Party Competition and Inclusion of Immigrants in Germany

Uwe Hunger
University of Muenster, Germany

Abstract

In the history of traditional immigration countries, i.e., countries with an open policy and tradition of immigration, migration has exercised a great influence on party systems and election results. In Europe, the current situation in Austria illustrates very clearly how migration can affect the electoral success of political parties. Apart from cases highlighting the isolated success of radical right-wing, xenophobic parties at the regional level, immigration in Germany has not had any marked influence on the party system up to today. An essential reason for this fact is that a large number of the immigrants do not have or have not yet gained German citizenship and, as a result, are not entitled to vote. But if we anticipate the future development of sustained immigration and naturalization in Germany, the number of migrants entitled to vote will likely grow in the near future. What implications will immigration have upon the German party system? And, what implications will the German party system have upon immigration policy and the integration of a large migrant population? This article is intended to make a first attempt to approach this complex subject by using the classic theories by Lipset/Rokkan and Downs which explain parties and the shape of party systems.

In this article I note that the role of parties in solving the question of the integration of immigrants in German society has been underestimated. Following the theory of Lipset/Rokkan it can be concluded that until now the importance of parties in their serving as bridges between various social groups is not recognized sufficiently in contemporary German migration research. The special role of parties surrounding the debate on immigration and the integration of immigrants is also emphasized by the Rational-Choice-Theory introduced into the party system research by Downs. According to Downs’ rational-choice prerogative, integration is not primarily socially and culturally determined, it is rather a question of will, or the benefit of parties. From this it seems to be clear that
migration policy is dependent on interests, which can mean, on the one hand, that parties build bridges, but which also means that social cleavages can be created by parties.

1. Introduction: German Party System and the Position of Immigrants

Throughout the history of countries with an open policy and tradition of immigration, migration has exercised a great influence on party systems and election results. Thus, immigration in Israel has led to a restructuring of the party system as immigrants, with a view to safeguarding their own specific interests, have founded parties of their own and which have participated in different constellations in the Israeli Government (Klein 200). Likewise, in the USA, the significance of the electoral strength of several immigrant populations has been a subject of discussion for a quite some time. Even during presidential elections, electoral researchers discovered that “immigrant votes” were decisive for the outcome of the elections (Kleppner 1966; Luconi 1989). In Europe, which is the “new continent of immigration” (Thränhardt 1996), the current situation in Austria illustrates very clearly how migration can affect the party system. Although Austria was seen for a long time as having one of the most stable party systems in West Europe, this stability was lost very suddenly after the success and participation in government of the extreme rightist “Anti-Immigration-Party”, FPÖ, which has caused considerable apprehension abroad. Similar situations can be observed in the other West-European neighboring countries, France, Italy and Switzerland, in which right-wing extremist parties have become established on the national level, a part of whose success is based on Anti-Emigration campaigns.

Apart from cases of the isolated success of radical right-wing, xenophobic parties on the regional level, immigration in Germany, with the exception of a short period between 1953 and 1957, has not had any marked influence on the party system up to the present. During that short period, “The Block of Expellees and Those who had been Deprived of their Rights (Bund der Heimatvertriebene und Entrechten)” formed to preserve the interests of over 8 million refugees and expellees from the former German territories in East Germany, were represented in the “Bundestag.“ Their initial success included two ministerial posts within the Federal Government (Lösche 1993: 166ff.). Yet after the BHE’s success, no migrant based party ever gained influence in the FRG. This is quite remarkable as
Germany, with nearly 10 million immigrants, ranks second behind the U.S. in overall levels of immigration. Since reunification in 1990, Germany has taken in more than 4 million new immigrants, which is, in proportion to the complete population and which is even more than the numbers in the USA (Santel 1999).

An essential reason that the German party system has not responded to immigration is that a large number of immigrants - in contrast to the expellees of the fifties and sixties - do not have or have not gained German citizenship and, as a result, are not entitled to vote. Local elections, in which members of E.U. countries may vote are the only exception. This has, however, had little or no influence on the German party system. Nor, has the constantly rising number of naturalized citizens led to any changes in the party system. What is more, the number of naturalizations has risen to altogether - over 2 million since 1990 - which corresponds to a growth of the electorate by more than 2%. If we anticipate the future development of the figures for immigration and naturalization in Germany, the number of migrants entitled to vote will grow more. Under the conditions of the new law on nationality, more immigrants will, on the one hand, become naturalized in Germany than up to now. Interior Minister, Otto Schily, projects that there will be 200,000 naturalizations per annum. Coupled with these growing naturalization figures is the recently adopted citizenship law which allows children born of non-Germans German citizenship (Hagedorn 2000). Furthermore, the number of native Germans entitled to vote is decreasing because of a drop in the birth rate. So, it is safe to assume that immigrants and immigrant issues will play an increasingly important role in German party politics.

