompson 1967, p. 35).” Training and contact may also make military leaders more aware of civilian organizations’ capabilities and the opportunities for mutually beneficial exchange. In addition, participants in peace operations often claim that the personal relationships between key members of different
organizations matter. Simply put, if leaders know one another and get along well, they will be more likely to cooperate (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, p. 146). This sort of explanation is somewhat unsatisfying, however, as it is difficult to generalize or use for predictions. The amount of prior training, exposure, and previous cooperation may serve as a good proxy, accounting for the likelihood of positive personal relationships arising. Along these lines, it seems likely that the Armed Forces’ relationships with civilian organizations may become more cooperative as a mission continues and the military becomes more familiar with civilian organizations’ operations and better able to identify opportunities for low-cost, high-impact assistance.

Similarities in organizational structure may facilitate cooperation by making interorganizational communication easier. It seems reasonable to assume that the Armed Forces will have an easier time coordinating with a hierarchical organization than one which has a flat structure, as communications between the organizations will be more efficient. Similar structures may ease development of a common language and the adoption of common procedures for coordination (March and Simon 1958, pp. 159-162). If the organization has a powerful national or international headquarters which can exercise considerable control over field operators, military leaders may have more confidence that the organization will hold up its end of any bargains struck. Many NGO operators, especially, are aggressively autonomous, and centralized control over them would reduce uncertainty for the military. In addition, if a civilian organization has a large professional staff, interorganizational planning and the assignment of military liaisons may be easier to accomplish.

I will look at levels of cooperation between the military and other organizations as the dependent variable in my analysis. For the purposes of this analysis, I will look at four possible outcomes, ranging from most to least cooperative:

- The military establishes **routine exchange relationships** with civilian organizations, as indicated by command emphasis on cooperation, regular meetings, and long-term military support on a variety of tasks.

- The military engages in **ad hoc exchange relationships** with civilian organizations, supporting them on particular tasks but avoiding any long-term support arrangements.

- The military has **no relationship** with civilian organizations, beyond basic communications—each group goes about its business and
essentially ignores the other.
- The military has an antagonistic relationship with civilian organizations, marked by a lack of support and public and private arguments about what their respective roles should be.

**Hypotheses**

**Reducing Uncertainty**

**Hypothesis 1A**: In planning for a peace operation, the US Armed Forces will prefer to have no relationship with civilian relief organizations, instead focusing on the military aspects of the mission. The military will have an antagonistic relationship with organizations that attempt to broaden its mandate.

**Hypothesis 1B**: During peace operations, the US Armed Forces will prefer to have no relationship with civilian relief organizations involved in vague, dangerous, and/or long-term tasks. The military will have an antagonistic relationship with organizations that attempt to involve it in these tasks.

**Hypothesis 1C**: The military will attempt to avoid routine exchange relationships with civilian relief organizations, instead offering limited assistance on an ad hoc basis.

**Increasing Prestige**

**Hypothesis 2A**: In planning for a peace operation, the military will seek and act on the input of civilian relief organizations in defining its role in order to achieve maximum impact on the target state.

**Hypothesis 2B**: During peace operations, the Armed Forces will attempt to develop routine exchange relationships with the civilian relief organizations that have the greatest prospect of improving the conditions that gave rise to the operation.

**Hypothesis 2C**: The military is more likely to develop exchange relationships with civilian relief organizations that have a high degree of influence with the US Government or the media.

**Interorganizational History**

**Hypothesis 3A**: The military will be more likely to develop exchange relationships with civilian relief organizations with which it has a
history of previous cooperation or training.

**Hypothesis 3B**: As a peace operation continues, the military is more likely to develop routine exchange relationships with civilian organizations with which it has initially had *ad hoc* exchange relationships. It is likely to attempt to have no relationship with organizations with which it has initially had antagonistic relationships—stated simply, cooperation should improve as an operation continues.

**Organizational Structure**

**Hypothesis 4A**: The military is more likely to develop exchange relationships with civilian relief organizations with a hierarchical structure and large professional staffs.

**Case Summary**

In this section, I will begin by providing a brief overview of the US intervention in Somalia and the US Armed Forces’ role in the operation (5). I will then examine the military’s interaction with major US Government agencies, UN agencies, and NGOs during each phase of the mission, discussing the issues over which the organizations came into contact and assessing the utility of my hypotheses in explaining the nature of these interorganizational relationships.

American involvement in the humanitarian disaster of Somalia took place in four fairly distinct phases: Operation Provide Relief (14 August-3 December 1992), during which the United States supported the United Nations Operation Somalia (UNOSOM I) by airlifting and sealifting relief supplies to the area and conducted planning for a dramatically increased role; Operation Support Hope (3 December 1992-4 May 1993), during which the United States deployed approximately 26,000 troops to Somalia and led the UN-sanctioned Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in attempting to provide a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid; Operation Continue Hope (4 May-3 October 1993), during which approximately 5,000 US troops supported a revamped United Nations Operation Somalia (UNOSOM II) in its efforts to fulfill a significantly-expanded humanitarian mandate; and withdrawal from Somalia (4 Oct 1993-25 March 1994), during which the United States first added to its contingent on the ground following the 3 October battle in Mogadishu and then gradually pulled all forces out of Somalia (6). I will focus on
civil-military interaction during the first two phases. The final two phases are somewhat less interesting in terms of interorganizational relations—UNOSOM II involved far fewer US forces than did UNITAF (and the focus of many of these forces shifted to more traditional military missions aimed at capturing Mohammed Farah Aideed), and the final phase was aimed solely at executing an orderly withdrawal of US troops.

**Operation Provide Relief/Planning for UNITAF**

The UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution establishing UNOSOM passed on 24 April 1992, but it was not until 20 July that the first 50 unarmed observers arrived in Mogadishu to monitor an ineffective ceasefire among the warring Somali clans. Meanwhile, NGO relief efforts were being dramatically hampered by banditry and extortion. By summer 1992, only a handful of relief organizations including World Vision, Save the Children-UK, CARE, MSF, and the ICRC maintained operations in Somalia. With up to an estimated 1.5 million Somalis at risk of death from disease and famine, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali increased his calls for action, accusing developed states of “fighting a rich man’s war in Yugoslavia while not lifting a finger to save Somalia from disintegration.”

