THE POLICE, CHANGING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND LATE MODERNITY: THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS

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Abstract

During the last fifteen years remarkable changes occurred in policing and security arrangements in The Netherlands. These changes are closely related to the shift to late modern society. For many Dutch citizens today safety problems should be the highest priority of the government. Feelings of unease about crime often result from general insecurities related to life in late modern society. On the one hand citizens expect the government and especially the police to solve the problems of crime and disorder, if necessary with harsh measures. On the other hand, however, both the government and the police are confronted with a loss of legitimacy. Five developments in public safety policy and policing in The Netherlands must be understood as answers to these developments: in organizational and managerial arrangements, in relations between the state and other agencies, extra-judicial measures and attention to victims, new technologies of prevention and surveillance and a harsher, stricter policy. These developments, however, create new problems and tensions.

1. Introduction

The prominent police scientists Bayley and Shearing have stated that, over the past ten to fifteen years, modern democratic countries like the United States, Britain, and Canada have experienced a fundamental break in the
development of their systems of crime control, policing and law enforcement; ‘Future generations will look back on our era as a time when one system of policing ended and another took its place’ (Bayley and Shearing, 1996: p. 585). They maintain that a process of pluralizing of policing, coupled with a serious identity crisis, amount to a radical restructuring of policing in contemporary democratic societies.

Their analysis has been criticized by Jones and Newburn (2002) for overlooking the continuities that are equally important in understanding the current practices of policing in western countries. Moreover, they question the assumption made by Bayley and Shearing that the transformations in policing can be seen as global. Their thesis fails to take sufficient account of significant differences between the nature of policing in the United States and European countries.

In this paper we describe and analyse the main changes that have occurred in policing, security arrangements and public safety policy in the Netherlands during the last ten to fifteen years. In the Netherlands in the 1990’s public safety became a central concern to many citizens and was a central topic on the political agenda. The last two decades or so have witnessed a remarkable change in the Dutch criminal justice climate. The traditional liberal, permissive criminal justice climate in this country was in many respects replaced by a harsher penal policy. At the same time, however, there were also other, almost contradictory developments.

Following Garland (2001), Newburn (2001) and Johnston (1998), among others, we assume that the changes in policing over the last ten to fifteen years are closely related to a complex of social changes which may be described as the shift to a ‘late modern’ society. In most western countries this shift has been accompanied by a rise
in the level of crime, a growing awareness and fear of insecurity and considerable impediments to citizens and governments seeking to find adequate (both formal and informal) ways of dealing with the problems of crime and disorder. Moreover, these developments have contributed to a change in the position of the government, and of public institutions more generally. The influence of these general social changes on policing and security arrangements depends on the ways relevant actors and agencies deal with them. To what extent are the changes in policing and security arrangements, including those in the Netherlands, to be understood as closely related to the shift to a late modern society?

In this paper we first deal with the late modern social context of changes in policing (2). We then describe public safety in the Netherlands as a social problem (3) and the expectations of Dutch citizens with regard to the police (4). Then we present an analysis of the main changes in policing and security arrangements in the Netherlands over the last ten to fifteen years (5). Some concluding remarks follow in Section 6.

2. Late modernity and the awareness of risk

The shift to a late modern society has been analysed by Giddens (1991; 1994) as the result of three long-term changes. First, there is the influence of an intensifying globalization in which activities in separate locations become more directly connected. Social activities are increasingly disembedded from their local context. Secondly, there is the emergence of a ‘post-traditional social order’. This does not mean that traditions completely disappear, but that they lose their taken-for-granted nature, that they have to explain themselves and that they increasingly become a matter of choice. The third basic change is the expansion of social reflexivity. These changes
result in a growing cultural pluralism and fragmentation, coupled with a gradual process of individualization. As a result, individuals are both able and indeed forced to make choices about their life styles and life situations – what Beck (1986; 190) calls a ‘Wahlzwang’.

In making these choices about life style and biography, citizens in late modern society are dependent on all kinds of experts. Nevertheless, there is often still a great deal of doubt and scepticism about the experts’ ability to solve problems. Therefore experts and their specialized body of knowledge often do not contribute to a stable environment. On the contrary, one of the main elements of late modern society is the widespread awareness of risks among its citizens. This does not imply that life in contemporary society is associated with more risks and dangers than in prior eras. However, a main difference is that current risks are, to a relatively large degree, ‘man-made’. Moreover, thinking in terms of risks and risk management is a more or less permanent exercise: it becomes hard to ignore in a generalized risk climate (Giddens, 1991: pp. 123-126). Despite the fact that gathering information on risks and the assessment of potentially hazardous situations, as well as the prevention and avoidance of risks, have become an element of many institutions and daily routines, insecurity and the fear of risks and lack of safety are still growing:

Living in a secular risk culture is inherently unsettling, and feelings of anxiety may become particularly pronounced […] . The difficulties of living in a risk culture do not mean that there is greater insecurity […] . They concern anxieties generated by risk calculations themselves (Giddens, 1991: pp. 181-182).