In light of this data it is surprising that immigration has not had any real influence on the German party system since the BHE in the early fifties. To be certain, the topic of immigration has been used in election campaigns not only by extreme right-wing parties to win elections but by the more moderate mainstream parties as well (Thranhardt 1992). Mainstream parties have failed to fully include Germany’s large immigrant population in daily party activities. In fact, the Union parties on the right, CDU and CSU, deny even today the fact that Germany is a country of immigration. In view of the figures presented coupled with the experience of other countries it should be clear that immigrants cannot, in the long run, be ignored by German mainstream parties as this group is bound to influence the party system in the future.
In view of the unresponsive attitude of parties in relation to immigration, on the one hand, and increased immigration and the significance of immigrants on the other, the question arises about how further immigration will affect the competition between the parties and the party system within Germany as a whole? In addition, there is also the question of how the competition between the parties and the party system will affect the future policy of migration and integration in the Federal Republic. How will parties react to the new societal composition? Will individual parties, such as the CDU and the CSU, continue to deny the presence of immigrants? Will a new (immigrant) party be established? In brief: what impact does immigration and a large immigrant population have on the German party system and vice-versa?

Currently, no systematic analyses of these questions have been submitted. Immigrants are mostly looked on by German political scientists as political outsiders (for France see Withol de Wenden, 1988). Until the 1980s, the focus was on discussing the needs and care of the immigrants where immigrants were seen and portrayed as passive and in need of help. While more recent research increasingly sees immigrants as active citizens in civil society (Thränhardt/ Hunger 2000), the political participation of migrants in parties has rarely been made a subject of research. In the area of party research the subject of immigration - apart from research into right-wing extremism - has been discussed equally little (Hollifield 1999: 68f; see also Harris, 2000), contrary to the tradition of research in other immigration countries, such as the USA or Australia. Moreover, more recent research on the challenges to the German party system caused by German reunification or globalization, as well as scholarship on the emergence of new parties are hardly aware of this aspect. This article is intended to make a first attempt to approach this complex subject.

2. Implications of Immigration for the German Party System: Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Evidence

In the scholarship on political parties essentially two starting points in the theory explaining parties and the shape of party systems have been established: the first is socio-structural and the second is rationa-choice. The ideas emerging from political sociology which explain party systems and political phenomena by means of their underlying social and socio-
structural phenomena as advanced by Lipset and Rokkan 1967 will address the first starting point. The new political economy approach advanced by Downs (1957) which explains the behavior of parties and the development of party systems via the rational choice model will address the second starting point. Whereas the first approach regards social and socio-cultural factors as fundamental reasons determining party behavior and party systems, Downs rational-choice approach considers only competitive factors as being decisive for the structure of the party system and the programmatic statements of parties which figure so prominently. Viewed in the rational-choice context, parties are not interpreted as instruments for enforcing the interests of social groups or classes (Lipset 1981), rather as political enterprises whose aim it is to maximize the share of votes regardless of their basic ideological orientation. In this article immigration and its impact on the German party system will be analyzed on the basis of these two approaches. In doing so, the distinction will need to be made whether immigrants are perceived as an object of politics or whether a growing number of immigrants become active political subjects who take part in elections and exercise direct influence on the parties and/or on the party system.

2.1 The Social-Structure-Approach: Cleavage Structures in the Society and the Rise of a New Party?

From the perspective of political sociology, the works of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) are considered seminal approaches in explaining and developing the modern party system in West Europe. Central to their core-thesis, parties are been formed along socio-structural conflict lines. Lipset and Rokkan list four critical conflict lines are still influential in most West European societies:

(1) Subject vs. Dominant Culture
(2) Church(es) vs. Government
(3) Primary vs. Secondary Economy

According to Lipset/ Rokkan (1967), the number and relevance of the various conflict lines essentially determines the nature of the party system developing. If a single strain of conflict dominates in a society, a bipolar two-party system can form along this topic of conflict, as is the case, for
example, in the work/capital opposition in England. The simultaneity and equivalence of various lines of conflict can, on the other hand, result in a splintered multi-party system, as was the case in Weimar, Germany. The comparative analysis of party systems in West Europe, in which the party system in the 1960s which closely mirrored the social lines of conflict of the 1920s, led Lipset and Rokkan to assert that the main lines of conflict establish a party doctrine for years and can even outlive social changes. On the other hand, this model should not be seen as being so static that new social lines of conflict could not lead to new party constellations. If one uses the Cleavage-Model of Lipset and Rokkan, the development of the Federal German party system can be easily reconstructed. Von Alemann (1992: 89ff.) demonstrates that the emergence of the German three-party system of CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP up to the beginning of the 1980s can be explained by the two dominating lines of conflict in contemporary German society: Workers vs. Employers/Owners, as well as Church(es) vs. Government.