Against this backdrop, and influenced by increasing domestic pressure, President Bush announced Operation Provide Relief on 14 August. In close coordination with the UN’s World Food Program and the ICRC, the US military (with some support from Europe) airlifted 28,000 tons of relief supplies to Somalia from Mombassa, Kenya (Weiss 1999, p. 80). The intent of the mission, run by a 600-troop Joint Task Force (JTF) under the control of US Central Command (CENTCOM) was to get the supplies to local airfields for subsequent distribution by relief organizations; it was moderately successful in this regard, but the victimization of relief agencies by local forces continued. In a similar vein, the US Air Force airlifted 500 Pakistani peacekeepers to Mogadishu in September, but they were unable to get supplies out of the Mogadishu airport due to armed opposition. The US Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), which had deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to Kenya to help coordinate the airlift, estimated that only 40 percent of the airlifted food was reaching its intended destination in September (Rosegrant and Watkins 1996, p. 9).
Military planning for the contingency of broader US action began in September and greatly intensified in November as the administration started to consider in earnest the possibility of putting troops on the ground. In National Security Council (NSC) and Deputies Committee meetings from 20-24 November, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman Colin Powell, supported by the CENTCOM commander, Marine General Joseph Hoar, surprised many by moving away from his previous opposition to committing US forces and supporting the “large option” of deploying some 20,000 soldiers and marines with the capability of using force to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid (7). On 25 November, President Bush decided on this course of action and proposed a large US-led mission to Boutros-Ghali through acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger. UNSC Resolution 794 creating UNITAF and authorizing it, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, “to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible” followed on 3 December. The intent of the operation was to hand the mission back to the UN after this “secure environment” was established.

Events progressed rapidly during this period. CENTCOM’s basic plan for the operation was formally approved on 5 December, and the First Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), commanded by LTG Robert Johnston, was designated as the headquarters for Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia. Former ambassador to Somalia Robert Oakley had been selected, on Powell’s advice, to head US civilian relief efforts as the President’s special envoy and he arrived in Somalia on 7 December. The Army’s contribution to UNITAF was approximately 10,000 troops, primarily drawn from MG Steven Arnold’s 10th Mountain Division. Arnold was alerted to the division’s role on 30 November and officially notified that it would serve as the Army Forces (ARFOR) headquarters on 3 December, and the first of the approximately 26,000 US troops that served in UNITAF arrived in Somalia on 9 December. According to National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, “it looked like a relatively simple operation where we were simply going to go in and open up the communications routes and put the gang leaders back in their cages, and then hopefully a smaller UN force could police the country and keep the aid flowing (Rosegrant and Watkins 1996, p. 15).”

Planning for future operations in Somalia was clearly the key challenge facing military leaders during this initial phase. Three basic issues required attention: deciding whether or not to support increased
US involvement, defining the military’s mission, and designing a force package to support this mission. In considering these issues, the military did not seek significant cooperation with civilian relief agencies. It developed minimal *ad hoc* exchange relationships with US Government agencies, specifically USAID and OFDA, and it essentially had no relationship with NGOs or UN agencies during this time. The Army’s desire to reduce uncertainty in approaching the mission (Hypothesis 1A) seems to best explain these outcomes.

At first glance, the military’s decision to back the “large option” for intervention seems puzzling from an organizational perspective—why would the Armed Forces support committing so many resources to a mission so clearly outside its core task of conducting high-intensity combat operations? This was not initially the case. In debates from September-November, the State Department and the NSC gradually moved to support some type of action, and the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) generally opposed increased involvement due to the fear of “both the high cost and the uncertain mandate of a Somalia intervention” (Rosegrant and Watkins 1996, pp. 11-12). The military’s November change of heart seems to have been a reaction to a growing civilian consensus that something would have to be done, coupled with the sense that Somalia would at least be an easier mission than Bosnia, which had become an issue in the 1992 Presidential campaign. Some senior officials felt that “an intervention in Somalia would preclude a similar operation in the Balkans” (Norton 2001, p. 14). Accepting some uncertainty by going to Somalia could hedge against even greater risk and uncertainty later on.

This rationale still does not explain the support for the “large option”—if something had to be done, why not do the minimum required? Again, the desire to limit uncertainty seems to have been the foremost motivation of the military in this choice. As General Hoar writes, “the application of decisive, rather than just sufficient, force can minimize resistance, saving casualties on all sides.” (Hoar 1993, p. 63) While some have suggested that Powell had only supported the “large option” because he thought that it would never be approved, a more likely explanation is his desire to avoid putting US troops under UN command and control. If the military had to deploy, it would do so with maximum capability and autonomy. This decision ran counter to the smaller force supported by some relief experts. Fred Cuny, who had been intimately involved in many humanitarian operations, including Provide Relief in Northern Iraq, complained about the military’s
insistence on overwhelming force: “This is the new Weinberger-Powell doctrine. You have a fly, you get a fifty-pound sledgehammer and smack it (Rosegrant and Watkins 1996, p. 13).”

Once the decision to create UNITAF was made, planning turned to defining the military’s role more specifically. Once more, organizational concerns over uncertainty dominated this process and limited the significance of the military’s relationships with civilian organizations. In the end, despite the availability of civilian expertise and input on how an integrated relief plan could be developed, the final CENTCOM mission statement attempted to delineate what many saw as an artificial separation between military and civilian tasks: “When directed by the National Command Authorities, CINCENT will conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure major air and sea ports, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, to provide security for relief convoys and relief organization operations, and to assist the United Nations/non-governmental organizations in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices (Dworken 1995, p. 15).”

Significantly, the last element of this mission, to assist the United Nations/non-governmental organizations in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices, was added as a “permissive task,” meaning that the JTF commander could assist (or not) as he saw fit. The military focus on security versus long-term relief tasks, in the view of some analysts, indicated the absence of an overall humanitarian strategy that would be supported by the military (Seiple 1996, pp. 109-110). It also led to considerable misunderstanding between military operators and civilian relief agencies, who expected the Armed Forces to be more forthcoming with assistance in areas such as disarmament of local factions (8). General Hoar, outlining the military position, stated that “disarmament was excluded from the mission because it was neither realistically achievable nor a prerequisite for the core mission of providing a secure environment for relief operations.” (Hoar 1993, p. 58)

The elements of a more comprehensive civil-military relief plan were available, but were not embraced by the military; the Armed Forces generally avoided exchange relationships with civilian organizations during this planning period. Andrew Natsios of USAID had proposed the outlines of a relief plan, which involved stabilizing
food prices, moving some elements of the population, and rehabilitating the agriculture and livestock sectors of the economy, as early as summer 1992, but “once the Department of Defense became a part of the planning, the humanitarian intent was diminished as military concerns began to dominate (Seiple 1996, p. 127).” While CENTCOM did meet daily with OFDA’s DART team during the airlift and had conducted a major humanitarian relief training exercise including USAID, OFDA, and State earlier in 1992, this cooperative interorganizational history did not lead to significant consultation in planning for Restore Hope.