This situation may be regarded as a paradox: never before in history has so much time and attention been spent and expertise devoted to the production of security and the
reduction of risks. At the same time, however, trust in experts and in intervention is extremely fragile. In Giddens’ terminology, in late modern society people are confronted with an ontological insecurity in a world that seems to slip from their control, a ‘runaway world’ (Giddens, 1994).

The processes of globalization, disembedding and an enhanced social reflexivity have far-reaching implications for the economy of western societies. The opportunities offered by the new information technology play an important role here. Economic activities are increasingly dependent on decisions made elsewhere in the world. Production processes and the use of labour have come to depend strongly on severe demands for flexibility and mobility. During the last decades a shift has been occurring from an industrial economy to a service economy based on information. These changes have drastic consequences for social inequality and for the socially and economically disadvantaged. Instead of a culturally homogeneous lower class, with its basis in industry, there is a culturally fragmented underclass in which many forms of deprivation may be found, closely related to very diverse forms of social exclusion and marginalization, in which biographic choices may also be an important element (Beck, 1986; Wilson, 1987).

The shift to a late modern society also strongly influences the position of the state. The combination of a high awareness of risks, the frequent claims made on the expertise of ‘abstract systems’ and at the same time the lack of trust in their capabilities, means that the authority and legitimacy of the state in many western countries has been eroding since the early 1980’s. The lack of trust in the capabilities of the state to create adequate answers to social problems and the antipathy to the (supposed) dependency of citizens on the state, also changes the position of the state. Tasks and responsibilities, once seen as principally public in nature, are now transferred, partly or as a whole,
to other agencies. Since the 1980’s decentralization, privatisation, the introduction of quasi-markets, contracting out, self-regulation and the transfer of tasks to supranational bodies have come to dominate many policy sectors and are all examples of this process. The national government not only loses many of its former tasks, but in many respects there is also an exhaustion of the former optimistic expectations about the social functions that the state may perform. The result is a less clear, somewhat ambivalent image of the state (Crook, Pakulski and Waters, 1992; pp. 79-105).

These social, cultural and economic features of late modern society, sketched here only briefly, are an important context within which to understand the changes in policing and security arrangements for the last fifteen years in many western European countries, including the Netherlands. Many of these societies are faced with high levels of crime, widespread feelings of insecurity and complex, often contradictory expectations about the state. In this new constellation the position of the state itself is also changing. Several strategies are applied within this changing context to create an answer to the problems of crime and insecurity. Before we deal with these strategies, we shall first treat some of the main aspects of public safety in the Netherlands as a social problem and the expectations of Dutch citizens with regard to the state and the police.

3. Public safety as a social problem

As in so many other countries, in the past, studies of levels of crime in the Netherlands were mainly based on police records. This source of information tells us that, in the years between 1960 and 2003, the level of crime in the Netherlands experienced a tenfold increase, the increase being almost continuous during the entire period, with the exception of the mid 1990’s, when the level of crime in the
Netherlands recorded by the police seemed more or less to stabilize (Van der Heide and Eggen, 2004; p. 26).

Police records, however, may give a seriously biased view of the level of crime, which is why population studies have been conducted in the Netherlands since the mid-1970’s. These survey studies present a rather different view of the level of crime and the way it has changed. According to these studies the level of crime in the Netherlands increased sharply in the 1970’s and the first half of the 1980’s. In the second half of the 1980’s the level of crime started to decrease, until the early 1990’s, when it started to rise again, although less steeply than in the 1970’s and early 1980’s (Eggen, 2003). The main studies conducted do not present the same trend in the level of crime since then. According to the Politiemonitor Bevolking the level of victimisation has decreased gradually since 1993. However, data presented by the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS) show that the number of citizens victimized by crime has been rising slowly since 1997 (SCP, 2004; pp. 461-462). The number of violent crimes, in particular, has grown in these years (Van der Heide and Eggen, 2004; p 10; SCP, 2004; pp. 461-462).