**FIGURE 1: DOMINANT CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES IN THE WESTERN GERMAN PARTY SYSTEM IN THE 1950S AND 1960S**

![Diagram of party system with CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP]

The emergence of the Greens in the 1980s can be explained by a new cleavage coupled with a diminishing Church-State conflict. A new
social movement and social orientation of a young generation, who had been greatly inspired by the ideas of 1968 protest movement and which clearly deviated from traditional party standards were converted into a party structure. The fact that none of the established parties could assimilate this new social movement was favorable to the foundation and success of the new party. This, in turn, was connected with the tradition of extra-parliamentary opposition at the time of the Grand Coalition (Große Koalition). Furthermore, the new themes of environmental protection and peace were rather unsatisfactorily translated into the program outline of the established parties. According to the Cleavage-Theory, a burgeoning new social line of conflict which Ingelhart (1983) described as materialistic (old politics) vs. postmaterialistic (new politics) was thus able to become dominant and resulted in the formation of a new party.

**FIGURE 2: DOMINANT CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES IN THE WESTERN GERMAN PARTY SYSTEM IN THE 1980S**

The most recent phase of the German party system, with the establishment of the party which succeeded the SED, the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) can also be explained by the Cleavage-Theory (Falter/ Klein/ Schumann 1992: 210). The gaping differences between East and West Germans in their experience and assessment of the political and
social circumstances, which emerged in connection with the reunification of Germany, favored the development of a new party which was able to serve as a preserver of the East German mentality and the protector of specific East German interests in the German party system. In light of the PDS ten-year success as part of the German party system, it can be argued that, according to the theory, there is a new Cleavage between East (Post-Communistic) and West (Non-Post-Communistic).

**FIGURE 3: DOMINANT CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES IN THE GERMAN PARTY SYSTEM IN THE 1990S**

![Party Competition Diagram]

In the literature on the German party system there is much speculation about further lines of social conflict, over and above the East-West-Opposition described, which may lead to party-building processes or, as the case may be, new constellations in the German party system. A recent work on the current development of small parties in Germany (van den Boom, 1999) demonstrates that small parties are constantly being reorganized running along lines of social conflict or based on a new social movement. However, for the most part, these small parties never manage to become permanently established. An example of this could be found in the first women’s party “Women’s Party for Human Politics” established in 1979 which attempted to convert the emancipation and equality of women
into effective party politics, yet always remained under the one per cent mark (van den Boom 1999: 243ff.). However, an example from Iceland illustrates how such attempts can indeed succeed in the long-term: The “Women’s Alliance Party“ succeeded at each general election in the period between 1983 and 1991 to gain between 5% and 10% of the votes (Ware 1996: 22). Whether such a newly founded party can establish itself permanently depends, from the point of view of the Cleavage-Theory, on the relevance and dominance of the lines of social conflict which are referred to.

To what extent an existing line of conflict gains in relevance and dominance depends on the behavior of the parties already in existence. The former Chancellor and CDU party chairman Helmut Kohl, repeatedly said that he recognized as one of his greatest strategic mistakes not to have reacted to the ecological movement and its themes and, as a result opened the way for the foundation of the Green Party. The mainstream German parties seem to have learned from this mistake in relation to the Women’s Movement in that all the established parties have responded to the topic of women and have introduced special regulations and forums to include more women related topics in their platforms. Thus, when it founded the Women’s Union, the CDU established a special committee to create an explicit forum for women’s politics. In addition, the CDU has, in the persona of Angela Merkel, the first Party Chairwoman of a large party in Germany. Merkel’s ascendancy to Party Chair is intended to signal the new gender role-distribution in Germany. Yet, since the 1980s the SPD has established female quotas within key party leadership posts thus seeing to it that women are more strongly represented in political office. The Study Group of Social Democratic Women, which is intended to form an explicit forum for women’s topics, has been in existence for some time as well. The Greens have seen themselves since their foundation as a socially progressive party which has formulated the equality of women in politics and society as one of the main aims of their party. This example indicates that large as well as small parties have clearly learned to react to social changes and to integrate new social movements.

To what extent this is, or will be the case in relation to the specific problems of immigration remains an unanswered question until today. According to the Cleavage-Theory presented, migration can, especially if it only leads to a change in the composition of the electorate, be a reason for the emergence of new parties and changes in the party system since new
social conflicts may arise as a result of immigration (Ware 1996: 220ff.). Within Germany sociologists point to the already existent line of conflict between natives and immigrants which, according to Elias, may be described as the Insider/Outsider-Cleavage (Elias 1993; Klein 2000). From the immigrants perspective, if they cannot share permanently in the societal opportunity structures and resources of Germans there will result a cleavage. From the indigenous German perspective, if they feel or are made to feel that they have certain social or economic disadvantages, for example on the labor market, as a result of immigration a cleavage will result. If we follow contemporary German cultural research, we can also observe cultural cleavages between migrants and the indigenous populace as well. The new cleavages may even revive an old religious line of conflict and might replace the former confessional opposition of Catholics vs. Protestants by that of Christians vs. non-Christians (Heitmeyer et al. 1997).