In Washington, interagency coordination took place primarily through the NSC Deputies Committee, which included representatives from State, DOD, USAID, the CIA, the JCS, and several other agencies. This process (which the Clinton Administration’s Presidential Decision Directive [PDD] 56 codified in 1997), however, did not overcome the military’s reluctance to cede influence over strategic planning to civilian US Government agencies. As a senior military officer explains, “We were working seven days a week, 20 hours a day. The problem was not that we weren’t talking; the problem was that each agency had objectives and fears, and tried to maximize its objectives and minimize its fears.” (McCaffrey 2002)

Similarly, UN Agencies’ and NGOs’ viewpoints had minimal impact on the military’s definition of its mission. The UN, in establishing UNOSOM, had also published a 100-day plan for Somalia, but the plan never drew international consensus, much less American military support. The NGOs that had remained in Somalia through the crisis were clearly an outstanding potential source of information on local needs, but their expertise went untapped during the planning phase. As an NGO operator states, “We didn’t know what to expect...it would have been great to bring the [NGO] leaders out and sit down with [General] Johnston and spend some time strategizing.” (Seiple 1996, p. 129) On the military side, COL Kevin Kennedy, the leader of the UNITAF Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), recalls that “what parties [the military] would be working with, their expectations, and the scope of their requirements were largely unknown to the military forces charged with carrying out the humanitarian intervention.” (Von Hippel 2000, p. 79) While this lack of contact could be explained by the very short time period between the receipt of orders to deploy and the deployment itself, some consultation would not have been difficult to achieve—the military had some recent history of
of working with NGOs in Operations Provide Comfort and Provide Relief, and an NGO coordinating committee on Somalia had been operating in Nairobi since January 1991, so there was a readily-accessible forum for interorganizational communication (Seiple 1996, p. 112). Military concern with reducing uncertainty by taking control of the planning process and developing a narrowly-defined mission statement seems a better explanation for this omission.

Another notable omission, the absence of a robust Civil Affairs (CA) capability from the initial deployment package, marked UNITAF’s force structure. CA teams are trained in establishing liaison with civilian relief organizations and coordinating military assistance for their operations. The vast majority are Army reservists. There is only one active duty Civil Affairs battalion. A company made up of six four-soldier CA teams was deployed to Somalia, but these teams were not available to support military operations until 20 days after the deployment, and the amount of CA support was “grossly insufficient to meet the needs of the ground commanders.” (JULLS 1993) The military’s reluctance to alert and deploy more CA teams, including reservists, seems odd; the utility of these teams in facilitating civil-military exchange had been proven in Northern Iraq. Additionally, an OFDA report on Somalia describing the civilian relief presence in Somalia and outlining many possible CA-run projects was sent to the 10th Mountain Division on 13 December, very shortly after the mission began (OFDA 1992). A likely explanation for the absence of a greater CA capability in UNITAF follows the same theory of military motivation outlined above: the military was hoping for a brief, simple operation, and “the call-up of such units generally implies the longer-term commitment of nation-building, something that was clearly not part of the mission statement (Seiple 1996, p. 112).”

To summarize, the US Armed Forces generally avoided establishing exchange relationships with all three groups of civilian relief organizations during the planning for Operation Restore Hope. While some ad hoc cooperation took place between CENTCOM and relief organizations in executing the Provide Relief airlift, this was an extremely small and relatively risk-free military mission with an intent—getting food to airstrips—that was understood by all involved. (Weiss 1999, pp. 79-81; Hoar 1993, pp. 57-58; Seiple 1996, pp. 110-111) “Reducing uncertainty” provides a much better explanation for military reluctance to deal with civilian organizations than does “increasing prestige”—the military’s overriding concern, once it was
clear that it would in fact deploy, was to ensure that the mission would be as simple, short and safe as possible, and more interaction with civilian organizations involved in less well-defined relief and nation-building tasks could have threatened this interest. This concern also trumped the influence of interorganizational history—past successful cooperation between the Army and relief organizations did not seem to carry over to planning for Somalia.

**Operation Restore Hope/Transition to UNOSOM II**

After the establishment of UNITAF on 3 December, the rapid deployment of approximately 38,000 troops, including small contingents from 20 other countries in addition to the US force, began. By its conclusion, UNITAF’s five-month mission had unquestionably allowed more humanitarian aid to get through to the population of Somalia and may have saved approximately 100,000 lives (Von Hippel 2000, p. 61) (9). Part of the reason for this success was that there was some degree of effective cooperation between the military and civilian relief organizations; however, this cooperation was uneven at best. The disagreement and misunderstandings about the military’s mission outlined above continued under UNITAF, and the failure to institutionalize civil-military cooperation become a major impediment to unified action as the operation transitioned to the control of UNOSOM II in May 1993.

In general, the Army developed somewhat cooperative *ad hoc* exchange relationships with US Government organizations during this phase, especially the US Liaison Office (USLO) in Somalia. Relations with NGOs varied widely, ranging from fairly close cooperation in remote areas of Somalia to some interorganizational conflict in Mogadishu. The military had minimal interaction with most UN agencies, and some conflict developed as the deadline for the UN’s assumption of the mission neared. As in the planning phase, the hypotheses concerning reducing uncertainty do a better job of explaining the nature of these relationships than do hypotheses on increasing prestige. Interorganizational history and organizational structure also had an impact, though it was less significant than that of the desire to reduce uncertainty.

UNITAF’s operations in Somalia were divided into four phases. The first, which lasted about one week, was designed to establish operational and logistical bases in Mogadishu in order to allow for the
orderly inflow of additional troops and supplies. Next, operations were expanded into southern Somalia, which was divided into eight “Humanitarian Relief Sectors” (HRS), and relief convoys began moving to these areas (10). By the end of December, each of the HRS had been occupied by UNITAF forces. ARFOR’s sector included approximately 10,000 square miles. It was responsible for the Bardera, and eventually the Baidoa HRS as well as assuming shared responsibility with Belgian forces for Kismaayo, and the Marines had responsibility for Mogadishu. In the third phase, UNITAF expanded operations to more ports and airfields and broadened security activities with a goal of breaking the famine and preparing for the transfer to UNOSOM II—most observers agree that looting and starvation had been dramatically reduced after the first three months of the deployment. The final phase was focused on scaling down the UNITAF troop commitment and executing a “seamless transition” back to the UN (Oakley 1997).