The high level of crime, compared with the 1950’s and 1960’s, is not unique to the Netherlands, but may also be found in other western countries. Growing affluence and a greater supply of consumer goods increased the opportunities for crime (Felson, 1998). As a result of the processes of cultural fragmentation and individualization in many social areas, norms and behavioural rules lost their authority and the status of just being taken for granted. This situation, however, demands greater levels of self-control and moral standards from citizens. In a large number of situations these are either not strong enough or hard to reconcile with a more individualized, even calculating attitude among the citizenry, which is so much encouraged in other institutional spheres in contemporary society.
Increased mobility and disembedding of social activities from localised contexts mean that all sorts of indirect, informal and integrated forms of social control either disappeared or lost their effectiveness (Jones and Newburn, 2002). New forms of social and economic exclusion also contributed to the high level of crime, especially in the cities. Members of the new urban underclass, male adolescents and young men above all, often only have a limited involvement with and attachment to dominant institutions and the rules and norms prevailing there. With the arrival of large numbers of migrants in the Netherlands since the 1970’s these problems only became more prominent. Members of the second and third generation of some of the immigrant groups (especially Moroccans and Antilleans) are over-represented among young criminals and those having contact with the police (Sansone, 1992; Van Gemert, 1998; Van San, 1998).

The high level of crime in contemporary Dutch (urban) society means that crime and insecurity have become something like inevitable social facts for many citizens. In their daily life citizens have continuously to take full account of these circumstances: ‘Crime has moved from the rare, the offence of the marginal and the stranger, to a commonplace part of the texture of everyday life’ (Young, 1999; p. 30). Therefore, it is more this widespread awareness of risks and the closely related feelings of insecurity that make our society a ‘high crime society’ (Garland, 2000) than (only) the rise of the level of crime since the 1950’s and 1960’s.

However, what has been rising is not so much the fear citizens have of crime in their immediate environment or the fear of being personally victimized, but a more general, often rather vague uneasiness and the feeling that crime and disorder have become major social problems. Over the last twenty years the number of people in the Netherlands who state that they feel personally insecure
(for example, those who are anxious about being alone at home, do not open the door after ten o’clock at night or say that there are places in their neighbourhood they perceive as dangerous) has not risen over the last twenty years (Integrale Veiligheidsrapportage, 2000; p. 59; Politiemonitor Bevolking, 2004; Van der Heide and Eggen, 2004, p. 16). What is relevant here is the distinction between the fear of crime (the emotion related to the perceived risk of becoming a victim of crime) and the more general uneasiness about crime as a major social problem (Van der Vijver, 2004). What has been rising in the Netherlands is this uneasiness, just as the view among Dutch citizens that crime as a social problem should receive the government’s highest priority (SCP, 2003; pp. 211-213). These more general feelings of insecurity are only to a very modest degree related to a more factual, ‘objective’ level of crime. Rather, to a large degree they seem to result from a feeling of loss of control over the life situation. The loss of traditional securities and social context, the growing individualization, and the increasingly direct relations with remote locations, provide on the one hand new opportunities to design one’s life according to individual preferences. However, on the other hand, these same developments may also create new insecurities and new forms of unease. According to Baumann (1999; pp. 9-57) these insecurities and anxieties may easily be translated into problems of safety, which should be countered with harsh measures so as to regain the feeling that something can be done about the problems.

4. Citizens’ expectations and views

Many Dutch citizens expect the government and especially the police to provide solutions to the problems of safety in the public space. However, studies conducted in the Netherlands show that there are many important
contradictions and inconsistencies in the expectations and preferences of citizens with regard to the police. On the one hand a growing number of citizens in the Netherlands, formerly known for its permissive criminal justice policy, now want the government and the police to apply harsher and more repressive strategies (SCP, 2003; 214-215), at least as long as it concerns the ‘Other’, who is viewed as a threat and as a dangerous outsider. On the other hand, however, when the problems of crime and nuisance are viewed as being caused by persons who are seen as belonging to one's own, known and intimate social circle (for example, youth and children living in one's own street or village), citizens have quite a different expectation about the police. In that case they expect the police to be attainable, approachable and personally recognizable. In this view the police should have an eye open for problems in the neighbourhood, they should be supportive and show an understanding of local problems and relations. In that case the police are expected to co-operate with local partners and citizens. In that kind of situation people are much less inclined to support a strict, repressive police strategy (Van der Vijver, 1993; see also Fitzgerald, et al. 2002; Girling, Loader and Sparks, 2000).