FIGURE 4: POTENTIAL DOMINANT CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES IN THE GERMAN PARTY SYSTEM IN THE 21ST CENTURY

In view of the blurred ideologies between Right and Left after the end of the Cold War (Giddens 1994) and between Materialists and Post-Materialists after the entry of the Greens as a permanent protest party and in view of the continual growing together of East and West, this line of
conflict could become the most relevant for German society in the foreseeable future. To what extent such a Cleavage-Structure could express itself in the formation of a new party, as is the case in other immigration countries, e.g. in Israel, depends on various factors: how large the number of immigrants; how homogeneous or heterogeneous is this group; and how do the established parties behave with regard to the topic of immigration.

What does the future immigration and integration policy of the parties look like? Will it be possible to integrate Germany’s large immigrant population in the existing party-structure and program? Up to now, there have been no immigrant parties in Germany. Instead there are various political clubs of migrants which, however, concentrate mainly on politics in the home countries. German parties have just recently begun to involve immigrants more in their party work and program. Already since the 1970s, a “Federation of people’s clubs of Turkish Social Democrats” has been in existence in Germany which has close connections to the SPD. The Greens founded the immigrants’ forum in the 1990s Immigrün (Immi-Green) which is intended to bind migrants to the party and to deal with topics specific to migration. The FDP also has a Forum of Liberal Turks in the “Liberal Turkish-German Union“ (LDT) and the CDU has also set up a “German-Turkish Forum“ (DTF) in order to open up the Turkish immigrants’ segment for the CDU (Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1999: 95).

According to the “theory of milieu“ developed by Lepsius (1966) – which is similar to the approach of Lipset and Rokkan – the stability of the German party system rests on its being anchored directly in social-moral milieus and the behavior of individual parties can be assessed as an attempt to bind the immigrants to existing party-milieus. Thus, according to the theory, it is intended to avoid the development of a specific immigrant milieu (e.g. a Muslim minority) and to support processes of social assignment of the immigrants to the established parties. Following Lepsius (1966), one would expect a simplified process of binding conservative, Christian immigrants with the CDU/CSU, immigrant workers with the SPD, immigrant entrepreneurs and liberal intellectuals with the FDP, immigrants of post-materialist, ecological or feminist-empowerment orientation with the Greens, and immigrants of a Marxist turn of mind with the PDS. A critical examination of these parties, however, would be problematic in linking conservative, non-Christian immigrants to the existing party structure. For many Muslim Turkish immigrants being classified as a
Christian Democrat would be problematic, in spite of the fact that many conservative Turks might closely drawn to the party platform.

If one considers the empirical data on the possible potentials of assignment of migrants to the existing parties according to the milieu approach, one comes to the following result: as a result of the history of labor immigration in the 1950s and 1960s there is great potential for addressing the immigrants as workers and for being able to bind them to the SPD. In addition, a considerable number of immigrants in Germany display a closeness to basic conservative positions, such as, for example, the meaning of traditional values such as family, law, order as well as the demand for a strong state thus making their assignment to the CDU/CSU conceivable. On the other hand, there is very little liberal thinking and even less post-materialist or Marxist attitudes among the immigrant population living within Germany. According to the explanatory approach of explanation discussed here, the integration of migrants in the German party system thus primarily sets a challenge to the two main large parties CDU/CSU and SPD.
When naturalized migrants and those who have been living in Germany over a long period are asked about their preference for German parties, they concentrate on both large parties CDU/CSU and SPD. Whereas the former “guest workers” (Gastarbeiter) almost exclusively sided with the SPD, ethnic German emigrants (Aussiedler) prefer the conservative union parties, CDU/CSU. This disconnect can be explained, on the one hand, by the more liberal political program offered by the SPD to the gastarbeiter and that many foreign workers are organized in trade unions which function as run-up organizations to the SPD. The inclination of ethnic German emigrants to the CDU could be explained by the Conservative-National and
Christian milieu structure (sociological explanation) or, as the case may be, by the more liberal politics of the CDU/CSU with regard to topics relating to ethnic German emigrants (Competition approach). Overall, there seems to be a great potential for both parties which, with increasing numbers of naturalization, might be exploited more fully by the SPD in particular. With regard to the ethnic German emigrants there are calculations which indicate that the 94 election would have been lost for the CDU/CSU without the votes of that group.