Coordination among civilian relief organizations and the military was primarily achieved through Humanitarian Operations Centers (HOCs) established in each HRS. The Mogadishu HOC (which doubled as the national HOC) was run by Philip Johnston, the American CEO of CARE designated as the UN’s Humanitarian Coordinator. Hosting daily meetings including a wide variety of relief organizations, the HOC was designed to increase the efficiency of humanitarian operations through coordination and information-sharing and provide civilian organizations a link to UNITAF forces. It also provided an opportunity for NGOs to seek US funding from OFDA’s DART team. Within each HOC, the local UNITAF force was represented by a CMOC normally staffed by Civil Affairs personnel or other officers filling a CA role. CMOCs would share information with relief organizations about military activities, gather requests for support, and relay them to the local UNITAF staff for vetting (Seiple 1996, pp. 113-115; Kennedy 1997, pp. 105-106).

The support provided by the military via this system was significant:

- From 12 December-15 April, 154 long-haul convoys were escorted from Mogadishu and Kismaayo to interior distribution centers, and hundreds more brought supplies from these centers to their final destinations. The military provided security for 237 humanitarian field missions or vehicle movement during this time. No US military-escorted convoy was ever looted.
UNITAF engineers repaired or improved 1800 kilometers of roads in southern Somalia in order to improve access to remote areas of the country.

UNITAF opened and operated the ports of Mogadishu and Kismaayo and the Mogadishu airport, arranging for civilian relief organization access.

Military forces also performed a wide variety of smaller support tasks: providing fuel for a Mogadishu water project, medical evacuation services for humanitarian workers, helicopter reconnaissance to locate vulnerable populations, rebuilding schools, and even teaching English in some Somali schools (Kennedy 1997, pp. 107-108).

While providing this assistance, the military concurrently focused on planning its eventual withdrawal from Somalia. UN Principal Officer Elizabeth Lindenmayer claims that “they had not deployed UNITAF, but they were already thinking about us taking over. There was this obsession, well, we are going there, fine, but how can we get out?” (Rosegrant and Watkins 1996, p. 27) The first battalion of US troops was actually withdrawn prior to President Clinton’s January inauguration as a symbol of American desire to see the mission handed back to the UN. UNOSOM II, the first-ever Chapter VII UN operation, was authorized by UNSC Resolution 814 on 26 March, and UNITAF forces continued to redeploy until 4 May, when UNOSOM II formally took control of the mission. By the end of March, the US presence was down to 13,000 troops, and the US contribution to UNOSOM II included just 4000 logistics troops and a 1150-man quick reaction force under the control of new 10th Mountain Division commander (and Deputy Commander of UNOSOM II) MG Thomas Montgomery.

Although military presence decreased, including a major loss of CA and psychological operations capabilities, the mandate for UNOSOM II was significantly broader than UNITAF’s, calling for the UN to maintain a secure environment throughout all of Somalia and to assist Somalis in “rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation (UNSC 1993).” In retrospect, this expansion of the mission coupled with a reduction of military capability appears misguided at best. As clan violence intensified and UNOSOM II became more aggressive, most civil-military relationships deteriorated as well—while there were some small cooperative ties forged under UNITAF, as I will detail
below, they did not prove to be deep or long-lasting.

**US Government Agencies**

The two US Government agencies with which the military had the most interaction in Somalia were the USLO and OFDA’s DART team, and it developed generally cooperative *ad hoc* relationship with both. The former, a hastily-created organization with a staff of 15-25, was headed by Robert Oakley, who reported to a State-led interagency task force in Washington. The USLO met regularly with Somali factions and UN representatives and essentially attempted to smooth the way for UNITAF and push the Somali clans toward agreements on long-term peace and reconstruction.

Having arrived two days before the first US troops, Oakley’s actions were critical to the initial phase of the deployment. After he facilitated a basic agreement with Aideed and Ali Mahdi (the other powerful warlord in Mogadishu), including the formation of a “joint security committee” designed to mediate disputes among the warlords and between them and UNITAF, the Marines were able to occupy Mogadishu peacefully (Rosegrant and Watkins, pp. 24-25). This pattern was repeated in other sectors, with Oakley preceding the military into each area, meeting with clan elders, explaining the military’s mission, and outlining the consequences of opposing the deployment. According to MG Arnold, “His support for our operation was superb and he played a key role in communicating with the leadership of the Somali clans. We followed his lead in operations…” (Arnold 1994, p. 289)

Another area on which the military cooperated with USLO was on the issue of support for recreating a Somali police force, the Auxiliary Security Force (ASF). While military leaders were at first reluctant to support the concept, Oakley convinced Johnston and his operations officer, BG Anthony Zinni, that a force of approximately 5000 police could lessen the burden on and risk to UNITAF by monitoring key traffic intersections and responding to small crimes: “fears of ‘mission creep’ were set aside because of the enhanced force protection the Somali police could provide (Thomas and Spataro 1998, p. 188).” Washington eventually approved the concept, but did not allocate funds for police training, and UNITAF funded the initiative through its operational budget. This was a fairly representative example of the *ad hoc* nature of military-USLO cooperation—the
general pattern was that military operators on the ground would sometimes go out of their way to support civilian relief activities, but these efforts were seen by all parties as exceptions to the normal course of business. The way Oakley words his praise for LTG Johnston is instructive: “Johnston was good at sticking his neck out and allocating troops for humanitarian purposes once the military mission was done and there was excess capacity.” (Oakley 2002)

While Arnold, Johnston, and Zinni developed close working relationships with the USLO, military-USLO cooperation waned with Oakley’s departure in March. His replacement, Robert Gosende, was more focused on transitioning the expanding operation to UN control than on working on detailed issues in Mogadishu, and he curtailed direct coordination with the Somali factions.

Although hypotheses on increasing prestige would predict a close military-USLO relationship because of Oakley’s influence with the Somali factions—as well as his influence in Washington—and resulting ability to facilitate long-term reconciliation in Somalia, it seems that the cooperative nature of this relationship was more driven by military desire to reduce uncertainty. The USLO’s actions in negotiating with warlords and supporting the establishment of the ASF clearly reduced risk to US troops and helped ensure that the military would not be dragged into more armed conflict. As USLO’s efforts in these activities decreased however, so did its exchange with UNITAF. Organizational history also appears to have had some impact on military-USLO ties. First, both Johnston and Oakley had experience in Vietnam and Lebanon and apparently shared a common understanding of the mistakes in those operations, although they had never worked together before (Rosegrant and Watkins 1996, p. 19; Oakley 2002). Additionally, Oakley’s effectiveness during UNITAF’s deployment demonstrated the utility of the USLO for the military early on, and this initial success seems to have set the stage for increasing cooperation.