This contradiction is closely related to another phenomenon. On the one hand many citizens demand that the government and the police will guarantee public safety in case of disturbances by people with a low social status or marginal position, with whom they do not easily identify. On the other hand, however, in our society many citizens claim for themselves and for their children the right to freedom, adventure, excitement or fast driving (by car), even if this may be detrimental to the peace and safety of others. In that case any interference by the government or the police is seen as patronizing and a violation of the right to freedom or excitement. A comparable phenomenon is described by Boutellier (2004) as a ‘safety utopia.’
There is yet a third contradiction which is relevant here. While on the one hand citizens expect that the government and the police above all will take the responsibility for the safety problem, on the other hand – especially since the late 1960’s – the police have been faced with a loss of authority and a decreasing legitimacy. Since about this time the Dutch citizenry has become increasingly critical of all types of authorities, including the police (Rigthart, 1995; Scheepers and Te Grotenhuis, 2000; Meershoek, 2000). According to a large-scale two-year survey, (Politiemonitor Bevolking, 2003) since 1993 the Dutch population has been increasingly dissatisfied with the functioning of the police in general.

Two major social developments are especially relevant to an understanding of this loss of police authority and legitimacy (Reiner, 1992). First, processes of individualization, de-traditionalization and an increasing social reflexivity in many fields of social life have contributed to a shift from regulation by order and command to regulation by negotiation. In a society where the only commonly shared norm seems to be that life choices should be made by individuals, consciously and by themselves, compliance with rules will need more supporting argumentation than merely the authority of the state. Negotiating with citizens and convincing them have therefore become more important, for the Dutch police, too. Nowadays, increasingly, authority and legitimacy can no longer be tacitly supposed, but have to be deserved or gained on the basis of proven performance, results or expertise (De Swaan, 1982; Zijderveld, 1985).

Secondly, since the 1980’s in the Netherlands, as in so many other western countries, new forms of social and economic exclusion have resulted in a new urban underclass (Engbersen, Vrooman and Snel, 1997). The scanty social integration of this underclass, especially if it includes youth from some of the migrant groups, may show
itself in a detached, sometimes even hostile relation with the Dutch police as a symbol of the state and dominant society. It is here especially that the authority and legitimacy of the police may come under serious pressure.

Despite their decreasing legitimacy and growing dissatisfaction, the police still have an important function for many citizens. Although many citizens in the Netherlands may be dissatisfied with the police in general, they nevertheless often have a positive view of their own community police officer (Van der Vijver, 1993). The fact that the police and criminal justice agencies show to citizens that they are not left alone with their problems in their neighbourhood has an important emotional and symbolic function (Terpstra and Bakker, 2004). The police are pre-eminently seen as the guardian of a fragile order in a society that is perceived as insecure. People expect the police to be there, as a powerful force providing answers in an anarchic world, not only helping the people (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003; pp. 43-44), but also contributing to the image of a ‘just world’ (Lerner, 1980; Van der Vijver, 1993).

5. Developments in Dutch security arrangements

These contradictory social changes and social forces, as they impact the problem of public safety, confront the government and the police with a range of difficult challenges. Over the last fifteen to twenty years the Dutch government and the police have tried to create answers to these developments in very diverse ways. These answers cannot always be regarded as goal-rational. Especially in the politics of crime and safety, emotional and symbolic aspects are very important. Politicians may try to profile themselves and to strengthen their position by declaring themselves be a supporter of a ‘tough’ and ‘strict’ policy on crime and public safety. Measures in this field of policy
may be of a highly symbolic nature: at least to a certain
degree they are meant to show that politicians and the
government are really doing something about the problems.
The so-called drama-democracy, described by Elchardus
(2002), is to a large degree constructed around safety
incidents, with their strong emotional appeal and symbolic
value, above all as presented by the mass media. Especially
in the recent political contact of the Netherlands, incidents
like the assassination of the populist politician Pim Fortuyn
in 2001 and the murder of the cineast/columnist Theo van
Gogh in 2004 are seen as representing deep-rooted
problems of public safety and social integration. In a newly
developed popular discourse, problems of public safety and
the social integration of ethnic minorities are increasingly
presented as closely linked and demanding strict, harsh
policies.