**FIGURE 6: LEANINGS TOWARD A POLITICAL PARTY OF FOREIGNERS, GERMANS, AND ETHNIC GERMANS 1997 (IN PERCENT)**

The strength of the immigrants links with the party platforms will be of decisive importance for the future development of the German party system. Opening the up the parties is certainly a method to defuse any developing Cleavage-structures. In so doing a new “social movement of immigrants“ would not even emerge but would rather be absorbed by the existing party
system right from the start. In that case the immigrants would assign themselves as workers, entrepreneurs, Christians or Conservatives to the existing parties and would not define themselves primarily as immigrants. Should the opening up of the parties to immigrants prove to be mere lip-service, according to the two sociological theories described here, a new party might be formed in the long run. This was the case with the Greens who emerged from a specific social-moral milieu (“Alternative Culture” (‘Alternativkultur’, Von Alemann 1992: 94)) and who are still anchored in it, not only theoretically conceivable. Many speak even today of “subcultures”, “parallel societies” and a continually developing “guest-worker-milieu“. In conclusion, it may be said that it is up to the existing parties today to fulfil the function of integration and inclusion necessary since otherwise a new Cleavage “Indigenous (Insider) vs. Immigrants (Outsiders)“ could develop out of which a new party might emerge in the long run.

2.2 The Rational-Choice-Approach: Party Competition and the Valence of Immigration Issues

The Rational-Choice approach explains parties and party systems not from the point of view of societal basic phenomena, it rather follows the axioms of the New Political Economy, which interprets politics as a marketing decision to gain the votes of the electorate and power (Downs 1957). In this context, parties are seen as instruments to maximize the number of votes and it is their aim to achieve, exercise and maintain government power. Rational choice sees politicians are seen as “political entrepreneurs“ who get involved in politics for self-interest. Their aim is not primarily to realize altruistic or humanitarian targets, rather to gain advantages of their own such as prestige, status and income (the axiom of the rationality of political behavior). Citizens, in contrast are viewed as actors acting rationally, who are concerned with maximizing their individual private benefit in the elections (Self-Interest-Axiom). On the basis of the axiom of the rationality of the political action of the parties and that of personal benefit of the citizens, rational choice works from the premise that the behavior of parties can be forecast if the political structure of preference in society is known.

Depending on whether the voters‘ preference related to the Right-Left Axis is normally distributed or whether it indicates a bi- or polymodal
distribution, different party systems are formed. A unimodal distribution of the voters’ preferences, as is assumed in Germany (Mintzel 1984: 83; von Alemann 1992: 101f.), favors, according to Downs (1957: 121f.), the development of a two-party system in which both parties take relatively moderate positions close to the political center. This leads to parties concentrating in their program orientation on the so-called ‘median voter’ and their ideology converging with time. In German party history the rational choice theorem is often used to explain the ideological convergence process between both big parties, SPD and CDU, in the last five decades such as the programmatic convergence of the SPD with the CDU in the famous Godesberg Program of 1959, or, from the CDU side, when it adopted the principles of the “Ostpolitik“ from the SPD in the seventies (Mintzel 1984: 83). At present, the CDU is attempting to adopt SPD positions of the “New Center“ after the change of government in 1998. The fact several small parties also exist beside the two major parties does not alter the dualistic character of the German party system.

FIGURE 7: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AN THE LEFT-RIGHT-SCALE IN GERMANY IN 1992 (IN PERCENT)
According to rational choice theory, immigration and immigration related issues should be cast to gain the largest number of adherents. Depending on the attitudes to immigration more and the number of votes which can be won, the parties will position themselves accordingly to maximize this benefit. That means that even conservative national parties are not *per se* against immigration because immigration would not be reconcilable with the national positions of conservative parties, rather more because they expect greater advantages for themselves in the form of votes from their anti-immigration position. This position is the opposite of far right parties (Harris, 2000). According to this theory, the question of which benefit they can work out for themselves from immigration or a liberal policy of integration is decisive for the citizens‘ attitude to immigration. This, in turn, depends to a great extent on how the citizens get information or are given information on this subject, which is, for its part, influenced by the parties (agenda setting). It must be considered in this context that parties have different interests in whether voters are confronted with information pro or contra migration, depending on which spectrum the majority of their voters belong to.

If one takes opinion polls as an indicator of the distribution of voters’ preferences on the subject of immigration it is clear that the normal Right-Left distribution in the general political attitude of the voters can also be found in immigration topics even if in individual questions a critical attitude towards immigration predominates. This can be explained within the framework of the theory in that the perception and/or presentation of the benefit of immigration to the individual is most diffuse whereas that of costs is concentrated and can be easily measured.
The fact that the topic of migration can be used in the political debate for maximizing votes was indicated by the signature-campaign carried out by the CDU with great success in the Local Elections in Hesse in 1999 against the introduction of double citizenship for foreign immigrants planned by the Red-Green Federal Government. The government parties in Berlin had not succeeded, in the run-up to the election, in getting across the benefit for the German population or the individual voter from a general acceptance of double citizenship for immigrants. The argument that German citizenship together with the parallel maintenance of the original citizenship of the persons involved would promote the integration of the migrants and thus reduce the social costs for society and also for the individual voter was cleverly refuted by the CDU campaign. The dualistically designed advertising slogan “Integration: Yes! Double Citizenship: No!” promised the voters, if they
voted for the CDU, that the “costs of the non-integration“ (von Loeffelholz/Thränhardt 1995) of immigrants would be kept low even without double citizenship, and that, in addition, the benefit of the undivided loyalty of all the citizens would remain guaranteed to the German state.