Military interaction with the DART team took place primarily in the daily HOC and CMOC meetings. While not as well-developed as the relationship with the USLO, the military’s interaction with the DART team was also fairly cooperative. The main reason for this is that the DART, which had a great deal of expertise on the humanitarian situation in Somalia, helped the military establish a more efficient interface with other relief organizations, especially NGOs: “the DART members—due to their many trips to the field,
their own previous experience, and their checkbook—were able to keep their finger on the pulse of the effort and help effect coordination.” (Seiple, p. 114)

An important caveat is that the CMOC’s activities, and by extension the DART’s activities in support of UN agencies and NGOs, never received a great deal of emphasis from UNITAF commanders. One observer believes that “there is…an unavoidable feeling that some force commanders, particularly from NATO nations with a short-term war fighting view of their role, tend to use the civil-military staff to sideline rather than expand civil-military cooperation (Gibbings, Hurley, and Moore 1998).” The fact that the Mogadishu CMOC staff consisted of only 10 personnel, only four of whom were officers, in an operation ostensibly designed to support humanitarian efforts, seems to support this view. Marine Colonels Kevin Kennedy and Bob MacPherson, who were responsible for UNITAF’s activities in the HOC and CMOC, developed a close relationship with the DART team and many NGOs, but this did not always translate to UNITAF action; “UNITAF very much wanted to remain in a support role and let the humanitarian organizations take the lead (Kennedy 1997, p. 105).” The CMOC officers sometimes felt that their civil-military mission did not have the full attention and support of the chain of command (11). Overall, the cooperation that did occur between the military and the DART seems more motivated by simple gains in efficiency in dealing with multiple organizations than by a military desire to have the maximum impact in support of humanitarian goals.

NGOs

Approximately 20 NGOs were operating in Mogadishu when the first US troops arrived; by the end of UNITAF’s mission, this number had grown to at least 50. Most coordination with them took place at the daily CMOC meetings, which began in Mogadishu on 11 December. Despite this frequent contact, the military’s relationships with most NGOs were limited to providing basic security for convoys and at fixed sites on an ad hoc basis, and conflict emerged when NGOs attempted to push the military beyond this role. The best explanation for this relative absence of cooperation is again based on the military’s desire to reduce uncertainty; differences in organizational structure also seem to have played a significant role.

The lack of military contact with NGOs in the planning phase
led to initial confusion and then to continuing disagreement between the groups over what the military’s priorities should be. As UNITAF deployed, its first concern was with ensuring its own security in an uncertain threat environment and establishing a logistics base in Mogadishu from which to launch operations. The first troops reached Baidoa, which is 142 miles west of Mogadishu, on 15 December. For military units used to deliberate operations, this seemed extremely quick. Hundreds of children were dying there daily, however, and Somali bandits took what they saw as their last opportunity and looted the town during this time—the NGOs had thought that Baidoa would and should have been occupied along with Mogadishu, and “these six days seemed like an eternity according to NGO expectations (Seiple 1996, p. 123).”

This incident reflected the larger disagreement between NGOs and UNITAF over how far the military should go in supporting NGO efforts, both directly and indirectly. The general view of officers on the JTF staff was that the military was tasked with assisting NGOs indirectly by providing general security, while NGO operators wanted more direct assistance and focused logistical and security aid (Dworken 1995, p. 17). In Mogadishu, UNITAF was reluctant to provide fixed-site security details due to its extensive patrolling requirements, and it also shied away from many requests for emergency response from NGOs under direct threat, fearing conflict with the armed Somali guards inevitably present at all NGO locations (Kennedy 1997, p. 110) (12). In one incident, CARE USA workers under siege by Somali employees demanding additional pay waited days before marines from UNITAF headquarters, 500 yards away, rescued them (Rosegrant and Watkins 1996, p. 32).

When the military began limited disarmament operations, and started seizing weapons carried in plain sight and demanding storage of heavy weapons in designated areas, the issue of disarmament became the biggest source of conflict between the groups. While most relief organizations supported a more active military role in disarmament, taking weapons from their guards threatened their security. Several iterations of a UNITAF weapons control policy resulted, but the NGO perspective was that the policy was unevenly enforced and that it too often hampered rather than supported their activities. During one week in March, 54 of 84 weapons confiscated by UNITAF belonged to NGOs (Seiple 1996, p. 126). Normally, confiscated weapons were eventually returned to NGOs, but this issue
was a constant source of civil-military friction. Kevin Kennedy describes some CMOC meetings as almost comical: “Meetings for the purpose of arranging support for humanitarian programs were dominated by discussions focused on the nuances of UNITAF weapons policies, and the relief workers departed burdened with recovered AK-47s and M-16s (Kennedy 1997, p. 112).”

A large part of the reason for the absence of military-NGO cooperation seems to be UNITAF’s lack of emphasis on HOC and CMOC activities, as discussed earlier. To the NGOs, CA personnel in the CMOC represented “the military view,” but the CA perspective was not shared by the majority of UNITAF and CENTCOM officers. When requests for support were well-received but never filled, NGOs often became frustrated—many came to view military officers as inflexible, insensitive to Somali suffering, and obsessively concerned with “mission creep,” a concern which they viewed as an excuse to do the minimum (Dworken 1995, p. 20). The military, in turn, often saw NGOs as “a somewhat undisciplined, disorganized lot whose operations were often counterproductive to achieving the high level of security they demanded the military establish (Kennedy 1997, p. 109).”

In addition to UNITAF concerns over avoiding the uncertainty of direct involvement in NGO operations, which could endanger soldiers and signal a long-term military commitment, differences in organizational structure can also explain some of the conflict and miscommunication. Even larger NGOs tend to have a comparatively flat structure, and most place a high value on autonomy for field operators. While the military promotes systematic planning and coordination, “NGOs do not necessarily want a planning structure imposed on them,” as it may diminish flexibility (National Defense University 1996). The ICRC’s perspective is instructive: “In whichever way the concept [of civil-military coordination (CIMIC)] is interpreted, it is first and foremost a military function. It is thus not an appropriate term for describing the ICRC’s relations with the military... (Studer 2001, p. 378).” MSF/France, described by some observers as having a “Pavlovian anti-military” attitude (Kennedy 2002) completely pulled out of Somalia in May 1993 due its state of near-total dependence on the military for security and its unwillingness to continue coordinating: “For a group that originally viewed attending the HOC/CMOC meetings as a compromise to their independence, this position was unacceptable.” (Seiple 1996, p. 124) While these types of reactions to relationships with the military are certainly due in part to
the perception among some NGOs that military action cannot be reconciled with humanitarian operations, there are numerous examples in Somalia and elsewhere of traditionally anti-military organizations requesting and accepting military support. “Cultural differences,” like organizational structure, may impede interorganizational cooperation, but this does not seem to be a decisive variable.