The answers that the Dutch government and police
have tried to give over the last fifteen to twenty years to the
social changes in the public safety arena are characterized
by many contradictions and inconsistencies. On the one
hand the government tries to convince itself and the
citizenry of its capacity to effectively fight the problems of
crime and public safety. For example, in October 2002 the
Dutch government promised that its safety policy would
decrease the level of crime by 20 to 25 percent within a
period of four years. On the other hand, however, there
seems to be a continuing uncertainty about the strategies,
core tasks and responsibilities of public agencies. Since the
mid-1990’s the Dutch police and public prosecution service
seem to be periodically plagued by crisis situations. In most
cases rather isolated incidents that attract a great deal of
mass media attention and cause a lot of political upheaval
are the catalysts for periodic stages of a general sense of
crisis. This seems to confirm, for the Netherlands, the view
of Bayley and Shearing (1996) that the police in the
western world are going through a period of true identity
There are also other important contradictions in the strategies applied by the Dutch government. First, as early as the mid-1980’s, much emphasis was put on the need for preventative strategies. However, especially in the last few years, re-active and repressive measures are becoming increasingly important and the need for prevention seems to be neglected in national policy. Secondly, on the one hand, a generally accepted principle is that public safety strategies should fit local situations and needs. Since the mid-1990’s a local safety policy has been developed which should largely be formulated at the local level. This principle also implies that police priorities should be chosen on the basis of the needs and problems of the local community. On the other hand, however, over the last decade there has been a creeping centralization of the Dutch police (Terpstra, 2004a). Recently the government even proposed the introduction of a national police system in the Netherlands. This contradictory development of both centralization and decentralization of the police may also be found in other countries, such as England and Wales (Savage, Charman and Cope, 2000).

Five main lines will be distinguished here in the developments of public safety policy and policing in the Netherlands over the last roughly fifteen years. In some cases these main lines may be interdependent and more or less congruent. In other cases, however, we are dealing with autonomous, independent or even contradictory developments. These main lines may be discerned during the whole period, but their relative importance may differ from time to time. The five main lines distinguished here are: changes in organizational and managerial arrangements, changes in the relations between the state and other agencies, the rise of extra-judicial instruments and a growing attention to the position of victims, the increasing technological nature of prevention and
surveillance, and the shift to a harsher, stricter state. These main lines are described in the following sections.

5.1 Changes in organizational and managerial arrangements

In the early 1990’s there was a strong impetus towards a policy aimed at improving the managerial control, effectiveness and efficiency of the Dutch police. During the 1990’s the Dutch police, public prosecution service and the courts, respectively, were confronted with large-scale, drastic reorganization. The introduction of the new Police Act in 1993 resulted in a considerable enlargement of scale in this organization. The 148 local (municipal) police forces and the (national) Royal Police Force (which operated especially in rural areas) were closed down and replaced by 25 regional forces and a national police force, which was originally seen as additional to and supportive of the regional forces.

A system of national policy planning was introduced in the mid 1990’s. From 1998 on, national priorities for the Dutch police were imposed by the Minister of Internal Affairs. At the same time, policy aimed at a better integration and co-ordination between the police, the public prosecution service, the courts and other criminal justice agencies. Closely linked to these developments was and is the growing influence of the new managerialism (Pollit, 1993; Clarke and Newman, 1997) on the police and criminal justice agencies. One of its main premises is that the police, in common with many other public sector agencies, should be accountable for its performance targets. In 2003 this resulted in performance contracts between the regional police forces and the Minister of Internal Affairs (Van Sluis and Van Thiel, 2003). The budgets of the Dutch regional forces depend (to a limited degree) on their results in achieving uniform, standardized, quantified performance
indicators. Despite the rhetoric of a freedom of management, the need to meet local demands and to embed the police in local circumstances and local democracy, these developments, only briefly described here, have resulted in a creeping centralization of the Dutch police.

As a new step in this process, in 2003 the Minister of Internal Affairs suggested the closure of the regional police forces and the introduction of a national police force. In July 2005 a commission responsible for the evaluation of the Dutch police system proposed to shift the managerial control of the police forces to a national level and to give the Minister of Internal Affairs more direct influence on the management control of the regional forces. Recently, the Dutch government proposed the establishment of a national police force, in which the managerial control of the police will to a large degree be centralised.