FIGURE 9: ATTITUDES TOWARD DUAL CITIZENSHIP IN GERMANY IN 1999 (IN PERCENT)

The picture drawn here that migration issues particularly with negative connotation are exploited in election campaigns is, just as the social mood in relation to immigration is by no means static. As emerged from reports in the media and in the statements of the parties in the last weeks in Germany, immigration themes can, indeed, be positively presented. This is frequently the case when immigration is discussed in connection with demographic development or labor scarcity in certain branches of the German economy. In the so-called “Green-Card” debate, which deals with recruiting experts for the German computer branch, the Bavarian CSU, for example, made its mark by taking a clear political
position and insisting on the speedy and unbureaucratic recruitment of IT specialists. For a long time, the CSU together with its sister-party, the CDU, had only discussed migration in a negative way and had denied the necessity of immigration thus ensuring a majority of its electorate’s votes for itself. As the citizens have become better informed about the significance of immigration for demographic stability, the security of the social state as well as the ability of the German economy to compete, there is an increasing change in the way the benefit of immigration is evaluated. This was first clearly seen in the failed election campaign “Kinder statt Inder“ (Kids instead of Inds (Indians)) of the North-Rhine Westphalian CDU in Spring 2000. The CDU had hoped, by means of this slogan against the immigration of IT specialists to the advantage of young Germans, to win votes. Its Bavarian sister-party, like a political enterprise, has responded to the change of mood in society. When it became clear that the German economy and large parts of the population would speak out in favor of the Green Card proposed by the German government for IT specialists, the CSU with its so-called Blue Card for Bavaria wanted to introduce an even more progressive regulation in many respects in order to outdo the offer made by the Federal Republic and to win back votes which had been lost.

The manipulable valency of the topic of immigration is being demonstrated very clearly at the moment in the USA where the recruitment of IT-experts is likewise being discussed. In the course of this discussion, a drastic change of mood in favor of immigration and increasing the rights of immigrants has taken place. Formerly xenophobic anti-immigration groups and organizations are now, in the face of worldwide competition for computer experts, demanding “a fundamental reform of the regulations for immigration” in the USA. Moreover, politicians who, up to recently, spoke out in favor of drastically reducing the numbers of immigrants, are now, with their demand: “The New Economy needs new Americans“, positioning themselves at the head of a new immigration coalition (“Immigration Reform Coalition“). Republicans as well as Democrats are arguing in favor of a liberal policy of immigration as if it were the most natural thing in the world (Sueddeutsche Zeitung 26.7.2000).

These examples are intended in reference to the German context to demonstrate that political parties can, in fact, react flexibly to changes in the structure of preferences among the population. It is of decisive importance how immigration can be “marketed“ in public (on the political market). If we start from the premise that immigration can no longer be denied in the
future and the necessity of future immigration is being recognized by ever
larger societal groups, we may expect that the parties will accordingly
position themselves and will, with an eye to the “theory of the median
evoter“ move to the center in this question. This is especially true for the
CDU/CSU, which is, at the moment, taking a more extreme position than
the future median voter. In order to maximize the number of votes
especially this party will change its political position showing a tendency to
move to the middle. The current policy of the CSU indicates that this
process has already been initiated since, in spite of its marked Christian
self-image, it supports the teaching of Islam to Turkish Muslims in German
schools (Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 10.7.2000). A possible consequence of this
development might be that radical members would no longer feel their
interests were being represented if the CDU/CSU’s positions proved too
moderate and that they would form a party of their own. The function of
such a party would then be to force the old party (CDU/CSU) back into the
direction acceptable to those voters who had deserted it (Downs 1957:
127ff.). It is also conceivable that no new party will be founded, but that
existing right-wing extremist parties would be used to achieve the same
goal (protest voters).

The trend to the center is, however, also being supported by a
second dynamic development. As the number of naturalizations will rise in
Germany, while the number of native German will simultaneously drop, the
number of voters with a migrant background will grow and immigrants will
become ever more important for the parties as the potential buyers of their
political programs. This will, on the premise of vote maximizing, then cause
the parties to make evermore offers to migrants so that the latter vote for
them according to the axiom of self-interest. In relation to the party system
as a whole, this assumption will lead to all parties in future probably
offering a more liberal policy of migration in order to gain votes from
immigrants. To achieve this it will, however, be necessary for parties, in
order not to lose the votes of the natives because of their pro-immigration
attitude (problem of extremism), to charge the subject of immigration with
positive semantics, i.e. to make pro-immigration information accessible to
the voters.