Despite the above difficulties, which were especially pronounced in Mogadishu, instances of effective ad hoc exchange relationships between the military and NGOs did occur. First of all, it is worth repeating that despite difficulties and conflict, the enormous humanitarian crisis that gripped Somalia in 1991 and 1992 was largely halted during Operation Restore Hope, at least in part due to the military's provision of security for NGO efforts. Also, participants and observers report that effective civil-military cooperation was much more common in the HRSs outside Mogadishu. (Kennedy 2002) In Baidoa, for example, Army units lined up their operational borders with those of NGOs already working in the area, and this led to more efficient support (Arnold 1994, p. 291).

This variation from the pattern in Mogadishu is interesting, and can be explained by three main factors. First, there were fewer organizations involved in the other HRSs (normally just one military contingent and a few NGOs), and the complexity of issues and clan politics was not as pronounced, so there was more opportunity for the development of personal ties and cooperative interorganizational history: “Commanders and their HOC-CMOC representatives had the opportunity to work closely with and get to know their humanitarian counterparts.” (Kennedy 1997, p. 108) Second, with the exception of occasional flare-ups, adequate security was not as difficult to achieve outside Mogadishu as it was in the city. This meant that the military in the outlying HRS could effectively provide general security rather than only guarding fixed sites or escorting convoys through dangerous areas, lessening the civil-military coordination challenge. Third, being geographically removed from higher military and NGO headquarters may have insulated operators in the more remote areas of Somalia from the parochial organizational concerns of those headquarters. Certainly ARFOR commander MG Arnold is more charitable in his assessment of NGOs than are his superiors in the UNITAF chain of command. As Seiple explains, “in general, cultural and organizational norms that may weigh heavily at higher echelons have far less saliency for operators in the field...For the operator in the field, it is about
problem-solving; it is about people (Seiple 1996, p. 9).” Perhaps hypotheses on reducing uncertainty may be less applicable to these lower-level, tactical interorganizational relationships than they are to operational and strategic interaction.

**UN Agencies**

After a period of limited contact, UNITAF’s interaction with UN agencies became more antagonistic as the transition to UNOSOM II approached. While some degree of ad hoc exchange was conducted with agencies such as the World Food Program on port operations and UNHCR on refugee resettlement, military relationships with UN agencies were the least cooperative of those with all three civilian groups I consider. As with US Government agencies and NGOs, military motivation to reduce uncertainty provides the best explanation for this outcome, with interorganizational history and organizational structure playing useful, but lesser roles.

With the early dispute over mission breadth and whether the United States should aggressively pursue disarmament of the Somali factions, UNITAF-UN relations began rather poorly. Essentially, UNITAF did not pursue any exchange relationship with UNOSOM or with the special representative of the secretary-general, Ismat Kittani, and his staff. Even the HOC, nominally a UN operation, was directed by an American, Philip Johnston, and dominated by USLO, the DART team, and UNITAF. The impotence of UNOSOM’s military force had not inspired confidence from Somali elites, and Oakley’s success in quickly bringing together faction leaders in Mogadishu and standing up the joint security council where Kittani had failed further marginalized the UN. “There is considerable merit to the argument that the US was the UN throughout the entire Somalia intervention, particularly during UNITAF (Seiple 1996, p. 132).”

As UNITAF operations achieved some success and the United States began planning for an eventual transition to UNOSOM II, military leaders became extremely frustrated with the UN’s lack of initiative, and interorganizational conflict was common. General Zinni put it bluntly: “Frankly, the problem with the UN through our whole time there is they would not cooperate with anything we did. We were trying to get them involved in the establishment of the police, in the refugee resettlement, and in the ceasefire disarmament process, but Boutros-Ghali wanted no part of this.” (Rosegrant and Watkins 1996, p.
It took the US pledge of logistics troops and the quick reaction force, a greater long-term presence than the Bush administration had originally envisioned, for Boutros-Ghali to agree to push the resolution establishing UNOSOM II (Oakley 2002).

In addition to the Secretary General’s reluctance to take over a mission he considered incomplete, UN efforts to plan the transition were hampered by chronic understaffing problems. When the 26-person American transition team, manned mostly by State and the Joint Staff, first met with the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York, DPKO had a staff of only three working on the issue. One participant described the US group as “totally frustrated with the ineptitude, lack of organization, small staff, and what appeared to be sort of pig-headed and anti-US attitudes (Rosegrant and Watkins 1996, p. 27).” In Somalia, Boutros-Ghali promised LTG Johnston that he would send at least 30 staffers to Mogadishu by the end of January to begin transition work, but this pledge was never fulfilled (Rosegrant and Watkins 1996, p. 28). CENTCOM attempted to fill some of the gaps in transition planning by detailing staff planners to the UN and attempting to define the command and control relationships for UNOSOM II; however, this support was not extensive. Jonathan Howe, the Special Representative of the Secretary General during UNOSOM II, described it as “ones and twos, where we needed dozens (Rosegrant and Watkins 1996, p. 38).” Clearly, organizational structure—or more specifically, the UN’s lack of structure—made cooperation difficult to achieve in this case.

As UNOSOM II continued to stumble toward defining its role, it is interesting to note that most sources claim that the Pentagon was intimately involved, along with the Department of State, in the writing of UNSC Resolution 814. The resolution’s extremely broad definition of the mandate for the new UN force essentially committed UNOSOM II to complete countrywide disarmament and political reconciliation, tasks for which the force was undermanned and ill-prepared to pursue. Given that the document added layers of risk and uncertainty to operations in Somalia, US military support for, or at least acceptance of Resolution 814 is puzzling. 5000 US troops would still remain in Somalia, and it seems that a military desire to reduce uncertainty would have lead it either to argue for a narrow UNOSOM II mandate or do a better job of positioning the force to execute its broad mandate, but neither was the case.
One possible explanation could be provided by a US military desire to increase prestige, in this case by attempting to address the longer-term problems plaguing Somalia and ensuring that the successes of UNITAF were not lost, but this explanation seems inconsistent with UNITAF actions during the spring of 1993. While Johnston and Hoar did attempt to support transition planning, the United States (on Pentagon advice) turned down a UN request to extend the 4 May transition deadline. MG Montgomery, who was left holding the bag for US forces under UNOSOM II, was somewhat diplomatic, but clearly discouraged by the US desire to withdraw on schedule: “I probably knew they wouldn’t do it. There wasn’t a lot of flexibility on the part of LTG Johnston because the plan was already in effect, and because there was no inclination on their part to do that, as a matter of fact (Rosegrant and Watkins 1996, p. 41).” Another explanation, offered by Robert Oakley, is that the Armed Forces wanted out of Somalia and feared that the new Clinton administration might extend the mission if the military raised too many concerns about the transition. The withdrawal plan was already in place, and agreeing to leave the logistics troops and station the quick reaction force on land rather than keeping it afloat was an acceptable price to pay to end the UNITAF commitment (Oakley 2002). This explanation, which seems likely, is more in line with hypotheses on reducing uncertainty, but it is still a bit unsatisfying—it is surprising that the military did not put up more of a fight to limit the mission or withdraw all US troops.