5.2 Changing relations between the state and other agencies

The relation between the state and other agencies has gradually been changing in the last ten to fifteen years in the Netherlands. This development fits in with a more general shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’, in which tasks and responsibilities in many public policy sectors that formerly belonged to the state are now being dispersed among a wide array of agencies (Newman, 2001). This development is encouraged by both financial-economic and moral-political arguments. The government uses what Garland (1996) calls a strategy of ‘responsibilization’ to encourage citizens and businesses, both individually and as a group, and other private organizations, to accept their responsibilities in the prevention and control of crime and disorder. The main assumption in this policy is that the government and especially the police are not able (any longer) to conduct these tasks on their own.
In the Netherlands three important developments may be distinguished in this shift in the division of responsibilities in the prevention and control of crime. The first development concerns the rise in the Netherlands in the 1990’s of local safety policy, the central concepts of which are partnership, prevention and community (see also Crawford, 1997). In the local safety policy the local government is supposed to draw up a Local Safety Policy Plan and to encourage and co-ordinate other agencies and partners in the prevention and control of crime and problems of safety. The most visible element of this local policy consists of a large number of highly diverse local security networks, participated in by local government, the police, criminal justice agencies, social work, youth work and citizens, and others (Terpstra, 2004b; 2005). These networks are to be found in neighbourhoods, at schools, shopping centres or industrial estates. As a rule the police – often represented by a community police officer – are a central participant in these networks.

The second development consists of what may be called the privatisation of policing (Newburn, 2001). Between 1981 and 1998 the number of employees working in the private security sector increased from about 10,000 to 25,000 (Van Dijk and De Waard, 2000). With this trend the Netherlands is following other Western countries, like the United States and Canada, where there are even more people currently working in the private security sector than in the public police (Johnston, 2000; pp. 71-74). Increasingly the private security not only has tasks in the surveillance of the private space (such as shops or business estates), but also in the (quasi-)public space, as at large events (like a professional soccer match or pop concert), in the public space at an industrial estate, a shopping centre, a railway station or on the streets. Increasingly these private security guards are contracted by public agencies, such as local government. This growth of the private security sector
meets the powerfully rising demands for security and security arrangements, which the public police are often unable to perform (Loader, 1999).

With this development factual policing activities are increasingly no longer coincident with the (public) police organization (Johnston and Shearing, 2003). The public police are losing their monopoly on the management of security which once existed, or maybe was often only supposed. This process is resulting in a dispersal of surveillance and of regulatory and supervisory tasks, and even of the use of means of coercion (Terpstra, 2005). This process has led policing activities to reflect processes of fragmentation and pluralization in late modern society (Reiner, 1992; p. 779).

The third development consists of strategies aimed at promoting an increasing involvement of citizens in the prevention and control of crime. In the 1990s, several pilot projects were conducted in the Netherlands to enhance the direct involvement and so-called self-reliant behaviour of citizens in the management of crime and disorder (Denkers, 1990; Raspe, 1996; Toenders et al., 1999). Business companies are also becoming more involved in the prevention and control of crime. This is partly a consequence of new legal obligations on companies to control of crime and fight terrorism. This development is not only encouraged because companies are confronted with high levels of crime, but also because, in their view, the police do not pay enough attention to their problems. This responsibilization of both citizens and businesses is resulting in many forms of public-private partnerships in the prevention and control of safety problems.

5.3 Extra-judicial measures and attention to victims

In the 1970’s in the Netherlands, as in many other western countries, the criminal justice system and
especially criminal law were seriously criticized for their lack of effectiveness in the reduction of crime and recidivism. As an answer to these criticisms in the Netherlands, from the 1970’s on much attention was paid to the creation of alternatives to the traditional criminal justice responses to crime. Extra-judicial and alternative instruments were developed for both adult and young offenders. Currently they are a more or less institutionalized element of the Dutch criminal justice system. These extra-judicial and alternative instruments are not only seen as more effective but also aim to avoid negative side-effects of the usual criminal justice sentences. For instance, young shoplifters or graffiti painters may receive a so-called Halt sentence. This Halt method is mainly based on pedagogical principles. The Halt sentence forces the young offender to restore the damage he or she caused. Judges in the Netherlands may, for certain categories of crimes, decide to impose an alternative sanction or what is currently called a ‘task sentence’. The offender is forced to engage for a number of hours imposed by the court in the provision of social services or in activities of general social interest.