The development of a new party for and by immigrants would,
according to this theory, be probable if none of the established parties
makes an attractive offer for this group. That is especially true in case the
preference structure of the native voters is not normally distributed, rather
tending to the right, i.e. mostly critical towards immigration, as this, e.g. with regard to the stream of non-EU-workers seems to be the case. Established parties would in this case, if they spoke out on behalf of immigration, tend to lose the votes of the natives. That is why they would probably stick to their old positions, i.e. they would not make any special offer for immigrants, which would favor the formation of an immigrant party.

3. Conclusions: The Important Role of Parties for Immigration and Integration in Germany

The theories quoted here to explain party behavior and party systems can also shed light on important structural phenomena and political processes in relation to the formulation of the question in this essay. The Social-Structure-Approach outlines the particular significance of social structures for the party system. It can be seen from many examples from German party history that the structure of society is important, if not decisive, for the shape of party systems and, vice-versa, that the parties are important for overcoming structural cleavages in society and converting conflicts into democratic decision processes. In German history it was always parties who were able to bring social groups together and solve conflicts in democratic processes. In this connection we are reminded of the way the CDU in the first years of the Federal Republic was able to overcome the confessional disagreements between Catholics and Protestants thus achieving a remarkable level of integration. The Green Party is also an example of how social groups from the extra-parliamentary opposition could be brought back as a party to parliamentary democracy. Applied to the subject of this essay, this means that, to solve the question of the integration of immigrants in German society, the parties once again must play a very important role. If there are, in fact, the structural cleavages assumed between immigrants and natives (parallel societies), the question arises about which role the parties can play in solving these lines of social conflict. Against this background, until now German migration research, which is inspired by this idea, does not recognize sufficiently the importance of parties in their bridging function between social groups as conceived above.

The special role of parties for the debate on immigration and the integration of immigrants in Germany is also emphasized by the Rational-
Choice-Method: according to this, integration is not primarily socially and culturally determined, it is rather a question of will, or the benefit of parties. Parties take the topics which are of advantage to them to discuss in public. At the same time they influence the way they are “charged”, i.e. that the parties also decisively determine the valency of the subject of immigration. In this they decide on the ratio of vote maximization, i.e. depending on the (manipulable) preference distribution of the voters, which position they take on integration and immigration. If the preferences change among the population to the extent that the citizens attach greater importance to the benefit of immigration, the parties react by making “more liberal“ political offers (for the median voter). From this it is clear that migration policy is dependent on interests, which can mean, on the one hand, that parties build bridges, but which also means that social cleavages can be created by parties.

From both approaches it becomes clear at this point that parties decisively shape the debate on immigration and integration policy. As an example of the prominent role in which parties stand out above the rest for the climate of the discussion about immigration, the shaping of integration policy and the structure of society, let me quote the central area of educational policy, which is of paramount importance for the social opportunities of immigrants. In this, the CSU in Bavaria represented the opinion up to the end of the eighties that foreigners should not - as originally planned - remain permanently in Germany, but should rather, in the long run, return to their home countries and thus followed a clear non-integratory policy in which foreign children were taught in separate “national classes“. The result of this policy is that these pupils today have both a poorer knowledge of German and a lower standard of school leaving certificates and are thus given a marginal position in German society (Hunger 2000a). Regardless of whether one explains the policy of the CSU by the Self-Interest-Axiom of Downs (maximization of votes), or with the fact that the CSU is firmly anchored in a national-conservative milieu (Mintzel 1978), the decisive role of the parties is made clear. In contrast to that, the policy of integration in education of the SPD-dominated State Government in North-Rhine Westphalia has contributed to a much higher level of educational success among foreign pupils (Hunger 2000a). This example makes it clear that different party policies can lead to different social structures and they have considerable influence on the level of integration among immigrants in Germany. Policy and especially party policy decides.
Bearing all this in mind, one could come to the conclusion that the “problem with foreigners” (Sontheimer 1993: 134), in the eyes of many, still unsolved, is a consequence of the lack of parliamentary debate about this subject by the parties. The conflicts in an immigration society are, it is true, perceived on the social level and ways of solving them are discussed within this framework but the fact that social conflicts in more recent history are mediated by the parties has been overlooked. The problem with regard to immigrants is that the majority of immigrants in Germany have not been naturalized and, as foreigners, like the workers formerly, are excluded from elections and thus also from party competition. The way to solve the current problem of integration in Germany, in analogy to the “worker question“ in the 19th Century, by means of party competition is thus largely closed. It could only be taken if either the right to vote is detached from German citizenship and is changed so that foreigners living permanently in Germany are also allowed to vote or that the practice of naturalization is implemented in a forceful way in order to enable immigrants to participate fully in political affairs. An important step towards opening party competition for immigrants was taken on 1.1.2000 when the law of nationality was liberalized. This will cause the parties to get involved more fully in the debate about this topic.

