ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Richard C. Feiock Askew School of Public Administration and Department of Political Science Florida State University

Symposium Introduction

Conflict between state and local environmental protection and economic growth has captured increased attention from the media and elected officials (Feiock and Stream, 2001). Despite general public support for environmental goals, policies designed to manage growth and protect resources are controversial and contentious because they are inherently regulatory and can therefore conflict with private property rights. Arthur Denzau and Barry Weingast (1982) argue that there is no justification for comprehensive land use control. Complete property rights are a combination of the right of exclusiveness, right to potential income, and the right of voluntary transferability, if these three criteria are met then controls are not needed, only enforcement of the rights (Denzau and Weingast, 1982: pp. 389-393). However, lacking such a system of "perfect" property rights, problems occur when there are incompatible uses and barriers to private bargaining and contracting.

At the state and local level, the politics of development and environmental management are shaped by competing interests including: developers, business and pro-growth environmentalists, anti-growth groups, and governmental units. The tension between these groups and their perspectives shape the politics for growth decisions. The potential for conflict over the environment increases with the complexity of environmental protection and growth management strategies. Conflict ensues from the additive effect of overlapping regulations (e.g., vertical tensions between the state and local relationship as to uses of land and natural resources and horizontal tensions between neighboring and nested governments). Robyn Turner (1990: pp. 38-39) suggested that there are three basic issues that need to be addressed if state and local

policy is to reconcile competing growth interests: level of control, either consolidation or fragmentation of the process; level of discretion, or how much choice is afforded to the local actors by the state; and level of distributional costs and benefits, not just who benefits and who pays, but the quality of services, availability of services, and the payment for the services.

This symposium explores these relationships at the state and local levels. The original empirical analyses reported here demonstrate that tradeoffs between environment and growth are common but not inevitable. The empirical work and the concluding essay suggest ways in which these tradeoffs may be overcome. The first five articles examine state level policy over time and employ pooled cross-sectional or event history designs to identify the development impacts of environmental policy across time and space. The lead article by Moon-Gi Jeong and Antonio Tavares examines the economic impact state growth management legislation has on economic development. Christopher Stream investigates the impact of state regulatory policy on job growth. The impacts of regulatory stringency and political factors on investment are then examined by Joohun Kang.

Collaborative strategies or partnerships provide a mechanism to bring environmental and development interests together. Carl Dasse applies event history analysis to identify when and why state legislatures choose to adopt collaborative strategies for natural resource management. This is followed by an investigation by Jill Satran of what motivates state governments in the U.S. to engage in either economic development or environmental agreements with other nations.

The final two empirical articles focus on tradeoffs between environmental and economic values at the local level. Jill Tao examines a case study of conflict in a rural Florida community where efforts to clean up and regulate the quality of water fouled by industrial pollution threatened to result in economic decline and job loss in the community. The relationship between economic development and water management is examined by Linda Johnson. She finds that economic forces are influencing patterns of water withdrawal across local governments. The concluding essay by Hyung-Jun Park and Richard Feiock explains the role of social capital in overcoming tradeoffs between economic growth and

environmental protection.

References

Denzau, Arthur and Barry Weingast. 1982. "Recent Developments in Zoning and Property Rights. Forward: The Political Economy of Land Use Regulation." Urban Law Annual. 23: pp. 385-405.

Feiock Richard. C. and Christopher C. Stream. 2001. "Environmental Protection and Economic Development: A False Tradeoff?" Public Administration Review. 61 (May/June): pp. 272-280.

Turner, Robyn. 1990. "New Rules for the Growth Game: The Use of Rational State Standards in Land Use Policy." Journal of Urban Affairs. 12: pp. 35-47.

Biographical Sketch

Richard C. Feiock (rfeiock@garnet.acns.fsu.edu) is a Professor and Ph.D. Program Director of the Askew School, Florida State University.