Because the treatment by the police and the court often leads victims of crime to feel they have been abandoned to their fate or even humiliated, in the 1970’s and 1980’s there were several endeavours in the Netherlands to pay more attention to their position. Today there are Victim Support Offices throughout the country. The police are expected to refer victims of crime to one of these offices. The staff of these offices, often volunteers, may provide practical and emotional support and assistance to victims of crime. In 1995 the introduction of the Terwee Act created more room for victims of crime to demand recovery of their losses as a consequence of the damage done to them by an offender. This has been made an element of the criminal justice process.
5.4 The new technologies of prevention and surveillance

A fourth important development is that the prevention of crime and surveillance are increasingly based on non-human, technological instruments. Since the 1980’s there has been a growing emphasis on physical, technological measures to prevent nuisance, crime and other problems of public safety, taken by both individual citizens, businesses and government. To a certain degree these measures fit in with the notions of situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1980). Partly, however, such measures are based on rather traditional notions of deterrence, but now with new technological instruments. The increasing use of these new instruments of prevention and surveillance was an endeavour to create a practical answer to high levels of crime and disorder. This development powered the rise of the security industry, which is nowadays a new, large economic sector in many western countries, including the Netherlands.

The current appearance of our cities has been greatly influenced by the increasing use of the new technological instruments for prevention and surveillance. Many of these instruments have become commonly accepted aspects of everyday situations in Dutch urban settings, like the CCTV cameras in public spaces, the extensive use of high quality locks and security alarms in residences, security gates and security tags in shops, and speed ramps. To a certain extent this development fits in with the trend towards responsibilization and the encouragement of self-reliant behaviour mentioned above. Citizens and businesses decide to take these measures, in some cases encouraged by the prospect that in such cases their insurance company will charge a lower premium.

The rise of the new surveillance technologies may
have even more far-reaching implications. Not only relevant here are the numerous new technologies of observation (like cameras and scanners). Even more important are the linkages of these technologies with large data and information-banks, which may increasingly be linked. Lyon (2001) interpreted this development as the result of the increasing disembedding of social activities from their local context. Processes of individualization and higher levels of mobility mean that people increasingly have relations at a distance. As a consequence social relations have often become rather superficial and temporary. This may create the need for new forms of evidence of trustworthiness (example with regard to financial solvency, for example). This development may have fairly diverse and often at first sight invisible implications for individuals in their position of employee, consumer, citizen or tourist. The rise of the new information and surveillance technologies seems to be creating a great deal of resistance among citizens. They are often seen as ‘Big Brother watching us’ and as a threat to citizens’ privacy. However, this development should not only be seen as creating new forms of social control, but also as an endeavour to find answers to the question of how to provide services and care in an anonymous, socially detached, privatized society. At the same time, this development means that both public and private agencies are continuously classifying people, with the result that new social distinctions are made and that existing social distinctions are reinforced. Here we often have to with forms of social inclusion and exclusion (Feely and Simon, 1994) based on actuarial security considerations or other forms of risk management.

5.5 Towards a harsher, stricter policy

Especially since the 1990’s the Dutch government
has developed a harsher, stricter policy on problems of crime and disorder. In many respects this seems to mark a break with the liberal climate of criminal justice which used to give the Netherlands a certain international reputation. Between the mid 1970’s and the mid 1990’s the Dutch prison capacity increased from almost 4,000 to about 12,000 places. Between 1990 and 2001 the number of prisoners in the Netherlands rose from 6,982 to 12,410 (Van der Heide and Kruissink, 2003). During the same period there was also a considerable growth in the number of Halt sanctions, alternative sanctions or sanctions imposed not by a judge, but by the Public Prosecutor (Wang et al, 2003).

There was also a remarkable expansion of the Dutch police forces. Between 1980 and 1995 the number of warranted police officers rose from 26,902 to 32,337 (SCP, 1998). The expectation is that in 2006 there will be about 39,500 warranted police officers in the Netherlands, which implies a growth of almost 50 percent in a period of 25 years.

This development was already going on in the 1990’s, but since about 2002 the policy has intensified. The police are expected to act more strictly. The extension of administrative enforcement became an important element of the government’s policy. In January 2006 local governments will get the right to impose administrative fines for incivilities in public spaces, such as urinating, graffiti, leaving behind dog dirt or trash or causing a nuisance in a shopping centre. Since the end of the 1990’s the powers and instruments of the police have been extended remarkably. The safety policy of the current Dutch government includes many measures like the introduction of a general obligation on citizens to be able to identify themselves, more powers for preventative search of persons, increased opportunity for the use of DNA technology for criminal investigation, increased powers to
search cars (for the presence of firearms, for example) and more opportunities to link data systems. Other measures include the increasing use of private surveillance and CCTV cameras in public spaces. To control the rising costs of the criminal justice system the government also proposed to house more than one prisoner in a cell, to introduce more sober cells and to create opportunities for so-called electronic tagging of sentenced persons. The government also decided to impose longer sentences, especially for repeat offenders. For drug addicts with a long criminal career the government wants to create legal grounds for enforced detoxification. The possibility of preventive detention has been introduced. The government wants to introduce more opportunities for a strict surveillance of certain categories of ex-prisoners. Most of these measures have been realized at the present time. The recent policy against terrorism resulted in new government proposals for additional measures.