In any case, during the final days before 4 May, any semblance of a “seamless transition” disappeared. UNOSOM II had less than one quarter of its staff in place, telephone and computer resources were totally inadequate, command and control issues still required attention, and UNITAF took with it almost all CA and psychological operations capabilities and some of its intelligence capability. As the NSC’s Richard Clarke puts it, “UNITAF bolted out of Somalia, and there was a security vacuum that UNOSOM was never able to fill (Rosegrant and Watkins 1996, p. 41).”

Overall, most of the military’s relationships with the UN, especially the early desire to avoid interaction with most UN agencies and the interorganizational conflict that arose when the UN attempted to push UNITAF beyond its original mission, seem to be explained by military motivation to reduce uncertainty. They were also shaped to a lesser degree by differences in organizational structure and a history of
antagonistic relations dating back to the original UNOSOM. Clearly, challenges in the military-UN agency relationship left UNOSOM II in a precarious political-military position.

**Conclusions and Policy Implications**

Of my four groups of hypotheses, “reducing uncertainty” does the best job of explaining the nature of civil-military relationships in Somalia. During planning for the operation, the military attempted to plan without much input from civilian organizations and to define its tasks as narrowly as possible. On the ground in Somalia, the CMOC system was sometimes effective in forging *ad hoc* civil-military cooperation, but its activities were certainly not the military’s main focus. While UNITAF did not establish any long-term, routine exchange relationships, its most cooperative relationship was with the USLO, which had the greatest potential to decrease risk for the military. Its most antagonistic relationships were with organizations such as NGOs in Mogadishu and the UN’s DPKO that pressed for more risk-taking and nation-building from UNITAF.

Hypotheses on “increasing prestige” received very little support from the case. There is a lack of evidence that the military leadership, certainly in its upper echelons, felt that doing its utmost to ensure that Restore Hope had the maximum impact on Somalia’s long-term prospects would be in the US Armed Forces’ best interest. Instead, a desire to minimize casualties and avoid becoming entangled in Somali or civilian relief affairs—a desire which was basically in line with the expectations set by the Bush and Clinton administrations—meant that UNITAF’s plan was essentially to get in, declare success based on a narrowly-defined mandate, and get out. Ironically, its haste in exiting Somalia contributed to the American entanglement under UNOSOM II.

“Interorganizational history” and “organizational structure” are both moderately supported as explanations for the military’s relationships. Prior training with USAID and OFDA led CENTCOM to include these organizations in its mission planning a bit more than it might otherwise have done. Interpersonal relations among some key players seemed to improve over time and lead to more cooperation, as with Johnston and Oakley in Mogadishu and NGOs and local military commanders in the outlying HRSs. In terms of structure, the professional, albeit small, USLO staff seemed to facilitate more efficient dialogue with the military, and structural differences with
NGOs such as MSF/France and UN agencies such as DPKO and the special representative’s staff made conflict more likely. Both of these last groups of hypotheses, however, were generally trumped by the military’s concern with reducing uncertainty when they made competing predictions. For example, the military’s good relationship with the USLO began to deteriorate when Gosende replaced Oakley and argued for an expanded military role.

While I would not suggest that firm policy recommendations can be derived from this analysis, several lessons and themes emerge from the study of the Somalia case that may warrant further attention and study:

1. **Policy makers should be aware of the organizational dynamics at work in peace operations.** I believe organizational theory does have something to offer in understanding civil-military interaction during these missions—just as NGOs compete for donor dollars while delivering humanitarian aid, the military will bring its own set of interests to any mission. As long as their primary mission remains fighting and winning high-intensity combat operations, the US Armed Forces have good organizational reasons to oppose deep involvement and long-term cooperation with most civilian organizations in peace operations. These interests will always work against long-term, proactive, efficient civil-military cooperation.

   Many recommendations for improving peace operations seem to ignore these dynamics. For example, a UN report on lessons learned in Somalia claims that “It is essential to have an integrated mission plan covering political, humanitarian, and military aspects, each dovetailed into and complementing the other...All involved should recognize that different components will play the lead role at different stages of a mission (United Nations 1995).” Former SACEUR George Joulwan suggests that “the civilian representatives must be prepared to subordinate themselves to the military during implementation and stabilization, and the military must be ready to subordinate its activities to the High Representative in the last stages of stabilization and during normalization (Joulwan and Shoemaker 1998, p. 43).” A recent article on Kosovo laments the “problem of authority and controlling and coordinating all organizations operating in a given region, including the UN, NATO, NGOs and PVOs” and recommends that all relief organizations be put into functional groups controlled by a joint/combined staff (Anderson 2001). These recommendations seem
to fly in the face of what is known about how large organizations behave.

2. **If policy makers want to increase the amount of civil-military cooperation in peace operations, they need to supervise military operations closely.** While closer civil-military cooperation could increase the chance that peace operations will have a longer-term impact on the target state, it should not be taken for granted that all parties share this goal. For example, the desire to be seen as “doing something” while avoiding casualties may be paramount in the minds of civilian as well as military policy makers. This seems to have been the case in Somalia. If there is no political will behind a long-term solution—including the “nation-building” activities that always seem to be required in ineffective states—it becomes easy for the military to pursue its own organizational interests, doing little beyond securing itself and providing a modicum of ad hoc, preferably well-publicized assistance to civilian relief efforts. Absent strong civilian political interest and supervision, military reluctance to do more may place important constraints on the ability of peace operations to have a lasting impact.

3. **Civil-military cooperation would be more likely if the military is forced to put more emphasis on CMOC activities.** Currently, with only one CA battalion in the military’s active duty inventory and little career value placed on success in the CA field, it seems likely that CMOC activities will continue to be marginalized by operational commanders. Some progress has been made during the past decade in educating officers about civil-military operations, but it is still rare to see them given great emphasis by the operational chain of command on the ground. While there are limits, due to civilian relief organizations’ concern for autonomy, to what a CMOC can achieve, some coordination tool is needed. CA officers, based on their training and functional purpose, tend to see civilian relief operations in a much more favorable light than do combat arms officers. Policy maker initiatives (likely to be opposed by the military) to triple the amount of CA soldiers on active duty, create habitual training relationships between CA units and active Army and Marine divisions, and ensure that CA service is rewarded in terms of career progression would at least help ensure that this perspective is considered by military operational commanders.