To date the CDU/CSU benefits from the ethnic German voters, but – as it seems – in the near future the SPD, above all, will have an advantage over the other parties. Empirical data on the party with which immigrants identify indicate that the majority of the immigrants will support this party, which can be explained by referring to the working milieu and the role of trade unions as an run-up organization which serves the SPD as well as by the more liberal offer this party makes to immigrants. As, above all, the competition-approach suggests, the CDU/CSU would, theoretically, be in a position to work together with the SPD and to change their position in relation to immigration and immigrants, as the CSU, with the Blue Card, has already shown us how. The statement by the CSU-Chairman Edmund Stoiber with regard to same-sex partnerships that (in the words of Frederick the Great) “everyone should be happy in their own way“, suggests how much scope they are leaving to develop in this matter. The danger for the CDU/CSU is, however, that if they show too strong a trend to the center, extremist right-wing parties could gain a lot of votes, as has already occurred in other European countries. The Nationalist-Right-Wing milieu can be assessed rather as small. Nevertheless, according to Downs (1957:
128) it might be argued that the extremist Right-Wing parties also get votes from less extreme voters if the extremist Right-Wing parties are closer in their positions to the preferences of these voters than a CDU/CSU which has become too moderate. Thus it was indeed functional for the stability of the Federal Republic and its policy of integration that the CDU/CSU stood for extreme positions (“On the right of the CSU there must be no place for a party”). Bade/ Bommes (2000) have developed a similar idea when they say that talking about Germany as a country of non-immigration has, paradoxically, only made an inclusive policy possible.

The future positioning of the CDU/CSU on the subjects of immigration and integration depends to a great degree on how the preferences are distributed among the population. With a normal distribution of the preferences, the CDU/CSU is likely to be in favor of immigration (tendency to the Center), with a steep right slope in the distribution of preferences and thus a critical attitude towards immigration among the population, their policy will remain rather restrictive. The way in which the preferences are distributed depends, on the one hand, on the way the mood develops among the population (Information of the population on the subject of migration) and, on the other hand, on the changes in the composition of the electorate (naturalizations). Profits to the SPD are likely if the preferences are normally distributed (more naturalizations and/or perceived use of immigration to the natives) and if the CDU positions itself to the Right, in order to avoid the risk of a Right-Wing being successful. The subject of migration will become decisive for the structure of the German party system as soon as one party succeeds in making it the main issue of an electoral campaign (One-Issue-Campaign). Should this be the case in a future Federal election, one might, under the conditions of a normally distributed structure of preferences, expect either a victory of the SPD over the CDU or even perhaps the strengthening of a Radical Right-Wing party. As this perspective of a One-Issue Election Campaign seems quite possible, it is to be expected that both big parties will be considerably more attentive to or will try to influence the distribution of preferences in the population on the subject of Migration/Integration. Their long-term prospects of success could be to a great extent dependent on this. The direction in which the subject is influenced depends on the strategic decisions of the parties.

The emergence of a new immigrant party, such as in Israel, is quite conceivable according to both theories. It depends, on the one hand, from the future numeric development in immigration and naturalization in
Germany. On the other hand, to what extent a group of immigrants is homogeneous or heterogeneous is decisive. The Turks, as the largest group of immigrants in Germany are, because of that, surely the most interesting group at the moment. Up to now, many Turks have not become naturalized and cannot, as a result, participate in elections. Besides, the Turks in Germany are a very heterogeneous group (Ögelman 2000). At the moment attempts are being made with the establishment of a “Turkish Community in Germany” to gather the Turkish group together and, on club level, to gain influence on the political system of the Federal Republic of German. It is the declared aim of the “Turkish Community” to acquire the status of an officially registered association with the German Parliament (“Bundestag”) and in the parlaments of the “Länder” (Federal States) in order to voice and to try to assert the specific interests of Turks in Germany (Hunger 2000b). The foundation of a political party by and for Turkish immigrants would really be the logical consequence of this development. Particularly in communal elections, in which there is no longer any five per cent hurdle in many “Länder”, the success of such a party from the point of view of competition would be easily imaginable, especially since there are plenty of migrants in cities with a high percentage of foreigners and foreigners from the EU are entitled to vote even without German nationality.

This idea may still seem out of place at the moment. The example of the Greens indicates, however, that, if there is a specific milieu and new interests arise to which the established parties do not react, a new and influential party in the otherwise so stable party system of the Federal Republic of Germany may very well be formed. How will things look in twenty years when “new” Germans have developed from the young Turks of today. Both migration and party research should really pay more attention to this question.

References


Ware, Alan (1996): Political Parties and Party Systems, Oxford University Press.