With these measures there seems to have been a shift from a policy in which much attention is paid to prevention, local safety and extra-judicial instruments to an extensive use of penal sanctions and other harsh strategies. This shift reflects a general hardening in many policy fields and social sectors in Dutch society during the last ten years. Although the Netherlands is still very far from an American-style penal state (Beckett and Sasson, 2000; Wacquant, 1997), there is a growing reliance on harsh action and penal policy which is unique in the Dutch historical context with its past of liberalism and permissiveness.

6. Concluding remarks

In this paper we have analysed the changes in policing and security arrangements in the Netherlands over the past ten to fifteen years. These changes must be
understood as endeavours to find answers to the problems of crime and insecurity associated with the shift to a late modern society. The analysis shows that also in a European country like the Netherlands there are important changes in policing and security associated with the problems of late modern society.

In many respects we have here to do with the rise of what we would like to call a security complex. The elements of this complex seem to reinforce each other, making public safety a complex phenomenon to which it seems to be increasingly difficult to find adequate answers. The general unease of Dutch citizens nowadays is often translated and presented in terms of insecurity, even if the level of objective public safety does not seem to justify such feelings of anxiety. The feelings of insecurity result in higher expectations about the problem solving capacities of the government and the police with regard to safety. The eroding legitimacy of the state and politics in general means that politicians often use problems of safety as a vehicle to display their capacities to combat social problems. This emphasis on public safety as a major problem may contribute to new feelings of insecurity among citizens and to even higher demands on the state and the police. The resulting disappointments about the results achieved by the police or, more generally, the governments’ safety policy, are a breeding ground for cynicism and scepticism about both the government and the police.

The developments in policing and security arrangements described here are often contradictory and result in many sorts of tensions. On the one hand there is a strong reliance on the strategy of responsibilization, with the aim of making the management of security a common responsibility of public and private agencies, including citizens. On the other hand, the government, with its more recent rhetoric of a harsh policy, continuously seems to
suggest that the state is capable of solving the problems of safety on its own. Moreover, there is a fundamental tension between the notion of citizens as consumers of the police and the notion that citizens should not expect all solutions to come from the government and the police (Loader, 1999).

These contradictory developments create new, often fundamental questions. The processes of pluralization and fragmentation make it important to ask how the public accountability of policing will be realized and how safety as a public good will be guaranteed (Johnston, 1998). What will be the consequences for the legitimacy of the state and the police if a pluralized, partly privatized system of policing does not meet the high demands of effectiveness, transparency, accountability and social justice? How will the emphasis on the three E’s (economy, efficiency and effectiveness) relate to other social, moral and legal values underlying policing and security arrangements? To what extent will the new managerial goal of efficiency and measurable performance relate to the demands of many citizens for a recognizable, visible, approachable police? A police force with a high score on standardized, quantitative performance measures, but one that is remote from citizens, may unwillingly contribute to sentiments of unease, resulting in feelings of anxiety about crime and insecurity.

One of the most important questions here is what the government and especially the police should do about the current high levels of anxiety and feelings of insecurity among citizens. To a large extent these feelings of insecurity embody all sorts of diffuse social unease. It seems unlikely that the solution to these feelings of unease will always be found in public safety policy. As Bauman (1999) rightly notes, the (re-) definition of all sorts of problems in terms of safety may even create new problems of social exclusion and suspicion:
‘What they (political institutions) can do and what they more often than not are doing is to shift the scattered and diffuse anxiety to one ingredient of Unsicherheit alone – that of safety, the only field in which something can be done and seen to be done. The snag is, though, that while doing something effectively to cure or at least to mitigate insecurity and uncertainty calls for united action, most measures undertaken under the banner of safety are divisive; they sow mutual suspicion, set people apart, prompt them to sniff enemies and conspirators behind every contention or dissent…’ (Bauman, 1999; pp. 5-6).

In contrast, it may be more important for the government and the police not to see all forms of personal and social unease as signals and demands for a public safety policy. The often high expectations about the police and criminal justice should be tempered. Both government and politicians should be very careful about using the issue of public safety as a means to regain their lost legitimacy and authority. As Crawford (1997; p. 312) has remarked: public safety may not be the most appropriate focus around which to organize open, tolerant and democratic communities.

References