4. **Increase the amount and quality of training exercises**
involving the military and civilian relief organizations. This is an extremely common recommendation, and a sensible one. While it may be difficult or expensive to ensure meaningful NGO participation, getting representatives from USAID and the major UN relief agencies more involved in military training exercises would improve mutual understanding of constraints and capabilities, perhaps foster some of the personal relationships that may improve civil-military coordination, and help Army leaders identify the organizations that will yield the highest dividend on military support. While there have been some promising initiatives on this front, such as training support provided by the Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Relief in Hawaii, much more can be done. As a start, staffs from higher level commands could be required to conduct civil-military planning exercises annually. Again, military opposition based on time constraints and the draining of resources from high-intensity combat training is likely, so this constraint would probably have to be externally imposed. The closing of the Army Peacekeeping Institute, however, indicates that training and doctrinal development may be slow in coming.

Challenges and shortcomings during the planning and execution of peace operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq seem to indicate that forging meaningful civil-military cooperation, especially at the strategic and operational levels, remains a difficult business a decade after Somalia. As long as the dynamics that shape interorganizational interaction do not change, there will be no simple solution. But there should not be surprises.

Notes

(1) I use the term “peace operations,” which is inclusive of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, throughout, because it is less awkward and somewhat more precise than other widely-used labels such as operations other than war (OOTW), stability and support operations (SASO), and complex humanitarian emergencies (CHE), and complex contingency operations (CCO).

(2) I use DiMaggio’s term rather than “organizational network” because, as he points out, little networking among organizations may
take place. It is also preferable to “interorganizational system,” another frequently-used term, for the same reason.

(3) Evidence of the military’s reluctance to commit to peace operations abounds—doctrinal development has been slow, the Army’s Peacekeeping Institute, long understaffed, is scheduled to be closed in September 2003, leaders have frequently expressed concern over degraded major theater war readiness resulting from participation in peace operations, and the option of reorganizing part of the military as a constabulary force has not been seriously considered. The Powell Doctrine, with its somewhat unrealistic demands for clear missions and exit strategies, effectively reflects usual military concerns. There is some evidence indicating that military leaders are becoming more comfortable with and supportive of peace operations. For example, see the Peace Through Law Education Fund’s 1999 survey of senior officers, *A Force For Peace*. The interesting question is whether this change in rhetoric is simply good public relations or whether it will have a substantive impact on the military’s actions.

(4) Thompson points to the importance of “prestige,” earned by creating and maintaining a “favorable image of the organization in its salient publics” (Thompson 1967, pp.33-34) in motivating organizational behavior.

(5) In discussions of organizations, boundaries are often difficult to draw. In this paper, I use the terms “US military” and “US Armed Forces” to refer to several groups which I analyze as one collective organization. The two services that were by far the most involved in the Somalia operation were the Army and the Marine Corps. While these two services clearly have important differences, I would expect their organizational motives and behavior to be similar in peace operations. The Marine Corps could perhaps be expected to oppose long-term commitment more forcefully, given its largely short-term expeditionary mission. I will also consider civil-military interaction involving the joint headquarters in the operation. These headquarters included Joint Task Force Somalia, formed around the First Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), US Central Command (CENTCOM), and the Joint Staff.

(6) In the interest of brevity, I will not summarize the events which led to US and UN concern over Somalia. For discussions of the war and drought which cause the terrible humanitarian emergency and

(7) Three options were considered by the NSC. In addition to the “large option,” the other two were continuing the airlift while keeping US troops out of Somalia and leaving the operation under UN command, and deploying a more robust peacekeeping force, including some US troops, under UN command (Rosegrant and Watkins 1996, pp. 12-13; Norton 2001, pp. 13-16).

(8) Disarmament would prove to be a thorny issue in civil-military cooperation throughout the mission. Initially, there was a well-publicized dispute between the US administration on one side and Boutros-Ghali and the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) on the other over how far the United States would go on disarmament. The fact that the US and UN leaders did not share an understanding of the purpose of the UNITAF operation is evidenced by the following telephone exchange on 8 December (Memorandum of Telephone Conversation 1992):

Boutros-Ghali: “Disarming of the gangs, and of the heavy weapons, will be important. If you can give some compensation for the weapons, it might help. As long as they have arms, we will not have peace.”

Bush: “I agree it is important. But we have not made it part of our mission statement. The world may turn on us if we don’t do what we said we would do. We need peacekeepers coming in quickly behind us.”

Boutros-Ghali: “I agree.”

General Hoar, outlining the military position, states that “disarmament was excluded from the mission because it was neither realistically achievable nor a prerequisite for the core mission of providing a secure environment for relief operations.” Hoar, p. 58.

(9) Estimates on the impact of the mission vary widely, with the differences largely hinging on the question of whether the famine would have decreased in intensity even without the international action. Thomas Weiss estimates that 10,000-25,000 lives were saved, while others put the number at 250,000 or more.

(10) In addition to Mogadishu, the other HRSs were Kismaayo, Merca,
Oddur, Beledweyne, Bardera, Gialalassi, Baledogle, and Baidoa (which had been hardest-hit by the famine). UNITAF did not conduct relief operations in northern Somalia.

(11) Kennedy observes that many senior officers are not comfortable dealing with civilian relief organizations, especially many NGOs, and that “they’d rather let some other schmuck do it (Kennedy 2002).” Mark Biser, a Marine infantry officer, caricatures the typical military view of the CMOC: “CMOC? What’s that? Who knows? Who cares? Those guys are over there living under UN rules with air-conditioning. They’re skating [getting off easy]. Who wants to be in a CMOC? Nobody wants to be in a CMOC. That’s like asking ten brand-new Second Lieutenant Infantry officers just out of the Basic School if they want to be the adjutant [an administrative position with little command opportunity]. Ten out of ten would say no. They are warfighters and they want to practice their craft (Seiple 1996, p. 120).”

(12) The NGOs were forced to hire Somali guards before the arrival of UNITAF to achieve a modicum of security—in fact, renting a vehicle often required renting a guard along with it. The NGO concern was that they would be operating in Somalia long after the military left, and they therefore did not want to anger the local militias by refusing protection.

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Biographical Sketch

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